Wealth in Aristocracies

[6J I therefore conclude that those vices that are prevalent in time of peace, and which we are now discussing, should never be directly prevented but only by indirect means, that is, by laying such a foundation to the state that most menI won’t say will be eager to live wisely, for that is impossible-will be guided by such feelings as will conduce to the greater good of the commonwealth.

So our chief objective is that the wealthy, if they cannot be thrifty, should at any rate be eager for gain.

If this love of gain, which is universal and constant, is nourished by desire for glory, most men will direct their main efforts to increasing their wealth by means that are not discreditable, so as to gain office and avoid utter disgrace.

[7] This very result follows from the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocracy as I have explained in the last 2 chapters.

For in both of them the number of rulers is so large that most of the wealthy have access to the governing body and to office of state.

If it is furthermore orda ined that patricians who become insolvent should be degraded from patrician rank, and those who have lost their possessions through misfortune should be restored to their former status (as I suggested in Section 47, Chapter 8), no doubt all will do their best to preserve their property.

Moreover, they will never covet foreign style of dress nor disda in their native style ifit is ordained by law that patricians and candidates for office are to be distingu ished by a particular form of dress.

For this, see Sections 25 and 47 of Chapter 8. And in each state additional measures can be devised that conform with the nature of its territory and the character of the people, always having as their main concern that subjects should do their duty willingly rather than under constraint of the law.

[8J For a state that looks only to govern men by fear will be one free from vice rather than endowed with virtue. Men should be governed in such a way that they do not think of themselves as being governed but as living as they please and by their own free will, so that their only restraint is love of freedom, desire to increase their property, and hope of atta ining offices of state.

As for statues, triumphal processions, and other incentives to virtue, these are symbols of servitude rather than of freedom; 12 for it is slaves, not free men , who are assigned rewards for virtue. I do indeed admit that men are spurred on by such inducements, but whereas at first they were awarded to men of greatness, with the passage of time and the growth of jealousy they are granted to men of no accoun� exalted by their enormous wealth, to the great indignation of all good men. Then again, those who boast of their ancestors’ triumphs and statues think they suffer injustice if they are not granted precedence over others.

Finally, to omit other considerations, th is much is certain, that equality, the abandonment of which must entail the loss of general freedom, cannot possibly be preserved if extraordinary honours are conferred by public decree on some man who is renowned for his virtue. [9J With these proposals in mind, let us now see whether states of this kind can be destroyed by some cause that might have been avoided.

If any state can be everlasting, it must be one whose constitution, being once correctly established, remains inviolate. For the constitution is the soul of the state; if this is preserved, the state is preserved. But a constitution cannot stay intact unless it is upheld both by reason and the common sentiment of the people.

Otherwise, if for instance laws are dependent solely on the support of reason, they are likely to be weak and easily overthrown. 13 So since we have shown that the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocracy are in conformity with reason and with the common sen timents of men, we can therefore affirm that, if any states can be everlasting, these will necessarily be so; that is to say, they cannot be destroyed by any avoidable cause, but only by some unavoidable fatality.

[10] But an objection can still be raised as follows, that although the constitutions set forth above may have the support of reason and the common sentiment of men, there are times when they can nevertheless be overthrown, for there is no emotion that is not sometimes overpowered by a stronger contrary emotion.

We often see the fear of death, for instance, overpowered by greed for another’s property.

Those who flee from the enemy in terror cannot be restrained by fear of some other danger; they hurl themselves into rivers or rush into flames to escape the enemy’s sword. So however well a commonwealth is organised and however good its constitution,14 yet when the state is in the grip of some crisis and everyone, as commonly happens, is seized with a kind of panic, they all pursue a course prompted only by their immediate fears with no regard for the future or the laws; all turn to the man who is renowned for his victories, they set him free from the laws, 15 they extend his command-a very bad precedent-and entrust the entire commonwealth to his good faith. This was indeed the cause of the fall of the Roman state. 16

But in reply to this objection I say, first, that in a properly organised commonwealth such a panic does not occur without good reason; and so th is panic and the resulting confusion cannot be assigned to any cause that could have been avoided by human foresight.

Next, it should be noted that in a commonwealth such as I have described above, it is impossible (Sections 9 and 25, Chapter 8) for any single man to attain such a high reputation as to become the centre of all eyes; he is bound to have several rivals who have strong support.

So although widespread panic leads to some confusion in the commonwealth, no one will be able to evade the laws and appoint someone illegally to a military command without at once evoking the opposition of otherl7 candidates.

To settle such a dispute it will finally be found necessary to have recourse to the constitution that was once ordained and approved by all and to order the affairs of state in accordance with existing laws. I can therefore affirm absolutely that, while it is true that the state whose government is in the hands of one city only will be lasting, this is particularly true of the state whose government is in the hands of a number of cities; that is, it cannot disintegrate or be changed into any other form by any internal cause.