The Reverence for the Rules of Conduct [Karma]

¹⁰⁵ Our moral faculties were plainly intended to be the governing principles of human nature.

The rules which they prescribe are to be regarded as the laws of the Deity.

All general rules are called laws.

The general rules observed by bodies in motion are called the laws of motion.

The general rules which our moral faculties observe can be more justly called as the laws of morals.

They are like the laws given by the sovereign to direct his subjects’ conduct.

They are also attended with rewards and punishments.

Those deputies of God within us always:

• punish their violation by inward shame and self-condemnation, and
• rewards obedience with peace of mind, and self-satisfaction.

¹⁰⁶ There are innumerable other considerations which serve to confirm the same conclusion.

The happiness of mankind and all other rational creatures seems to be the original purpose intended by the Author of nature when he brought them into existence.

No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him. We are led to this opinion by the abstract consideration of his infinite perfections. This opinion is still more confirmed by examining the works of nature.

They seem all intended to:

• promote happiness, and
• guard against misery.

By acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effective means for promoting mankind’s happiness.

We may therefore be said in some sense to:

• cooperate with the Deity, and
• advance the plan of Providence as far as we can.

On the contrary, by acting in other ways, we seem to:

• obstruct the scheme which the Author of nature established for the world’s happiness and perfection, and
• declare ourselves the enemies of God.

Hence we are naturally encouraged to:

• hope for his extraordinary favour and reward in the one case, and
• dread his vengeance and punishment in the other case.

¹⁰⁷ There are many other reasons and natural principles which confirm and inculcate the same salutary doctrine.

Despite the world’s disorder, every virtue naturally meets with:

• its proper reward, and
• the recompense most fit to encourage and promote it.

A very extraordinary concurrence of circumstances is required to entirely disappoint it.

What is the reward most proper for encouraging industry, prudence, and circumspection?

Success in every sort of business.

Can these virtues fail of attaining it in one’s whole life?

Wealth and external honours are their proper recompense.

These virtues can seldom fail to acquire the recompense. What reward is most proper for promoting the practice of truth, justice, and humanity?

The confidence, the esteem, and love of those we live with.

Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved.

Truth and justice would rejoice in being trusted and believed and not in being rich. Truth and justice almost always recompenses with being trusted and believed. By some very extraordinary and unlucky circumstance, a good man may be suspected of a crime he was not capable of.

He might be most unjustly exposed to mankind’s horror and aversion for the rest of his life.

By this accident, he may lose his all, despite his integrity and justice, in the same way as a cautious man may be ruined by an earthquake or a flood, despite his utmost circumspection.

However, accidents of the first kind are perhaps more rare. It is more contrary to the common course of things than those of the second. The practice of truth, justice, and humanity chiefly aim at the confidence and love of those we live with.

The practice of such virtues is a certain and almost infallible method of acquiring such confidence and love. A person may be very easily misrepresented with regard to a particular action. But it impossible that he should be so with regard to the general tenor of his conduct. An innocent man may be believed to have done wrong.

However, this will rarely happen.

On the contrary, the established opinion of the innocence of his manners will often lead us to absolve him when he has really been in the fault, despite very strong presumptions.

In the same way, a knave may escape censure or even be applauded for a particular knavery, in which his conduct is not understood.

But no innocent man was ever habitually blamed for a wrong action without being:

• almost universally known to be a knave, and
• frequently suspected of guilt.

Thus, vice and virtue can be commonly met with something more than exact and impartial justice.