Phsyics Questions

Do the propositions & even axioms of geometry suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?

T. Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.

Lines & points conceiv’d as terminations different ideas from those conceiv’d absolutely.

Every position alters a line.

S. Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind.

All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.

Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv’d by Locke216.

Qu. how ’tis possible we should see flats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon217?

Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted218?

T. Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.

M. Matter tho’ allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin’s head.

Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.

Velocity not proportionable to space describ’d in given time.

M. No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not219.

Magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin’d, are resoluble into those points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.

M. Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wt the body has past may be conceiv’d annihilated.

M. Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

All potentiæ alike indifferent.

A. B. Wt does he mean by his potentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t’other?

No agent can be conceiv’d indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

We do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.

Mo. S. A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.

S. Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.

Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.

S. By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.

S. In moral matters men think (’tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties220.

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will’d them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the potentia of A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills in infinitum.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.

M. The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter’d; they not having yet thought on such matters. ‘Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose221, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho’ never so exact, will not go down with most.

[pg 070] Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.

S. Mo. Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin’d by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin’d by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence ’tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.

Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.

The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius’s of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t’other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater?

Why objects seen erect?

N. To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other perceptions?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can’t perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.

Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the punctum visibile below 30 minutes?

I. S. Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow’d from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.

S. The grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the [pg 071]operations of our minds222. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35223.

G. The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them224.

M. The substance wood a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be no necessary connexion between those thoughts?

Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.

Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish’d by convexes, or enlarg’d by concaves?

P.N. Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.

M. P. Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. ‘Tis prudent to correct men’s mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly225.

M. P. Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.

How the retina is fill’d by a looking-glass?

Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses.

Do concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses?

Convex speculums diminish & concave magnify has not yet been fully explained by any writer I know.

Why not objects seen confus’d when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?

How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?