The Nature of Existence
Table of Contents
- I do not argue against the Existence of anything that we can apprehend either by Sense or Reflexion.
I am not saying that the things I see and touch do not exist.
I only deny the existence of Matter or corporeal Substance.
And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the rest of Mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
The Atheist will want the Colour of an empty Name to support his Impiety.
The Philosophers may possibly find, they have lost a great Handle for Trifling and Disputation.
- If any Man thinks this detracts from the Existence or Reality of Things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest Terms I could think of.
Take here an Abstract of what has been said.
There are spiritual Substances, Minds, or humane Souls, which will or excite Ideas in themselves at pleasure: but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by Sense, which being impressed upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, speak themselves the Effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than humane Spirits.
These latter are said to have more Reality in them than the former: By which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them.
In this Sense, the Sun that I see by Day is the real Sun, and that which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former.
In the Sense here given of Reality, it is evident that every Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general each part of the Mundane System, is as much a real Being by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what I do, I intreat them to look into their own Thoughts and see.
- It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal Substances.
To this my Answer is, That if the word Substance be taken in the vulgar Sense, for a Combination of sensible Qualities, such as Extension, Solidity, Weight, and the like; This we cannot be accused of taking away. But if it be taken in a philosophic Sense, for the support of Accidents or Qualities without the Mind: Then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any Existence, not even in the Imagination.
- But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink Ideas, and are clothed with Ideas.
I acknowledge it does so, the word Idea not being used in common Discourse to signify the several Combinations of sensible Qualities, which are called Things: and it is certain that any Expression which varies from the familiar Use of Language, will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the Truth of the Proposition, which in other Words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those Things which we perceive immediately by our Senses.
The Hardness or Softness, the Colour, Taste, Warmth, Figure, and such like Qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of Victuals and Apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the Mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them Ideas; which Word, if it was as ordinarily used as Thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it.
I am not for disputing about the Propriety, but the Truth of the Expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink, and are clad with the immediate Objects of Sense which cannot exist unperceived or without the Mind: I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to Custom, that they should be called Things rather than Ideas.
- If it be demanded why I make use of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Custom call them Things, I answer, I do it for two Reasons:
First, because the Term Thing, in contradistinction to Idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the Mind: Secondly, because Thing hath a more comprehensive Signification than Idea, including Spirits or thinking Things as well as Ideas.
Since therefore the Objects of Sense exist only in the Mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word Idea, which implies those Properties.
- But say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his Senses, and never suffer any Arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it so, assert the Evidence of Sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.
That what I see, hear and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own Being. But I do not see how the Testimony of Sense can be alledged, as a proof for the Existence of any thing, which is not perceived by Sense.
We are not for having any Man turn Sceptic, and disbelieve his Senses; on the contrary we give them all the Stress and Assurance imaginable; nor are there any Principles more opposite to Scepticism, than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.
- Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for Instance, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones self burnt, and actually being so: This and the like may be urged in opposition to our Tenets.
To all which the Answer is evident from what hath been already said, and I shall only add in this place, that if real Fire be very different from the Idea of Fire, so also is the real Pain that it occasions, very different from the Idea of the same Pain: and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving Thing or without the Mind, any more than its Idea.
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It will be objected that we see Things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the Mind, it being absurd that those Things which are seen at the distance of several Miles, should be as near to us as our own Thoughts.
I reply that in a Dream we do oft perceive Things as existing at a great distance off. Yet those Things exist only in the Mind.
- To understand this Point, we should consider how we perceive Distance and Things placed at a Distance by Sight.
For that we should in truth see external Space, and Bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some Opposition to what hath been said, of their existing no where without the Mind. The Consideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to my Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, which was published not long since.
Wherein it is shewn that Distance or Outness is neither immediately of it self perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing that hath a necessary Connexion with it: But that it is only suggested to our Thoughts, by certain visible Ideas and Sensations attending Vision, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude or Relation, either with Distance, or Things placed at a Distance.
But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that Words of any Language suggest the Ideas they are made to stand for. Insomuch that a Man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not, at first Sight, think the Things he saw, to be without his Mind, or at any Distance from him. See Sect. 41. of the forementioned Treatise.