Conclusion Of Book 3

I hope that no accurate proof is lacking of this system of ethics.

Sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature.

It has a great influence on our sense of beauty, when we:

• regard external objects, and
• judge of morals.

It has enough force to give us the strongest approbation when it operates alone, without the concurrence of any other principle.

For example, in the cases of justice, allegiance, chastity, and good-manners.

All the circumstances needed for its operation are found in most of the virtues which do good for the society or the person who has them.

If we compare all these circumstances, we shall find that sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions.

No objection can be raised against this hypothesis, which will not extend to all cases.

Justice is approved of, only because it has a tendency to the public good.

The public good is indifferent to us, except so far as sympathy interests us in it. We may presume the same with regard to all the other virtues, which have a similar tendency to the public good. They must derive their merit from our sympathy with those who reap any advantage from them, just as the virtues which do good to their possessors, derive their merit from our sympathy with them.

Most people readily allow that the useful qualities of the mind are virtuous because of their utility. This way of thinking is so natural. It occurs on so many occasions that few will make any scruple of admitting it. The force of sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as means to an end. The means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued. But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. We therefore ascribe the sentiment of approbation to sympathy. This approbation arises from surveying all those virtues useful to society or to the person who has them. These form the most considerable part of morality.

If the reader could be convinced with bribes or anything but solid arguments, we would use topics here to engage his affections.
We are all lovers of virtue in thought, but we might degenerate in practice.
    We are pleased to see moral distinctions derived from so noble a source, which gives us a just notion of human nature's generosity and capacity.
Very little knowledge of human affairs is needed to perceive that a sense of morals is:
    a principle inherent in the soul, and
    one of the most powerful principles.
But this sense must acquire new force when, reflecting on itself, it:
    approves those principles from whence it is derived, and
    finds only what is great and good in its rise and origin.
Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, might defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority.
    But they lack the advantage of those who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind.
        According to their system, the virtue, the sense of virtue, and the principles of this sense must be approved of, so that only the laudable and good are presented on any side.

This observation may be extended to justice and other virtues of that kind.
    Justice is artificial, but the sense of its morality is natural.
Any act of justice is beneficial to society because of the agreement of men in a system of conduct.
    We naturally approve of it after it has that tendency.
    If we did not approve of it, no agreement could ever produce that sentiment.

Most of men's inventions are subject to change.
    They:
        depend on humour and caprice, and
        have a vogue for a time, and then sink into oblivion.
If justice were a human invention then it must be placed on the same footing.
    But the cases are widely different.
Justice is founded on the greatest imaginable interest.
    It extends to all times and places.
    It cannot possibly be served by any other invention.
    It is obvious.
    It discovers itself on the very first formation of society.
All these causes render the rules of justice steadfast and at least, as immutable as human nature.
    If they were founded on original instincts, could they have any greater stability?

The same system may:
    help us to form a just notion of virtue's happiness and dignity, and
    interest every principle of our nature in the embracing and cherishing that noble quality.
Who does not feel eagerness in his pursuits of every knowledge and ability when he considers that, besides the advantages of these acquisitions, they:
    also give him a new lustre in mankind's eyes, and
    are universally attended with esteem and approbation?
Who can think that the advantages of fortune are a sufficient compensation for the smallest breach of the social virtues, when he considers:
    that his character, with regard to others, and his peace entirely depend on strictly observing them?
    that a mind, which is deficient in mankind and society, will never be able to bear its own survey?
But I refrain to insist on this subject.
    Such reflections require a work very different from the present genius.
The anatomist should never emulate the painter.
    His accurate dissections and portraits of the smaller body parts do not give his figures any graceful expression.
    They are even hideous.
    To make objects engaging to the eye and imagination, they should be:
        set farther, and
        more covered up from sight.
    An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter.
        It is even impractical to excel in painting the human body without the anatomist's help.
Before we can design with any elegance or correctness, we must exactly know the situation and connection of the parts.
    Thus the most abstract speculations on human nature, however cold and unentertaining:
        become subservient to practical morality, and
        may render practical morality more:
            correct in its precepts, and
            persuasive in its exhortations.

Appendix A

I am most wiling to confess my errors.
I think corrections are more honourable than the most unerring judgment.
A man, who is free from mistakes, can pretend to no praises, except from the justness of his understanding.
    But a man, who corrects his mistakes, shows the:
        justness of his understanding, and
        candour and ingenuity of his temper.
I have not discovered any considerable mistakes in my reasonings except on one article.
But I have found that some of my words have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all mistakes in the readers.
    I have added this appendix to remedy this defect.