Propositions 9-10

9. The idea of an existing individual thing is caused by God, not as he is infinite, but as he is the ultimate cause of its cause

Proof: The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking.

It is distinct from other modes (by the Corollary and note to Prop. 8 of this part).

Thus (by Prop. 6 of this part) it is caused by God, as a thinking thing, but not (by Prop. 28 of Part 1) as an absolute thinking thing, only as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking.

He is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so on to infinity.

The order and connection of ideas is (by Prop. 7 of this book) the same as the order and connection of causes.

Therefore, of a given individual idea another individual idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea, is the cause;

Of this second idea God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary: Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he has the idea of the object.

Proof: Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in God (by Prop. 3 of this part), not as he is infinite, but as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.);

But (by Prop. 7 of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Therefore, the knowledge of that which takes place in any individual object will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object. Q.E.D.

10. The form of substance does not appertain to the essence of man. In other words, substance does not constitute the actual form of man.

Proof: The being of substance involves necessary existence (Part 1, Prop. 7).

Therefore, if the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (2. Def. 2).

Consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (2. Ax. 1). Q.E.D.

Note: This proposition may also be proved from Heading 1.5.

It shows that there cannot be two substances of the same nature.

For as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.

Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, etc., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary: It follows that man’s essence is made up of certain modifications of God’s attributes.

For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to man’s essence.

That essence therefore (by 1.15) is something which is in God.

Without God, it can neither be nor be conceived, whether as a modification (1.25. Coroll.), or a mode which expresses God’s nature in a certain conditioned manner.

Note: Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without God.

All men agree that God is the one and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence.

God is the cause of things in respect to their being made, and also in respect to their being.

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to that thing’s essence.

Wherefore they believe that either:

• God’s nature appertains to the essence of created things, or
• created things can exist or be conceived without God.

Otherwise, they probably hold inconsistent doctrines.

I think the cause for such confusion is mainly that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking.

God’s nature should be reflected on first, as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature.

They have:

• taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and put into the first place ’the objects of sensation'.

Hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature.

When they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature afterwards, they are unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature.

So it is easy to see that these persons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point.

My intention here was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:

Individual things cannot exist or be conceived without God.

Yet God does not appertain to their essence.

I said that “I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also. or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived.” (2. Def. 2)