The Indivisible and Divisible

The things found in the Law can be divided into 5 kinds.

But in the first place, there are only 2 kinds of things:

1. Indivisible[303]
2. Divisible

The divisible is divided into 4 kinds.

1. This is which is mentioned in the Quran
2. An example of a thing. This is divided into 4 kinds:

• a. The meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies, which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by this far-fetched way.
• b. The opposite of b. They can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here.
• c. It can be easily known that it is merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend.
• d. This is quite opposite to c. The thing of which it is an example, is easily understood;[304] while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all.

The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt.

The kind in which both the things are far-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite—that which can be understood on both the sides—is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary.

3. The case of the third kind is like the case of the above.

For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the people to action.

Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet; “The black stone is God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men.

Those who understand that it is only an illustration, but are not[305] learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.

The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book, Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga.

One thing has 5 existences which he calls:

• Essential (Zati)
• Sensual (Hissi)
• Rational (Agli)
• Imaginative (Khayali)
• Doubtful (Shilbhi)

At the time of doubt, it should be considered which of these 5 kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called essential then an illustration would best satisfy their minds.

In it is also included the following traditions of the Prophet, “Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here,[306] even heaven and hell.” “Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise;” and “The earth will eat up the whole of a man except the extremity of the tail.”

All these, it can easily be known are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong.

Abu Hamid has not decided about the occasion when both the sides of the question—the illustration and the illustrated—be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the Mutazilites.

4. The fourth kind of occasion is opposite to the third kind.

In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all.

If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all.

It is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. For these 2 kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when disclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them.

When this work of interpretation was done by people who[308] could not distinguish between these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.

From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.

The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took it up because we thought that it was the most important of all purposes—connected with God and the Law.