Two Objections To This System

We approve of qualities that benefit mankind because it presents the lively idea of pleasure.

• This idea affects us by sympathy.
• It itself is a kind of pleasure.

But this sympathy is very variable.

Our moral sentiments also have the same variations.

We sympathize more with:

• persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us,
• our acquaintance, than with strangers,
• our countrymen, than with foreigners.

Despite this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation and esteem to the same moral qualities in China as in England.

Therefore, our esteem does not come from sympathy.

I answer that the approbation of moral qualities comes entirely from:

• a moral taste, and
• certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust.

These arise from the contemplation of qualities.

Those sentiments vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects.

I cannot feel the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a person who lived in Greece 2,000 years ago, that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend and acquaintance.

But it does not mean that I esteem my friend more than the Greek.

Therefore, if people object to sentiments varying without esteem varying, then the objection applies to all systems.

To fix this, I assert that the variation has no force at all.

Our relation with persons and things continuously fluctuates.

A person who lives far can become a familiar acquaintance in a short time.

Everyone has a peculiar position with regard to others.

If we talked only to people that we like, then we would talk to so few people.

To prevent those continual contradictions and have a more stable judgment of things, we fix some steady and general points of view.

Similarly, external beauty is determined merely by pleasure.

A beautiful face cannot give much pleasure when seen 20 paces away.

• But we do not say that it is less beautiful.
• This is because we know what effect it will have in a distant position.

By this reflection, we correct its momentary appearance.

In general, all sentiments of blame or praise vary according to:

• our nearness or remoteness to the person blamed or praised, and
• our mind’s present disposition.

But we do not regard these variations in our general decision.

We still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same way as if we remained in one point of view.

Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments or language.

If our servant is diligent and faithful, he may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus as represented in history.

But we do not say that our servant is more laudable than Marcus Brutus who is a renowned patriot.

Marcus Brutus would command much more affection and admiration if we came closer to him.

Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses.

It would be impossible for us to communicate our sentiments if we did not:

• correct the momentary appearances of things, and
• overlook our present situation.

We blame or praise a person we talk to from the influence of his characters and qualities.

We do not consider whether the persons, affected by the qualities, are our acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners.

We overlook our own interest in those general judgments.

We do not blame a man for opposing us in any of our pretensions, when his own interest is particularly concerned.

We make allowance for a certain degree of selfishness in men.

Because we know it to be:

• inseparable from human nature, and
• inherent in our frame and constitution.

By this reflection, we correct those sentiments of blame which naturally arise upon any opposition.

Thus, the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles.

But the general principles are not altogether effective.

Our passions do not often correspond entirely to this present theory.