Aristocracy: Its Organisation

[I] Now that the fundamental laws of both kinds of aristocratic government have been explained in detail, it remains for us to enquire whether by reason of any discernible fault they are liable to disintegrate or change into a different form.

The primary reason why states of this kind disintegrate is the one noted by that acute Florentine in his Book 3 on Livy, Discourse I, where he says, “A state, like the human body, has every day something added to it which some time or another needs to be put right.’” It is therefore necessary, he continues, that occasionally something should occur to bring the state back to the original principle on which it was first established.

(This does not happen in due time, its defects will develop to such an extent that they cannot be removed without destroying the state itself. And this restoration, he tells us, can come about either by chance or through the wisdom and forethought of the laws or of a man of singular virtue.

This is a matter of the greatest importance, and where no provision has been made against this danger, the state will not be able to endure by its own strength, but only by good fortune.

On the other hand, where a proper remedy has been applied to counter this evil, the state cannot collapse through any defect of its own, but only through some mischance that could not have been avoided, as ( shall go on to explain more clearly. The first remedy suggested to meet this evil was as follows: Every five years a dictator with supreme powers was appointed for one or two months, having the right to make enquiry, judge, and pronounce upon the conduct of senators and all ministers, and thus to restore the state to its original basis.

But he who seeks to obviate the troubles to which a state is liable should apply remedies that are in conformity with the nature of the state and follow from its basic laws; otherwise in his efforts to avoid Charybdis he will fall upon Scylla.

It is indeed true that all men, both rulers and ruled, have to be restrained by fear of punishment or loss, lest they be permitted to do wrong with impunity or with profit. But on the other hand it is also a fact that if this fear is shared by good and bad alike, the state will inevitably find itself in great peril.

So since dictatorial power is absolute, it is bound to be a terror to all, especially if, as is here required, there is a fixed time for a dictator to be appointed. For then every ambitious man would canvass for this office, and it is certainly true that in time of peace, virtue is not so much regarded as wealth, so that the more arrogant the man, the more likely he is to ga in office.

Perhaps it is for this reason that the Romans used to appoint a dictator not at any fixed time but under pressure of some chance emergency ’ Nevertheless, to quote Cicero’s words, “The distended status of a dictator was displeasing to good citizens.” And of course, since this dictatorial power is in essence regal, the state cannot occasionally turn into a monarchy, even for ever so short a time, without endangering its republican constitution.

Furthermore, if no fixed time is aSSigned for the appointment of a dictator, no reckoning would be made of the time intervening between one dictator and another, though careful attention should be paid thereto, as we have said.

Then again, the indefiniteness surrounding the whole business could easily result in its being overlooked. So unless this dictatorial power is permanent and firmly based, and thus of a kind that cannot be conferred on one man without destroying the form of the state, it will be very unsure, and consequently so will be the safety and preservation of the republ ic.

[2] But on the other hand we cannot possibly doubt (by Section 3, Chapter 6) that if it were feasible, while still preserving the form of the state, for the sword of the dictator to be permanent and fearsome only to the wicked, vices would never thrive to such a degree that they cannot be eradicated or corrected.

So in order to secure all these conditions, we proposed the institution of a council of syndics su bordinate to the supreme council with this in view, that the sword of the dictator should be permanently in the hands not of any natural person but of a civil body, whose members would be too many to make it possible to divide among themselves command of the state (Sections I and 2, Chapter 8) or to conspire together in any crime.

In addition, they are debarred from undertaking any other offices of state, they are not the paymasters of the armed forces, and they are of such an age as to prefer present security to the dangers of innovation. Hence the state is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot be a threat to the good but only to the wicked, and this in fact they will be.

For as they are less in a position to commit crimes, so they are in a better position to suppress wickedness. For apart from the fact that they are well able to suppress its early manifestations' (since their council is a permanent institution), they are also sufficiently numerous to venture to accuse and condemn this or that powerful figure without fear of incurring unpopularity, especially since voting is by secret ballot and judgment is pronounced in the name of the whole council.

[3J Now at Rome the tribunes of the people were also in continuous office.5 But they were not equal to the task of restraining the power of a Scipio; and furthermore, such measures as they thought salutary they were obliged to submit to the senate, who often frustrated their efforts by ensuring that the tribune from whom the senators had less to fear would be the one most in favour with the commons 6 In addition, the authority of the tribunes as against the patricians depended on the support of the commons, and whenever the tribunes summoned a meeting of the commons they appeared to be raising a revolt rather than convoking a council. Troubles of this kind, naturally, have no place in the state we have described in the last two Chapters. [4 J However, the authority of the syndics can effect only this, that the form of the state is preserved, thus ensuring that the laws are not broken and that no one is permitted to profit from transgression. But it will certainly not be able to prevent the proliferation of vices that cannot be forbidden by law, such as those to which men are prone when they have too much leisure and which not infrequently lead to the collapse of the state.7 For in time of peace men rid themselves of their fear, and from being fierce and savage they gradually become civilised or cultured, and from being cultured they become soft and sluggish, seeking to outdo one another not in virtue but in arrogance and extravagance. Hence they begin to despise the ways of their ancestors and to adopt foreign ways; that is, they begin to be slaves.8 [5J To prevent these evils, many attempts have been made to establish sumptuary laws, but in vain 9 For all laws that can be broken without injury to another become a laughingstock, and far from restraining the desires and lusts of men, they even stimulate them, because “we are ever eager for what is forbidden and desire what is denied.” 10 Nor do idle men lack cleverness to evade laws enacted to deal with things that cannot be absolutely forbidden, such things as banquets, gaming, personal adornment, and so forth, which are bad only when excessive and should be be judged in relation to the individual’s fortune, and thus cannot be the subject of a general law.