Book 1

Aph. 1. The complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

Aph. 2. The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] cessation.

Aph. 3.* [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul’s desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger

Aph. 4.* This [method of palliatives (§ 3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

Aph. 5.* Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else.

Aph. 6.* And there is no difference between the two.

Aph. 7.* There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.

Aph. 8.* Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

Aph. 9.* There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

Aph. 10.* If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

Aph. 11.* Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible* power imperceptible].

Aph. 12.* Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

Aph. 13.* Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason]

Aph. 14.* Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.

Aph. 15.* Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

Aph. 16.* Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal,3 [if the case were as you imagine].

Aph. 17.* If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

Aph. 18.* If [you say that the soul’s bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] ’no;’ [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

Aph. 19.* [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

Aph. 20.* Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul’s bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

Aph. 21.* If it [‘Ignorance’] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

Aph. 22.* And [if you assume ‘Ignorance’ to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

Aph. 23.* If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding ‘Ignorance,’ that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say ’no,’ for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

Aph. 24.* [To the suggestion that ‘Ignorance’ is at once real and unreal we say] ’no;’ because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]