CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH

I think we would be a little inattentive to run over the human mind without once considering that love of truth, which was the first source of all our inquiries.

We should: ◦ bestow a few reflections on curiosity ◦ show its origin in human nature.

It is such a peculiar an affection. ◦ It would have been impossible to have treated of it under any previous heading, without danger of obscurity and confusion.

Truth is of 2 kinds, consisting in:

1. The discovery of the proportions of ideas or

This is not desired merely as truth, and that it is not the justness of our conclusions, which alone gives the pleasure.

2. The conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence.

These conclusions are equally just, when we discover the equality of two bodies by a pair of compasses, as when we learn it by a mathematical demonstration. ◦ In the one case, the proofs are demonstrative. ◦ In the other case, the proofs are only sensible. ◦ Yet the mind acquiesces with equal assurance in the one as in the other.

In an arithmetical operation, both the truth and the assurance are of the same nature, as in the most profound algebraic problem. ◦ In it, the pleasure is very inconsiderable, if it does not degenerate into pain. ◦ This is a proof that our satisfaction from the discovery of truth, does not proceed from its mere discovery, but only as endowed with certain qualities.

The first and most considerable circumstance needed to render truth agreeable, is the genius and capacity employed in its invention and discovery. ◦ What is easy and obvious is never valued. ◦ Even what is difficult is but little regarded if we come to know it without: ▪ difficulty ▪ any stretch of thought or judgment. • We love to trace the demonstrations of mathematicians. ◦ But we receive small entertainment from a person who barely informs us of the proportions of lines and angles, even if we have the utmost confidence in his judgment and veracity. ▪ In this case, it is enough to have ears to learn the truth. • We are never obliged to fix our attention or exert our genius. ◦ This is the most pleasant and agreeable of all the other exercises of the mind.

• The exercise of genius is the principal source of the satisfaction we receive from the sciences.
    ◦ I doubt if it alone is sufficient to give us any considerable enjoyment.
• The truth we discover must also be of some importance.
    ◦ It is easy to multiply algebraic problems to infinity.
    ◦ There is no end in the discovery of the proportions of conic sections.
        ▪ Few mathematicians take any pleasure in these researches.
        ▪ They turn their thoughts to what is more useful and important.
• How does this utility and importance operate on us?
    ◦ In the search of such truths, many philosophers have:
        ▪ consumed their time
        ▪ destroyed their health
        ▪ neglected their fortune.
    ◦ These truths they have esteemed important and useful to the world.
    ◦ But it appeared from their whole conduct and behaviour, that they did not have:
        ▪ any public spirit
        ▪ any concern for mankind’s interests.
• They would entirely lose all relish for their studies if they were convinced that their discoveries:
    ◦ were of no consequence
    ◦ had consequences entirely indifferent to them.
        ▪ This is a contradiction.

• To remove this contradiction, we must consider that there are certain desires and inclinations which:
    ◦ go no farther than the imagination
    ◦ are rather the faint shadows and images of passions, than any real affections.
• A man who surveys a city’s fortifications, considers their strength and advantages, natural or acquired.
    ◦ He observes the disposition and contrivance of the bastions, ramparts, mines, and other military works.
    ◦ He will receive a suitable pleasure and satisfaction in proportion as all these are fitted to attain their ends.
        ▪ This pleasure:
            • arises from the utility, not the form of the objects.
            • is only a sympathy with the inhabitants who benefit from the fortifications.
    ◦ Though it is possible, that he may have no kindness for them or may even hate them, as a stranger or enemy.

• It may be objected that:
    ◦ such a remote sympathy is a very slight foundation for a passion
    ◦ so much industry and application, as we frequently observe in philosophers, can never be derived from so inconsiderable an original.
• But the pleasure of study conflicts:
    ◦ chiefly in the mind’s action
    ◦ the exercise of the genius and understanding in the discovery or comprehension of any truth.
• If the truth’s importance is needed to complete the pleasure, our enjoyment is not brought by any considerable addition.
    ◦ The truth’s importance is only needed in order to fix our attention.
• When we are careless and inattentive, the understanding has no effect on us.
    ◦ It is unable to convey any of that satisfaction from understanding.

• The mind’s action is the principal foundation of that pleasure.
    ◦ Besides this, we also need a degree of success in:
        ▪ the attainment of the end, or
        ▪ the discovery of that truth.
• Where the mind pursues any end with passion, we:
    ◦ acquire a concern for the end itself
    ◦ are uneasy if we are disappointed with its pursuit.
        ▪ Even if that passion is not derived originally from the end, but merely from the action and pursuit.
        ▪ Yet by the natural course of the affections, this proceeds from the relation and parallel direction of the passions above-mentioned.

• The passions of hunting and philosophy are two passions most nearly resembling each other.
    ◦ The pleasure of hunting conflicts in the motion, attention, difficulty, and uncertainty of actions of the mind and body.
    ◦ These actions must be attended with an idea of utility, for them to have any effect on us.
• A man of the greatest fortune and the farthest from avarice takes a pleasure in hunting patridges and pheasants.
    ◦ He feels no satisfaction in shooting crows and magpies because he considers:
        ▪ patridges and pheasants fit for the table
        ▪ crows and magpies as useless.
• The utility or importance of itself causes no real passion.
    ◦ It is only needed to support the imagination.
    ◦ The same person who overlooks a ten times greater profit in any other subject, is pleased to bring home six woodcocks or plovers, after having hunted them for several hours.
• To make the parallel between hunting and philosophy more complete, we may observe that in both cases the end of our action may be despised.
    ◦ Yet in the heat of the action, we acquire such an attention to this end, that we are:
        ▪ very uneasy under any disappointments
        ▪ sorry when we:
            • miss our game or
            • fall into any error in our reasoning.

• If we want another parallel to these affections, we may consider the passion of gaming.
    ◦ It affords a pleasure from the same principles as hunting and philosophy.
• The pleasure of gaming does not arise from interest alone.
    ◦ Since many leave a sure gain for this entertainment.
• It is not derived from the game alone.
    ◦ Since the same persons have no satisfaction, when they play for nothing.
• It proceeds from both these causes united.
    ◦ Though separately, they have no effect.
• It is here, as in certain chemical preparations, where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third opaque and coloured liquid.

• Our interest in any game engages our attention, without which we can have no enjoyment.
• Once our attention is engaged, the difficulty, variety, and sudden reverses of fortune, further interests us.
    ◦ Our satisfaction arises from that concern.
• Human life is so tiresome a scene.
    ◦ Men generally are of such indolent dispositions.
    ◦ Whatever amuses them gives them a sensible pleasure, though by a passion mixed with pain.
        ▪ This pleasure is increased by the nature of the objects which are sensible and of a narrow compass.
            • They are:
                ◦ entered into with facility
                ◦ agreeable to the imagination.

• The same theory that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics and algebra may be extended to morals, politics, natural philosophy, and other studies.
    ◦ In these, we consider the real connections and existence of ideas, not their other abstract relations of ideas.
• The love of knowledge displays itself in the sciences.
    ◦ Besides this, there is a certain curiosity implanted in human nature.
    ◦ This curiosity is a passion derived from a quite different principle.
• Some people have an insatiable desire of knowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbours.
    ◦ Even if:
        ▪ their interest is in no way concerned in them
        ▪ they must entirely depend on others for their information.
            • In this case, there is no room for study or application.
• Let us search for the reason of this phenomenon.

• It has been proved at large, that the influence of belief is at once to:
    ◦ enliven and infix any idea in the imagination
    ◦ prevent all kinds of hesitation and uncertainty about it.
• Both these circumstances are advantageous.
    ◦ By the vivacity of the idea we:
        ▪ interest the fancy
        ▪ produce the same pleasure arising from a moderate passion, in a lesser degree.
• The vivacity of the idea gives pleasure.
    ◦ Its certainty prevents uneasiness by:
        ▪ fixing one particular idea in the mind
        ▪ keeping it from wavering in the choice of its objects.
• The following is a conspicuous quality of human nature that is common to the mind and body.
    ◦ A change that is too sudden and violent is unpleasant to us.
    ◦ No matter how objects may be indifferent in themselves, their alteration gives uneasiness.
• It is the nature of doubt to:
    ◦ cause a variation in the thought
    ◦ transport us suddenly from one idea to another
• Consequently, it must bring pain.
    ◦ This pain chiefly takes place, where interest, relation, or the greatness and novelty of any event interests us.
    ◦ We do not have the interest nor curiosity to know every matter of fact.
    ◦ It is enough for the idea to strike us with such force and concern us so nearly, to give us an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy.
• A stranger, who first arrives at any town, may be entirely indifferent about knowing the inhabitants’ history and adventures.
    ◦ But he acquires the same curiosity as the natives, as he:
        ▪ becomes more acquainted with them
        ▪ has lived any considerable time among them.
• When we read the history of a nation, we may have an ardent desire to clear up any doubt or difficulty that occurs in it.
    ◦ But we become careless in such researches when the ideas of these events are obliterated.