The General rules of justice

¹²² The general rules of the virtue are called justice. This requires the greatest exactness.

Their modifications must be as accurate as the rules themselves.

If I owe a man £10, justice requires that I precisely pay him £10:

• at the agreed time, or
• when he demands it.

It might be awkward and pedantic to adhere too strictly to the common rules of prudence or generosity. But there is no pedantry in sticking fast by the rules of justice.

On the contrary, the most sacred regard is due to them. The actions required by justice are most properly performed when their chief motive is a reverential regard to those general rules.

In the practice of the other virtues, our conduct should rather be directed by:

• a certain idea of propriety, and
• a certain taste for a particular tenor of conduct, than by any regard to a precise maxim or rule.

We should consider the end and foundation of the rule, more than the rule itself. But it is otherwise with regard to justice. The most commendable and dependable man is he who:

• refines the rules, and
• adheres most steadfastly to the general rules themselves.

The goal of the rules of justice is to hinder us from hurting our neighbour. It is a crime to violate them even if we imagine that the violation does no harm. A man often becomes a villain the moment he begins to think to trick others. At that moment, he is no longer to be trusted.

The thief imagines he does no evil when he steals from the rich the things that he thinks:

• they may lose without much concern, or
• they may possibly never know was even stolen from them.

The adulterer imagines he does no evil when he corrupts his friend’s wife, provided he:

• covers his intrigue from his friend’s suspicion, and
• does not disturb the family’s peace.

Once we begin to give way to such thoughts, we become capable of such an enormity that we did not know we could do.

¹²³ The rules of justice may be compared to the precise rules of grammar. The rules of the other virtues can be compared to the vague rules which critics lay down. They give us a general idea of the perfection we should aim at, instead of certain directions for acquiring it.

A man may learn to write perfectly grammatically by rule, just as he might be taught to act justly. But there are no rules which will infallibly lead us to the elegance or sublimity in writing. Though there are some rules which might help us to correct the vague ideas of those perfections.

There are no rules which we can infallibly teach us to always act with prudence, magnanimity, or beneficence. Though there are some which may enable us to correct our imperfect ideas of those virtues.

¹²⁴ Sometimes, we may mistake the proper rules of conduct when we most seriously want to act to deserve approbation. We are thus misled by that very principle which should direct us. In this case, it is in vain to expect that mankind should entirely approve of our behaviour. They cannot:

• enter into that absurd idea of duty which influenced us, and
• go along with any of the actions which follow from it.

However, there is still something respectable in the character and behaviour of one who is betrayed into vice by:

• a wrong sense of duty or
• an erroneous conscience.

No matter how fatally he was misled by it, he is still more the object of sympathy than of hatred or resentment, with the generous and humane.

They lament the weakness of human nature which exposes us to such unhappy delusions, even while we are most sincerely:

• labouring after perfection
• trying to act according to the best principle which can possibly direct us

Only the false notions from religion can cause very gross perversions of our natural feelings in this way. In all other cases, common sense is sufficient to direct us. Everyone agrees that the first rule of duty is to obey the Deity’s will. But they differ widely on the commandments that Deity imposes on us. Therefore, the greatest mutual toleration is required.

Society’s defence requires crimes to be punished from whatever motives. Yet a good man will always punish them reluctantly when their motives are from the false notions of religious duty. He will never feel that indignation which he feels against other criminals. He will rather regret and sometimes even admire their unfortunate firmness and magnanimity while he punishes them. The tragedy of Mahomet was one of Voltaire’s finest.

It properly represented what should be our feelings for crimes from such motives. In that tragedy, a young man Seid and woman Palmira had a mutual fondness for one another.

They were most innocent and virtuous. They are instigated to commit a horrid murder by the strongest motives of a false religion.

It shocks all the principles of human nature. A venerable old man expressed the most tender affection for both of them. He was the avowed enemy of their religion. They both conceived the highest reverence and esteem for him. In reality, he was their father who they did not know about.

He is pointed out to them as a sacrifice which God expressly required at their hands. They are commanded to kill him.

While executing this crime, they are tortured with all the agonies arising from the struggle between: the idea of religious duty on the one side, and compassion, gratitude, reverence for the aged, and love for the humanity and virtue of the person they are going to destroy, on the other

It shows one of the most interesting and instructive theatre spectacle. However, the sense of duty prevails finally over all the amiable weaknesses of human nature. They execute the crime imposed on them. But immediately they discover: their error and the fraud which deceived them

They are distracted with horror, remorse, and resentment.

Our feelings for Seid and Palmira should be our feelings for anyone misled by religion in this way, when we are sure that it is really religion which misleads him and not the pretence of it. Its pretence is made as a cover to some of the worst human passions.

¹²⁵ A person may act wrongly by following a wrong sense of duty. Nature may sometimes prevail and lead him to oppose it. In this case, we cannot be displeased to see the sense of duty prevail, which we think should prevail, though the person himself is so weak as to think otherwise.

However, his conduct is the effect of weakness and not of principle.

During the massacre of St Bartholomew, Catholics were told that it was their duty to kill Protestants. We would not applaud a bigoted Roman Catholic who saves Protestants and not of compassion.

We might be pleased with his humanity. But we should still regard him with a sort of pity. This pity would then be totally inconsistent with our admiration for perfect virtue.

We do not dislike to see them exert themselves properly, even when a false notion of duty directs them otherwise. A very devout Quaker is struck on one cheek. Instead of turning up the other cheek, he forgets his literal interpretation of our Saviour’s precept. He bestows some good discipline on the brute that insulted him. This would be agreeable to us. We should:

• laugh and be diverted with his spirit, and
• like him more for it.

But we should not give him the respect due to one who acted properly from a just sense of what was proper, on a like occasion. No action can be called virtuous if it is not accompanied with the feeling of self-approbation.