Rhetoric

Chapter XVI.26 On The Practical Use Of Reason And On Stoicism.

In the seventh chapter I have shown that, in the theoretical sphere, procedure based upon conceptions suffices for mediocre achievements only, while great achievements, on the other hand, demand that we should draw from perception itself as the primary source of all knowledge. In the practical sphere, however, the converse is the case. Here determination by what is perceived is the way of the brutes, but is unworthy of man, who has conceptions to guide his conduct, and is thus emancipated from the power of what is actually perceptibly present, to which the brute is unconditionally given over. In proportion as a man makes good this prerogative his conduct may be called rational, and only in this sense can we speak of practical reason, not in the Kantian sense, the inadmissibility of which I have thoroughly exposed in my prize essay on the foundation of morals. It is not easy, however, to let oneself be determined by conceptions alone; for the directly present external world, with its perceptible reality, intrudes itself forcibly even on the strongest mind. But it is just in conquering this impression, in destroying its illusion, that the human spirit shows its worth and greatness. Thus if incitements to lust and pleasure leave it unaffected, if the threats and fury of enraged enemies do not shake it, if the entreaties of erring friends do not make its purpose waver, and the delusive forms with which preconcerted plots surround it leave it unmoved, if the scorn of fools and of the vulgar herd does not disturb it nor trouble it as to its own worth, then it seems to stand under the influence of a spirit-world, visible to it alone (and this is the world of conceptions), before which that perceptibly present world which lies open to all dissolves like a phantom. But, on the other hand, what gives to the external 26 This chapter is connected with § 16 of the first volume.337 world and visible reality their great power over the mind is their nearness and directness. As the magnetic needle, which is kept in its position by the combined action of widely distributed forces of nature embracing the whole earth, can yet be perturbed and set in violent oscillation by a small piece of iron, if only it comes quite close to it, so even a great mind can sometimes be disconcerted and perturbed by trifling events and insignificant men, if only they affect it very closely, and the deliberate purpose can be for the moment shaken by a trivial but immediately present counter motive. For the influence of the motives is subject to a law which is directly opposed to the law according to which weights act on a balance, and in consequence of it a very small motive, which, however, lies very near to us, can outweigh one which in itself is much stronger, but which only affects us from a distance. But it is this quality of the mind, by reason of which it allows itself to be determined in accordance with this law, and does not withdraw itself from it by the strength of actual practical reason, which the ancients denoted by animi impotentia, which really signifies ratio regendæ voluntatis impotens. Every emotion (animi perturbatio) simply arises from the fact that an idea which affects our will comes so excessively near to us that it conceals everything else from us, and we can no longer see anything but it, so that for the moment we become incapable of taking account of things of another kind. It would be a valuable safeguard against this if we were to bring ourselves to regard the present, by the assistance of imagination, as if it were past, and should thus accustom our apperception to the epistolary style of the Romans. Yet conversely we are very well able to regard what is long past as so vividly present that old emotions which have long been asleep are thereby reawakened in their full strength. Thus also no one would be irritated or disconcerted by a misfortune, a disappointment, if reason always kept present to him what man really is: the most needy of creatures, daily and hourly abandoned to innumerable misfortunes, great and [347]338 [348] The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) small, Ä¿ ́μ1»¿Ä±Ä¿1⁄2 ¶É¿1⁄2, who has therefore to live in constant care and fear. Herodotus already says, “ ±1⁄2 μÃÄ1 ±1⁄2 ̧ÁÉÀ¿Â ÃÅ1⁄4Æ¿Á±” (homo totus est calamitas). The application of reason to practice primarily accomplishes this. It reconstructs what is one-sided and defective in knowledge of mere perception, and makes use of the contrasts or oppositions which it presents, to correct each other, so that thus the objectively true result is arrived at. For example, if we look simply at the bad action of a man we will condemn him; on the other hand, if we consider merely the need that moved him to it, we will compassionate him: reason, by means of its conceptions, weighs the two, and leads to the conclusion that he must be restrained, restricted, and curbed by a proportionate punishment. I am again reminded here of Seneca’s saying: “Si vis tibi omnia subjicere, te subjice rationi.” Since, however, as was shown in the fourth book, the nature of suffering is positive, and that of pleasure negative, he who takes abstract or rational knowledge as the rule of his conduct, and therefore constantly reflects on its consequences and on the future, will very frequently have to practise sustine et abstine, for in order to obtain the life that is most free from pain he generally sacrifices its keenest joys and pleasures, mindful of Aristotle’s “A ÆÁ¿1⁄211⁄4¿Â Ä¿ ±»ÅÀ¿1⁄2 ́1Éoμ1, ¿Å Ä¿ ! ́Å” (quod dolore vacat, non quod suave est, persequitur vir prudens). Therefore with him the future constantly borrows from the present, instead of the present borrowing from the future, as is the case with a frivolous fool, who thus becomes impoverished and finally bankrupt. In the case of the former reason must, for the most part, assume the rôle of a churlish mentor, and unceasingly call for renunciations, without being able to promise anything in return, except a fairly painless existence. This rests on the fact that reason, by means of its conceptions, surveys the whole of life, whose outcome, in the happiest conceivable case, can be no other than what we have said.339 When this striving after a painless existence, so far as it might be attainable by the application of and strict adherence to rational reflection and acquired knowledge of the true nature of life, was carried out with the greatest consistency and to the utmost extreme, it produced cynicism, from which stoicism afterwards proceeded. I wish briefly here to bring this out more fully for the sake of establishing more firmly the concluding exposition of our first book. All ancient moral systems, with the single exception of that of Plato, were guides to a happy life. Accordingly in them the end of virtue was entirely in this life, not beyond death. For to them it is only the right path to a truly happy life; and on this account the wise choose it. Hence arise those lengthy debates chiefly preserved for us by Cicero, those keen and constantly renewed investigations, whether virtue quite alone and in itself is really sufficient for a happy life, or whether this further requires some external condition; whether the virtuous and wise may also be happy on the rack and the wheel, or in the bull of Phalaris; or whether it does not go as far as this. For certainly this would be the touchstone of an ethical system of this kind; the practice of it must give happiness directly and unconditionally. If it cannot do this it does not accomplish what it ought, and must be rejected. It is therefore with truth and in accordance with the Christian point of view that Augustine prefaces his exposition of the moral systems of the ancients (De Civ. Dei, Lib. xix. c. 1) with the explanation: “Exponenda sunt nobis argumenta mortalium, quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere IN HUJUS VITÆ INFELICITATE moliti sunt; ut ab eorum rebus vanis spes nostra quid differat clarescat. De finibus bonorum et malorum multa inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam quæstionem maxima intentione versantes, invenire conati sunt, quid efficiat hominem beatum: illud enim est finis bonorum.” I wish to place beyond all doubt the eudæmonistic end which we have ascribed to all ancient ethics by several express statements of the ancients themselves. Aristotle says in the “Eth. Magna,” [349]340 [350] The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) i. 4: “) μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄21± μ1⁄2 Äó μ1⁄2 ¶Ã1⁄2 μÃÄ1, Ä¿ ́μ μÅ ¶Ã1⁄2 μ1⁄2 Äó o±Ä± ı ±Áμı ¶Ã1⁄2.” (Felicitas in bene vivendo posita est: verum bene vivere est in eo positum, ut secundum virtutem vivamus), with which may be compared “Eth. Nicom.,” i. 5. “Cic. Tusc.,” v. 1: “Nam, quum ea causa impulerit eos, qui primi se ad philosophiæ studia contulerunt, ut, omnibus rebus posthabitis, totos se in optimo vitæ statu exquirendo collocarent; profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt”. According to Plutarch (De Repugn. Stoic., c. xviii.) Chrysippus said: “¤¿ o±Ä± o±o1±1⁄2 ¶Ã1⁄2 Äó o±o¿ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2É ¶Ã1⁄2 ıÅÄ¿1⁄2 μÃÄ1.” (Vitiose vivere idem est guod vivere infeliciter.) Ibid., c. 26: “) ÆÁ¿1⁄2·Ã1 ¿ÅÇ ÄμÁ¿1⁄2 μÃÄ1 Ä·Â μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄21±Â o± ̧1⁄2 ±ÅÄ¿, ±»»1⁄2 μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄21±.” (Prudentia nihil differt a felicitate, estque ipsa adeo felicitas.) “Stob. Ecl.,” Lib. ii. c. 7: “¤μ»¿Â ́μ ƱÃ11⁄2 μ11⁄2±1 Ä¿ μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2μ11⁄2, AÅ 1⁄2μo± À±1⁄2ı ÀÁ±ÄÄμı1.” (Finem esse dicunt felicitatem, cujus causa fiunt omnia.) “•Å ́±11⁄4¿1⁄21±1⁄2 ÃÅ1⁄2É1⁄2Å1⁄4μ11⁄2 Äó Äμ»μ1 »μ3¿ÅÃ1.” (Finem bonorum et felicitatem synonyma esse dicunt.) “Arrian Diss. Epict.,” i. 4: “) ±ÁμÄ· ıÅÄ·1⁄2 μÇμ1 Ä·1⁄2 μÀ±33μ»1±1⁄2, μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄21±1⁄2 À¿1·Ã±1.” (Virtus profitetur, se felicitatem præstare.) Sen., Ep. 90: “Ceterum (sapientia) ad beatum statum tendit, illo ducit, illo vias aperit.”—Id., Ep. 108: “Illud admoneo auditionem philosophorum, lectionemque, ad propositum beatæ vitæ trahendum.” The ethics of the Cynics also adopted this end of the happiest life, as the Emperor Julian expressly testifies (Orat. vi.): “¤·Â šÅ1⁄21o·Â ́μ Æ1»¿Ã¿Æ1±Â Ão¿À¿Â 1⁄4μ1⁄2 μÃÄ1 o±1 Äμ»¿Â, aÃÀμÁ ́· o±1 À±Ã·Â Æ1»¿Ã¿Æ1±Â, Ä¿ μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2μ11⁄2; Ä¿ ́μ μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2μ11⁄2 μ1⁄2 Äó ¶Ã1⁄2 o±Ä± ÆÅÃ11⁄2, ±»»± 1⁄4· ÀÁ¿Â ı ÄÉ1⁄2 À¿»»É1⁄2 ́¿3⁄4±Â.” (Cynicæ philosophiæ ut etiam omnis philosophiæ, scopus et finis est feliciter vivere: felicitas vitæ autem in eo posita est, ut secundum naturam vivatur, nec vero secundum opiniones multitudinis.) Only the Cynics followed quite a peculiar path to this end, a path directly opposed to the ordinary one—the path of extreme privation. They start from the insight that the341 motions of the will which are brought about by the objects which attract and excite it, and the wearisome, and for the most part vain, efforts to attain these, or, if they are attained, the fear of losing them, and finally the loss itself, produce far greater pain than the want of all these objects ever can. Therefore, in order to attain to the life that is most free from pain, they chose the path of the extremest destitution, and fled from all pleasures as snares through which one was afterwards handed over to pain. But after this they could boldly scorn happiness and its caprices. This is the spirit of cynicism. Seneca distinctly expresses it in the eighth chapter, “De Tranquilitate Animi:” “Cogitandum est, quanto levior dolor sit, non habere, quam perdere: et intelligemus paupertati eo minorem tormentorum, quo minorem damnorum esse materiam.” Then: “Tolerabilius est, faciliusque, non acquirere, quam amittere…. Diogenes effecit, ne quid sibi eripi posset, … qui se fortuitis omnibus exuit…. Videtur mihi dixisse; age tuum negotium, fortuna: nihil apud Diogenem jam tuum est.” The parallel passage to this last sentence is the quotation of Stobæus (Ecl. ii. 7): “”1¿3μ1⁄2·Â μÆ· 1⁄2¿1⁄41¶μ11⁄2 AÁ±1⁄2 Ä·1⁄2 ¤ÅÇ·1⁄2 μ1⁄2¿ÁÉñ1⁄2 ±ÅÄ¿1⁄2 o±1 »μ3¿Åñ1⁄2; Ä¿ÅÄ¿1⁄2 ́1⁄2 ¿Å ́Å1⁄2±1⁄4±1 2±»μμ11⁄2 oÅ1⁄2± »ÅÃ÷ķÁ±.” (Diogenes credere se dixit, videre Fortunam, ipsum intuentem, ac dicentem: aut hunc non potui tetigisse canem rabiosum.) The same spirit of cynicism is also shown in the epitaph on Diogenes, in Suidas, under the word ¦1»1Ão¿Â, and in “Diogenes Laertius,” vi. 2: ““·Á±Ãoμ1 1⁄4μ1⁄2 DZ»o¿Â QÀ¿ ÇÁ¿1⁄2¿Å; ±»»± ÿ1⁄2 ¿ÅÄ1 šÅ ́¿Â A À±Â ±1É1⁄2, ”1¿3μ1⁄2·Â, o± ̧μ»μ1; œ¿Å1⁄2¿Â μÀμ1 21¿Ä·Â ±ÅıÁoμ± ́¿3⁄4±1⁄2 μ ́μ13⁄4±Â ̃1⁄2·Ä¿1Â, o±1 ¶É·Â ¿11⁄4¿1⁄2 μ»±ÆÁ¿Ä±Ä·1⁄2.” (Æra quidem absumit tempus, sed tempore numquam Interitura tua est gloria, Diogenes: Quandoquidem ad vitam miseris mortalibus æquam Monstrata est facilis, te duce, et ampla via.) [351]342 [352] The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) Accordingly the fundamental thought of cynicism is that life in its simplest and nakedest form, with the hardships that belong to it by nature, is the most endurable, and is therefore to be chosen; for every assistance, convenience, gratification, and pleasure by means of which men seek to make life more agreeable only brings with it new and greater ills than originally belonged to it. Therefore we may regard the following sentence as the expression of the kernel of the doctrine of cynicism: “”1¿3μ1⁄2·Â μ2¿3 À¿»»±o1 »μ3É1⁄2, Ä¿1⁄2 ÄÉ1⁄2 ±1⁄2 ̧ÉÀÉ1⁄2 21¿1⁄2 Á± ́1¿1⁄2 QÀ¿ ÄÉ1⁄2 ̧μÉ1⁄2 ́μ ́¿Ã ̧±1, ±À¿oμoÁÅÆ ̧±1 ́μ ±ÅÄ¿1⁄2 ¶·Ä¿Å1⁄2ÄÉ1⁄2 1⁄4μ»1À·oı o±1 1⁄4ÅÁ± o±1 ı À±Á±À»·Ã1±.” (Diogenes clamabat sæpius, hominum vitam facilem a diis dari, verum occultari illam quærentibus mellita cibaria, unguenta et his similia.) (Diog., Laert., vi. 2.) And further: “”μ¿1⁄2, ±1⁄2Ä1 ÄÉ1⁄2 ±ÇÁ·ÃÄÉ1⁄2 À¿1⁄2É1⁄2, Ä¿Å o±Ä± ÆÅÃ11⁄2 »¿1⁄4μ1⁄2¿ÅÂ, ¶Ã1⁄2 μÅ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2ÉÂ; À±Á± Ä·1⁄2 ±1⁄2¿1±1⁄2 o±o¿ ́±11⁄4¿1⁄2¿ÅÃ1…. Ä¿1⁄2 ±ÅÄ¿1⁄2 DZÁ±oÄ·Á± Ä¿Å 21¿Å »μ3É1⁄2 ́1μ3⁄4±3μ11⁄2, A1⁄2ÀμÁ o±1 )Á±o»·Â, 1⁄4· ́μ1⁄2 μ»μÅ ̧·Á1±Â ÀÁ¿oÁ11⁄2É1⁄2.” (Quum igitur, repudiatis inutilibus laboribus, naturales insequi, ac vivere beate debeamus, per summam dementiam infelices sumus…. eandem vitæ formam, quam Hercules, se vivere affirmans, nihil libertati præferens. Ibid.) Therefore the old, genuine Cynics, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, and their disciples had once for all renounced every possession, all conveniences and pleasures, in order to escape for ever from the troubles and cares, the dependence and the pains, which are inevitably bound up with them and are not counterbalanced by them. Through the bare satisfaction of the most pressing wants and the renunciation of everything superfluous they thought they would come off best. Accordingly they contented themselves with what in Athens or Corinth was to be had almost for nothing, such as lupines, water, an old threadbare cloak, a wallet, and a staff. They begged occasionally, as far as was necessary to supply such wants, but they never worked. Yet they accepted absolutely nothing that exceeded the wants referred to above. Independence343 in the widest sense was their aim. They occupied their time in resting, going about, talking with all men, and much mocking, laughing, and joking; their characteristic was carelessness and great cheerfulness. Since now in this manner of life they had no aims of their own, no purposes or ends to pursue, thus were lifted above the sphere of human action, and at the same time always enjoyed complete leisure, they were admirably fitted, as men of proved strength of mind, to be the advisers and admonishers of the rest. Therefore Apuleius says (Florid., iv.): “Crates, ut lar familiaris apud homines suæ ætatis cultus est. Nulla domus ei unquam clausa erat: nec erat patrisfamilias tam absconditum secretum, quin eo tempestive Crates interveniret, litium omnium et jurgiorum inter propinquos disceptator et arbiter.” Thus in this, as in so many other respects, they show a great likeness to the mendicant friars of modern times, that is, to the better and more genuine among them, whose ideal may be seen in the Capucine Christoforo in Manzoni’s famous romance. Yet this resemblance lies only in the effects, not in the cause. They agree in the result, but the fundamental thought of the two is quite different. With the friars, as with the Sannyâsis, who are akin to them, it is an aim which transcends life; but with the Cynics it is only the conviction that it is easier to reduce their wishes and their wants to the minimum, than to attain to the maximum in their satisfaction, which indeed is impossible, for with their satisfaction the wishes and wants grow ad infinitum; therefore, in order to reach the goal of all ancient ethics, the greatest happiness possible in this life, they took the path of renunciation as the shortest and easiest: “A ̧μ1⁄2 o±1 Ä¿1⁄2 šÅ1⁄21Ã1⁄4¿1⁄2 μ1Á·o±Ã11⁄2 ÃÅ1⁄2Ä¿1⁄4¿1⁄2 μÀ1⁄2 ±ÁμÄ·1⁄2 A ́¿1⁄2.” (Unde Cynismum dixere compendiosam ad virtutem viam.) Diog. Laert., vi. 9. The fundamental difference between the spirit of cynicism and that of asceticism comes out very clearly in the humility which is essential to the ascetic, but is so foreign to the Cynic that, on the contrary, he is distinguished beyond everything else for pride [353]344 The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) and scorn:— “Sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives, Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum.”—Hor. [354] On the other hand, the view of life held by the Cynics agrees in spirit with that of J. J. Rousseau as he expounds it in the “Discours sur l’Origine de l’Inégalité.” For he also would wish to lead us back to the crude state of nature, and regards the reduction of our wants to the minimum as the surest path to happiness. For the rest, the Cynics were exclusively practical philosophers: at least no account of their theoretical philosophy is known to me. Now the Stoics proceeded from them in this way—they changed the practical into the theoretical. They held that the actual dispensing with everything that can be done without is not demanded, but that it is sufficient that we should regard possessions and pleasures constantly as dispensable, and as held in the hand of chance; for then the actual deprivation of them, if it should chance to occur, would neither be unexpected nor fall heavily. One might always have and enjoy everything; only one must ever keep present the conviction of the worthlessness and dispensableness of these good things on the one hand, and of their uncertainty and perishableness on the other, and therefore prize them all very little, and be always ready to give them up. Nay more, he who must actually dispense with these things in order not to be moved by them, thereby shows that in his heart he holds them to be truly good things, which one must put quite out of sight if one is not to long after them. The wise man, on the other hand, knows that they are not good things at all, but rather perfectly indifferent things, ± ́1±Æ¿Á±, in any case ÀÁ¿·31⁄4μ1⁄2±. Therefore if they present themselves he will accept them, but yet is always ready to let them go again, if chance, to which they belong, should demand them back; for they are ÄÉ1⁄2 ¿Åo μÆ1⁄2345 !1⁄411⁄2. In this sense, Epictetus, chap. vii., says that the wise man, like one who has landed from a ship, &c., will also let himself be comforted by a wife or a child, but yet will always be ready, whenever the captain calls, to let them go again. Thus the Stoics perfected the theory of equanimity and independence at the cost of the practice, for they reduced everything to a mental process, and by arguments, such as are presented in the first chapter of Epictetus, sophisticated themselves into all the amenities of life. But in doing so they left out of account that everything to which one is accustomed becomes a need, and therefore can only be given up with pain; that the will does not allow itself to be played with, cannot enjoy without loving the pleasures; that a dog does not remain indifferent if one draws a piece of meat through its mouth, and neither does a wise man if he is hungry; and that there is no middle path between desiring and renouncing. But they believed that they satisfied their principles if, sitting at a luxurious Roman table, they left no dish untasted, yet at the same time protested that they were each and all of them mere ÀÁ¿·31⁄4μ1⁄2±, not ±3± ̧±; or in plain English, if they eat, drank, and were merry, yet gave no thanks to God for it all, but rather made fastidious faces, and persisted in boldly asserting that they gained nothing whatever from the whole feast. This was the expedient of the Stoics; they were therefore mere braggarts, and stand to the Cynics in much the same relation as well-fed Benedictines and Augustines stand to Franciscans and Capucines. Now the more they neglected practice, the more they refined the theory. I shall here add a few proofs and supplementary details to the exposition of it given at the close of our first book. If we search in the writings of the Stoics which remain to us, all of which are unsystematically composed, for the ultimate ground of that irrefragible equanimity which is unceasingly demanded of us, we find no other than the knowledge that the course of the world is entirely independent of our will, and consequently, that the evil which befalls us is inevitable. If we [355]346 [356] The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) have regulated our claims by a correct insight into this, then mourning, rejoicing, fearing, and hoping are follies of which we are no longer capable. Further, especially in the commentaries of Arrian, it is surreptitiously assumed that all that is ¿Åo μÆ1⁄2 !1⁄411⁄2 (i.e., does not depend upon us) is at once also ¿Å ÀÁ¿Â !1⁄4±Â (i.e., does not concern us). Yet it remains true that all the good things of life are in the power of chance, and therefore whenever it makes use of this power to deprive us of them, we are unhappy if we have placed our happiness in them. From this unworthy fate we are, in the opinion of the Stoics, delivered by the right use of reason, by virtue of which we regard all these things, never as ours, but only as lent to us for an indefinite time; only thus can we never really lose them. Therefore Seneca says (Ep. 98): “Si, quid humanarum rerum varietas possit, cogitaverit, ante quam senserit,” and Diogenes Laertius (vii. 1. 87): “TMÿ1⁄2 ́μ μÃÄ1 Ä¿ o±Ä1⁄2 ±ÁμÄ·1⁄2 ¶Ã1⁄2 Äó o±Ä1⁄2 μ1⁄4Àμ1Á1±1⁄2 ÄÉ1⁄2 ÆÅÃμ1 ÃÅ1⁄42±11⁄2¿1⁄2ÄÉ1⁄2 ¶Ã1⁄2.” (Secundum virtutem vivere idem est, quod secundum experientiam eorum, quæ secundum naturam accidunt, vivere.) The passage in Arrian’s “Discourses of Epictetus,” B. iii., c. 24, 84-89, is particularly in point here; and especially, as a proof of what I have said in this reference in § 16 of the first volume, the passage: “¤¿ÅÄ¿ 3±Á μÃÄ1 Ä¿ ±1Ä1¿1⁄2 Ä¿1 ±1⁄2 ̧Á¿À¿1 À±1⁄2ÄÉ1⁄2 ÄÉ1⁄2 o±oÉ1⁄2 Ä¿ ı ÀÁ¿»·Èμ1 ı o¿11⁄2±Â 1⁄4· ́Å1⁄2±Ã ̧±1 μƱÁ1⁄4¿¶μ11⁄2 Ä¿1 μÀ1 1⁄4μÁ¿ÅÂ,” Ibid. iv.,

1. 42. (Hæc enim causa est hominibus omnium malorum, quod anticipationes generales rebus singularibus accommodare non possunt.) Similarly the passage in “Marcus Aurelius” (iv. 29): “•1 3⁄4μ1⁄2¿Â o¿Ã1⁄4¿Å A 1⁄4· 31⁄2ÉÁ1¶É1⁄2 ı μ1⁄2 ±ÅÄó ¿1⁄2ı, ¿ÅÇ !ÄÄ¿1⁄2 3⁄4μ1⁄2¿Â o±1 ¿ 1⁄4· 31⁄2ÉÁ1¶É1⁄2 ı 3131⁄2¿1⁄4μ1⁄2±;” that is: “If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know how things go on in it.” Also Seneca’s eleventh chapter, “De Tranquilitate Animi,” is a complete proof of this view. The opinion of the Stoics amounts on the whole to this, that if a man has watched for a while the347 juggling illusion of happiness and then uses his reason, he must recognise both the rapid changes of the dice and the intrinsic worthlessness of the counters, and therefore must henceforth remain unmoved. Taken generally the Stoical point of view may be thus expressed: our suffering always arises from the want of agreement between our wishes and the course of the world. Therefore one of these two must be changed and adapted to the other. Since now the course of things is not in our power (¿Åo μÆ1⁄2 !1⁄411⁄2), we must direct our volitions and desires according to the course of things: for the will alone is μÆ1⁄2 !1⁄411⁄2. This adaptation of volition to the course of the external world, thus to the nature of things, is very often understood under the ambiguous o±Ä± ÆÅÃ11⁄2 ¶·1⁄2. See the “Discourses of Epictetus,” ii. 17, 21, 22. Seneca also denotes this point of view (Ep. 119) when he says: “Nihil interest, utrum non desideres, an habeas. Summa rei in utroque est eadem: non torqueberis.” Also Cicero (Tusc. iv. 26) by the words: “Solum habere velle, summa dementia est.” Similarly Arrian (iv. 1. 175): “ŸÅ 3±Á μoÀ»·ÁÉÃμ1 ÄÉ1⁄2 μÀ1 ̧Å1⁄4¿Å1⁄4μ1⁄2É1⁄2 μ»μÅ ̧μÁ1± À±Á±Ãoμű¶μı1, ±»»± ±1⁄2±ÃoμÅ· Ä·Â μÀ1 ̧Å1⁄41±Â.” (Non enim explendis desideriis libertas comparatur, sed tollenda cupiditate.) The collected quotations in the “Historia Philosophiæ Græco- Romanæ” of Ritter and Preller may be taken as proofs of what I have said, in the place referred to above, about the A1⁄4¿»¿3¿Å1⁄4μ1⁄2É ¶Ã1⁄2 of the Stoics. Also the saying of Seneca (Ep. 31, and again Ep. 74): “Perfecta virtus est æqualitas et tenor vitæ per omnia consonans sibi.” The following passage of Seneca’s indicates the spirit of the Stoa generally (Ep. 92): “Quid est beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabit animi magnitudo, dabit constantia bene judicati tenax.” A systematical study of the Stoics will convince every one that the end of their ethics, like that of the ethics of Cynicism from which they sprang, is really nothing else than a life as free as possible from pain, and therefore as happy as possible. Whence it follows [357]348 [358] The World As Will And Idea (Vol. 2 of 3) that the Stoical morality is only a special form of Eudæmonism. It has not, like the Indian, the Christian, and even the Platonic ethics, a metaphysical tendency, a transcendental end, but a completely immanent end, attainable in this life; the steadfast serenity (±Ä±Á±3⁄41±) and unclouded happiness of the wise man, whom nothing can disturb. Yet it cannot be denied that the later Stoics, especially Arrian, sometimes lose sight of this end, and show a really ascetic tendency, which is to be attributed to the Christian and Oriental spirit in general which was then already spreading. If we consider closely and seriously the goal of Stoicism, that ±Ä±Á±3⁄41±, we find in it merely a hardening and insensibility to the blow of fate which a man attains to because he keeps ever present to his mind the shortness of life, the emptiness of pleasure, the instability of happiness, and has also discerned that the difference between happiness and unhappiness is very much less than our anticipation of both is wont to represent. But this is yet no state of happiness; it is only the patient endurance of sufferings which one has foreseen as irremediable. Yet magnanimity and worth consist in this, that one should bear silently and patiently what is irremediable, in melancholy peace, remaining always the same, while others pass from rejoicing to despair and from despair to rejoicing. Accordingly one may also conceive of Stoicism as a spiritual hygiene, in accordance with which, just as one hardens the body against the influences of wind and weather, against fatigue and exertion, one has also to harden one’s mind against misfortune, danger, loss, injustice, malice, perfidy, arrogance, and the folly of men. I remark further, that the o± ̧3o¿1⁄2ı of the Stoics, which Cicero translates officia, signify as nearly as possible Obliegenheiten, or that which it befits the occasion to do; English, incumbencies; Italian, quel che tocca a me di fare, o di lasciare, thus what it behoves a reasonable man to do. Cf. Diog. Laert., vii. 1. 109. Finally, the pantheism of the Stoics, though absolutely inconsistent with many an exhortation349 of Arrian, is most distinctly expressed by Seneca: “Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest: si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra, et intra tenet.” (Quæst. Natur. 1, præfatio 12.)