What is Place?

THE physicist must have a knowledge of:

• Place
• the infinite
  • whether there is such a thing or not
  • how its existence and what it is

This is because:

• all suppose that things which exist are somewhere (the non-existent is nowhere—where is the goat-stag or the sphinx?)
• ‘motion’ in its most general and primary sense is change of place, which we call ‘locomotion’.

What is place? This question presents many difficulties.

An examination of all the relevant facts seems to lead to divergent conclusions. Moreover, we have inherited nothing from previous thinkers, whether in the way of a statement of difficulties or of a solution.

The existence of place is held to be obvious from the fact of mutual replacement. Where water now is, there in turn, when the water has gone out as from a vessel, air is present.

When therefore another body occupies this same place, the place is thought to be different from all the bodies which come to be in it and replace one another.

What now contains air formerly contained water, so that clearly the place or space into which and out of which they passed was something different from both.

Further, the typical locomotions of the elementary natural bodies-namely, fire, earth, and the like-show not only that place is something, but also that it exerts a certain influence.

Each is carried to its own place, if it is not hindered, the one up, the other down. Now these are regions or kinds of place-up and down and the rest of the six directions. Nor do such distinctions (up and down and right and left, &c.) hold only in relation to us.

To us they are not always the same but change with the direction in which we are turned: that is why the same thing may be both right and left, up and down, before and behind.

But in nature each is distinct, taken apart by itself. It is not every chance direction which is ‘up’, but where fire and what is light are carried; similarly, too, ‘down’ is not any chance direction but where what has weight and what is made of earth are carried-the implication being that these places do not differ merely in relative position, but also as possessing distinct potencies.

This is made plain also by the objects studied by mathematics.

They have no real place. But they nevertheless, in respect of their position relatively to us, have a right and left as attributes ascribed to them only in consequence of their relative position, not having by nature these various characteristics.

The theory that the void exists involves the existence of place: for one would define void as place bereft of body.

These considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is something distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in place.

Hesiod gave a correct account of it by making chaos first.

{{ c v=“red” }}This implies that things need to have space first, because he thought, with most people, that everything is somewhere and in place.{{ /c }}

If this is its nature, the potency of place must:

• be a marvellous thing
• take precedence of all other things.

For that without which nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first; for place does not pass out of existence when the things in it are annihilated.

Even if we suppose its existence settled, the question of its nature presents difficulty-whether it is some sort of ‘bulk’ of body or some entity other than that, for we must first determine its genus.

1. It has 3 dimensions: length, width, height

The dimensions by which all body also is bounded. But the place cannot be body; for if it were there would be two bodies in the same place.

2. If body has a place and space, clearly so too have surface and the other limits of body

For the same statement will apply to them: where the bounding planes of the water were, there in turn will be those of the air.

But when we come to a point we cannot make a distinction between it and its place. Hence if the place of a point is not different from the point, no more will that of any of the others be different, and place will not be something different from each of them.

3. What in the world then are we to suppose place to be?

If it has the sort of nature described, it cannot be an element or composed of elements, whether these be corporeal or incorporeal: for while it has size, it has not body. But the elements of sensible bodies are bodies, while nothing that has size results from a combination of intelligible elements.

4. Of what in things is space the cause?

None of the four modes of causation can be ascribed to it. It is neither in the sense of the matter of existents (for nothing is composed of it), nor as the form and definition of things, nor as end, nor does it move existents.

5. If it is itself an existent, where will it be?

Zeno’s difficulty demands an explanation: for if everything that exists has a place, place too will have a place, and so on ad infinitum.

6. Just as every body is in place, so, too, every place has a body in it.

What then shall we say about growing things? It follows from these premisses that their place must grow with them, if their place is neither less nor greater than they are.

By asking these questions, then, we must raise the whole problem about place-not only as to what it is, but even whether there is such a thing.