Relatives

1. Definition of relatives, and instances.

Such things are termed “relatives,” which are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else; thus “the greater” is said to be what it is in reference to another thing, for it is called greater than something; and “the double” is called what it is in reference to something else, for it is said to be double a certain thing; and similarly as to other things of this kind. Such as these are of the number of relatives, as habit,[31] disposition, sense, knowledge, position, for all these specified are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or however else they are referrible to another, and they are nothing else; for habit is said to be the habit of some one, knowledge the knowledge of something, position the position of somewhat, and so the rest. Relatives, therefore, are such things, as are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or which may somehow be referred to another; as a mountain is called “great” in comparison with another, for the mountain is called “great” in relation to something, and “like” is said to be like somewhat, and other things of this sort, are similarly spoken of, in relation to something. Reclining, station, sitting, are nevertheless certain positions, and position is a relative; but to recline, to stand, or to sit, are not themselves positions, but are paronymously denominated from the above-named positions.

2. Some relatives admit contrariety.Yet there is contrariety in relatives, as virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being relative, and knowledge to ignorance;[32] but contrariety is not inherent in all relatives, since there is nothing contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to any thing of the sort.

3. Also degree.Relatives appear, notwithstanding, to receive the more and the less, for the like and the unlike are said to be so, more and less, and the equal and the unequal are so called, more and less, each of them being a relative, for the similar is said to be similar to something, and the unequal, unequal to something. 4. Exceptions.Not that all relatives admit of the more and less, for double is not called more and less double, nor any such thing, 5. Relatives reciprocally convertible.but all relatives are styled so by reciprocity, as the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master, master of the servant; and the double, double of the half, also the half, half of the double, and the greater, greater than the less, and the less, less than the greater. In like manner it happens as to other things, except that sometimes they differ in diction by case, as knowledge is said to be the knowledge of something knowable, and what is knowable is knowable by knowledge: sense also is the sense of the sensible, and the sensible is sensible by sense. 6. Except where the attribution of the relation is erroneous.Sometimes indeed they appear not to reciprocate, if that be not appropriately attributed to which relation is made, but here he who attributes errs; for instance, a wing of a bird, if it be attributed to the bird, does not reciprocate, for the first is not appropriately attributed, namely “wing” to “bird,” since “wing” is not predicated of it so far as it is “bird,” but so far as it is “winged,” as there are wings of many other things which are not birds, so that if it were appropriately attributed, it would also reciprocate; as “wing” is the wing of “a winged creature,” and “the winged creature” is “winged” by the “wing.” 7. Necessity of sometimes inventing a name for the relata.It is sometimes necessary perhaps even to invent a name,[33] if there be none at hand, for that to which it may be properly applied: e. g. if a rudder be attributed to a ship, it is not properly so attributed, for a rudder is not predicated of a ship so far as it is “ship,” since there are ships without rudders; hence they do not reciprocate, inasmuch as a ship is not said to be the ship of a rudder. The attribution will perhaps be more appropriate, if it were attributed thus, a rudder is the rudder of something ruddered, or in some other way, since a name is not assigned; a reciprocity also occurs, if it is appropriately attributed, for what is ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. So also in other things; the head, for example, will be more appropriately attributed to something headed, than to animal, for a thing has not a head, so far as it is an animal, since there are many animals which have not a head.

4. Rule for nomination of reciprocals.Thus any one may easily assume those things to which names are not given, if from those which are first, he assigns names to those others also, with which they reciprocate,[34] as in the cases adduced, “winged” from “wing,” and “ruddered” from “rudder.” 9. All proper relatives reciprocate.All relatives therefore, if they be properly attributed, are referred to reciprocals, since if they are referred to something casual, and not to that to which they relate, they will not reciprocate. I mean, that neither will any one of those things which are admitted to be referrible to reciprocals, reciprocate, even though names be assigned to them, if the thing be attributed to something accidental, and not to that to which it has relation: for example, a servant, if he be not attributed as the servant of a master, but of a man, of a biped, or any thing else of the kind, will not reciprocate, for the attribution is not appropriate. If however that, to which something is referred, be appropriately attributed, every thing else accidental being taken away, and this thing alone being left, to which it is appropriately attributed, it may always be referred to it, as “a servant,” if he is referred to “a master,” every thing else accidental to the master being left out of the question, (as the being “a biped,” and “capable of knowledge,” and that he is “a man,”) and his being “a master” alone, left, here the “servant” will always be referred to him, for a “servant” is said to be the servant of a “master.” If again, on the other hand, that to which it is at any time referred is not appropriately attributed, other things being taken away, and that alone left, to which it is attributed, in this case it will not be referred to it. 10. So that the existence of one depends upon the other. Vide infra, 13.For let a “servant” be referred to “man,” and a “wing” to “bird,” and let the being “a master” be taken away from “man,” the servant will no longer refer to man, since “master” not existing, neither does “servant” exist. So also let “being winged” be taken away from “bird,” and “wing” will no longer be amongst relatives, for what is “winged” not existing, neither will “wing” be the wing of any thing. Hence it is necessary to attribute that, to which a thing is appropriately referred, and if indeed a name be already given to it, the application is easy; but if no name be assigned, it is perhaps necessary to invent one; but being thus attributed, it is clear that all relatives are referred to reciprocals.

5. Relatives by nature simultaneous, with some exceptions.

Naturally, relatives appear simultaneous.

This is true of the generality of them, for “double” and “half” are simultaneous.

If “half” exists, then its “double” exists, just as a “master” exists if his “servant” exists.

These also are mutually subversive.

There can be:

• no “double” if there is no “half”
• no “half” if there is no “double”

12. But this is not true of all relatives.

that they are by nature simultaneous, for the object of “science” may appear to be prior to “science,” since for the most part we derive science from things pre-existing, as in few things, if even in any, do we see science and its object originating together.

13. Sometimes, relatives are co-subversive.

A relative subverts the object of science which then co-subverts the science.

But the subversion of science does not co-subvert the object of science.

For if science had no object, science itself becomes non-existent.

(since there will be no longer a science of any thing)

But on the contrary, though science does not exist, there is nothing to prevent the object of science existing.

Thus, the quadrature of the circle, if it be an object of scientific knowledge, the science of it does not yet exist, though it is itself an object of science.

If “animal” being taken away, there will not be “science” but still it is possible for many objects of science to be.

14. Instance of things pertaining to sense.

Likewise also do things pertaining to sense subsist, since the sensible seems to be prior to the sense, as the sensible being subverted co-subverts sense, but sense does not co-subvert the sensible.

For the senses are conversant with body, and are in body, but the sensible being subverted, body also is subverted, (since body is of the number of sensibles,) and body not existing, sense also is subverted, so that the sensible co-subverts sense.

Sense on the other hand does not co-subvert the sensible, since if animal were subverted, sense indeed would be subverted, but yet the sensible will remain; such for instance as “body,” “warm,” “sweet,” “bitter,” and every thing else which is sensible.

Besides, “sense” is produced simultaneously with what is “sensitive,” for at one and the same time “animal” and “sense” are produced, but the “sensible” is prior in existence to “animal” or “sense,” for fire and water, and such things as animal consists of, are altogether prior to the existence of animal or sense, so that the sensible will appear to be antecedent to sense.

15. Primary substance has no relation

It is doubtful however whether no substance is among the number of relatives, as seems to be the case, or whether this happens in certain second substances; for it is true in first substances, since neither the wholes, nor the parts, of first substances are relative.

“A certain man” is not said to be a certain man of something, nor “a certain ox” said to be a certain ox of something; and so also with respect to the parts, for a “certain hand” is not said to be a certain hand of some one, but the hand of some one; and some head is not said to be a certain head of some one, but the head of some one, and in most secondary substances the like occurs. Thus man is not said to be the man of some one, nor an ox the ox of some one, nor the wood the wood of some one, but they are said to be the possession of some one; in such things therefore, it is evident, that they are not included amongst relatives. 16. But some secodary substances seem to possess relation, but the question is solved by an analysis of the definition of τῶν πρός, τι.In the case of some secondary substances there is a doubt, as “head,” is said to be the head of some one, and “hand,” the hand of some one, and in like manner, every such thing, so that these may appear amongst the number of relatives. If then the definition of relatives has been sufficiently framed, it is either a matter of difficulty, or of impossibility, to show that no substance is relative;[37] but if the definition has not been sufficiently framed, but those things are relatives, whose substance is the same, as consists with a relation, after a certain manner, to a certain thing; somewhat, perhaps, in reply to this, may be stated. The former definition, however, concurs with all relatives, yet it is not the same thing, that their being, consists in relation, and that being what they are, they are predicated of other things. 17. One relative being known, the correlative can be known.Hence it is clear, that he who knows any one relative, definitely, will also know what it is referred to, definitely. Wherefore also from this it is apparent, that if one knows this particular thing to be among relatives, and if the substance of relatives is the same, as subsisting in a certain manner, with reference to something, he will also know that, with reference to which, this particular thing, after a certain manner, subsists; for if, in short, he were ignorant of that, with reference to which, this particular thing, after a certain manner, subsists, neither would he know, whether it subsists, after a certain manner, with reference to something. 18. Singulars.And in singulars, indeed, this is evident; for if any one knows definitely, that this thing is “double,” he will also forthwith know that, definitely, of which it is the double, since if he knows not that it is the double, of something definite, neither will he know that it is “double,” at all. So again, if a man knows this thing, to be more beautiful than something else, he must straightway and definitely know that, than which, it is more beautiful. Wherefore, he will not indefinitely know, that this, is better, than that which is worse, for such is opinion and not science, since he will not accurately know that it is better than something worse, as it may so happen that there is nothing worse than it, whence it is necessarily evident, that whoever definitely knows any relative, also definitely knows that, to which it is referred. 19. The converse true of secondary substances.It is possible, notwithstanding, to know definitely what the head, and the hand, and every thing of the sort are, which are substances; but it is not necessary to know that to which they are referred, since it is not necessary definitely to know whose, is the head, or whose, is the hand; thus these will not be relatives, but if these be not relatives, we may truly affirm no substance to be among relatives. It is, perhaps, difficult for a man to assert assuredly any thing of such matters, who has not frequently considered them, yet to have submitted each of them to inquiry, is not without its use.[38]