Definitions

Defintions of the Emotions

1. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.

The note to Prop. 9 says that desire is appetite, with consciousness of that appetite.

That appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence.

But, I also recognize no distinction between appetite and desire.

Whether a is conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite.

A possible is that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity.

• But this definition (cf. 2.23.) does not allow the ability of the mind to be conscious of its desire or appetite.

Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, I added “in so far as it is determined by some given modification, etc.”

A modification of man’s essence means every disposition of the said essence. It does not matter whether such disposition is:

• innate, or
• conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or
• conceived solely under the attribute of extension, or
• referred simultaneously to both these attributes.

‘Desire’ means all man’s endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions. These vary according to each man’s disposition. These are sometimes opposed to each other, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.

2. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.

3. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

4. Wonder is the conception of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts (cf. 3.52 and note).

Therefore, I recognize only three primitive or primary emotions (as I said in the note to 3.11.)=

• Pleasure
• Pain
• Desire

I have spoken of wonder simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt.

5. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf. 3.52. note).

6. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

7. Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explanation= These observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. also 3.13 note).

8. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

9. Aversion is pain accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. 3. 15. note).

10. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

11. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality which we despise, in an object which we hate.

12. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.

13. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. 3.18. note).

14. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

15. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

16. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.

17. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

18. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf. 3.22. note, and 3.27. note).

19. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.

20. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another. Explanation= These terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.

21. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.

22. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we hate him.

23. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another’s good fortune, and to rejoice in another’s evil fortune.

25. Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man’s contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

26. Humility is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.

27. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action which we believe we have performed by our mind’s free decision.

28. Pride is thinking too highly of one’s self from self-love.

29. Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one’s self by reason of pain.

30. Honour [11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others. [11] Gloria.

31. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of our own action which we believe to be blamed by others.

32. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something. It is kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing. It is constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it, at the same time.

33. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.

34. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. 3.39 note and 40.

35. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. 3.27 note.

36. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate, 3.39.

37. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See 3.40 Coroll. 2 and note.)

38. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

39. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. 3.39. note.

40. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

41. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

42. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

43. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.

44. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power. Explanation= Ambition is the desire whereby all the emotions (cf. 3.27. and 31) are fostered and strengthened.

• Therefore this emotion can be overcome with difficulty.
• As long as a man is bound by any desire, he is necessarily bound by this at the same time. Cicero says= “The best men are especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a book contemning honour, sign their names thereto.”

45. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.

46. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

47. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.

48. Lust is desire and love in sexual intercourse.

General Definition Of The Emotions

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation= first, emotion or passion of the soul is a confused idea. The mind is only passive, as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (3.3.)

Part 3= The origin and nature of the emotions

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature’s general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom= They believe= that he disturbs rather than follows nature’s order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself.

They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man.

They bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse this flaw.

He, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who= have written many noteworthy things on the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined= the nature and strength of the emotions, and the mind’s power against them for their restraint. The illustrious Descartes believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions. He strove= to explain human emotions by their primary causes. to point out a way how the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. But I think that he only displays the acuteness of his own great intellect. For now, I will to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will think it strange that I= should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein, for nature is always the same. Everywhere, her efficacy and power of action is the same. That is, nature’s laws and ordinances, on the changing of all things from one form to another, are the same always and everywhere. There should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature’s universal laws and rules. Thus, hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature. They answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood. They have certain properties which delight us in the contemplation of those properties themselves. Therefore, I shall explain the nature and strength of the emotions in the same way that I explained the nature of God and the mind. I shall examine human actions and desires in the same way as I examine lines, planes, and solids.

Definitions

• An adequate cause is a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived.
• An inadequate or partial cause is a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood. When anything happens within us or externally to us, we act and become our own adequate cause. We become our own adequate cause (by the foregoing definition) when something happens within us or externally to us, which can only be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature. On the other hand, we are only the partial cause for something that happens within us, or follows from our nature externally, which we are passive about.

Emotions are= the modifications of the body which increases or reduces the body’s active power, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications. Note= If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then call the emotion an activity. Otherwise, I call it a passion or state wherein the mind is passive.