The Nature of Bodies

Proposition 14: The human mind can perceive many things in proportion as its body can receive many impressions.

Proof: The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies.

But (2.12) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body.

The human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.

Proposition 15: The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Proof: The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (2.13), which (Post. 1) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts.

But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (2.8. Coroll.).

Therefore (2.7.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

Proposition 16: The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.

Proof: All the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. 1, after the Coroll. of Lemma 3), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by 1. Ax. 4) involves the nature of both bodies.

Therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary 1 & 2: It follows that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own.

That the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies.

Proposition 17: If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

Proof: As long as the human body continues to be affected, so long will the human mind (2.12) regard this modification of the body—that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.

It will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body.

Therefore, the mind (by 2.16, Coroll. 1) will regard the external body as actually existing, until it is affected, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary: The mind can regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.

Proof: When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named (Post. 5).

Hence (Ax. 2, after the Coroll. of Lemma 3) they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before such change.

Further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies.

Consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (2.12) will again take cognizance—that is (2.17), the mind will again regard the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.

Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated. Q.E.D.

Note: This is how we regard as present many things which are not present.

The same result may be brought about by other causes.

We (2.7. Coroll. 2.16. Coroll. 2) clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.

The former directly answers to the essence of Peter’s own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists.

The latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul’s body lasts, Paul’s mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists.

Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things.

When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.

The imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.

The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining. It only errs when it imagines being without the idea.

A mind might imagine non—existent things while being conscious that they do not really exist. This shows the power of free imagination. It is not a fault.