Aristocracy: The Second Model

[I] So far we have been considering an aristocracy that takes its name from just one city, the capital of the whole state. It is now time to deal with the kind where the sovereignty is held by several cities, a kind which I regard as preferable to the former. l

To discover where lies the difference between them and the superiority of one to the other, we shall make a survey one-by-one of the fundamental laws of the former, rejecting those which are unsuited to the latter and replacing them with other laws to form the basis of the latter.

[2] Cities which enjoy the right of citizenship should be founded and fortified in such a way that whereas each of them cannot even subsist without the others, on the other hand one cannot secede from the others without causing consider62 [For he may not believe in the God by whom he IS reqUired by law to swear: See Hobbes, De cive

63 [See TIP20/569, see also the invitation to Spmoza to teach freely under the condition that he not “disturb the publicly established religion” and hiS reply, Ep47-48.] I [Spmoza’s primary model of this kind of aristocracy IS the provlDce of Holland 1

able damage to the whole state; for if such be the case they will always remain united.

But cities that are so constituted that they can neither preserve themselves nor present a threat to the others are obviously not in control of their own right but completely subject to the others.

[3J The measures set out in Sections 9 and 10 of the previous Chapter result from a consideration of the general nature of aristocratic government, as is also the maintenance of a proportion between the number of patricians and the whole population, and the age and qualifications of candidates for the patriciate, so that on these points it can make no difference whether sovereignty is held by one city or by several.

But with regard to the supreme council, another consideration must here arise.

For if any city belonging to the state were chosen as a meeting-place for the supreme council, it would in fact be the capital of the state. So either there would have to be a system of rotation or else a place that does not possess the right of citizenship and that belongs equally to all must be chosen as this council’s meeting-place.2

But both these suggestions, easy as they are to state, are difficult in practice, with so many thousands of men having so frequently to quit their cities or to assemble in different places in turn. [4J To enable us, taking account of the nature and constitution of this kind of state, to decide how to deal with th is problem and how its councils should be organised, the following points should be considered. Each city has as much more right than a private person as it has more power than a private person (Section 4, Chapter 2), and consequently the right of each city of this state (see Section 2 of this Chapter) within its own walls or the bounds of its jurisdiction is to be measured by its power. Secondly, all the cities are bound together and united not as confederates but as constituting a single state with this reservation, that each city holds that much more right over government than others as it exceeds others in power; for to look for equality in un equals is to look for the absurd.3

Citizens are rightly regarded as equals, because the power of the individual compared with the power of the entire state is of no account.

But the power of each city constitutes a great part of the power of the state, and the greater the city, the greater the power it contributes ’ Therefore not all cities can be regarded as equals; just as the power of each, so the right of each should be assessed by its size.

The ties by which they must be bound together so as to form a single state are primarily (Section 1, Chapter 4) the senate and the court of justice.s How they are to be 2 [ Pnor to about 1 593 the Estates of Holland met In different places at different times.

In 1 593 Its meetmgs began to be held in the Hague, which pnor to that year had lacked political nghts.]

3 [Each town represented in the Estates of Holland and each provlDce represented III the States General had a Single vote 1

4 [ThIS section and the next prOVide good examples of Spmoza’s use of potentia and pote$las.

Throughout thiS section he uses the former, I.e., ‘power’ in the sense of the natural power or efficacy which a group has; and argues (in the next sechon) that its potestas (authonty or constitutional power) should be proportionate to lts natural power. Spmoza, however, IS not always so consistent in hIS usage.]

5 [Holland had only provlDcial courts and no supreme court 1

bound together by these ties in such a way that each of them still remains as far as possible in control of its own right, I shall now briefly explain.

[5] I assume that the patricians of each city, who (by Section 3 of this Chapter) are to vary in number in accordance with the size of the city, have the supreme right over their own city, and in that city’s supreme council they have full power to fortify it, to enlarge its walls, to impose taxes, to enact and repeal laws, and, in general, to do everything they think necessary for the preservation and growth of their city.6

But to deal with the common business of the state, a senate must be created on just the same lines as we described in the previous chapter,so that there will be no difference between this senate and the other except that this senate has, in addition, authority to decide any dispute arising between cities.

For in a state which has no capital city this cannot be done by the supreme council, as was previously the case. See Section 38 of the previous Chapter.

[6] But in this state the supreme counciF is not to be summoned unless the need arises to alter the form ofthe state itself, or in case of some difficulty to which the senators think themselves unequal.

So it will rarely happen that all the patricians are summoned to council.

The chief duty of the supreme council is to enact and and repeal laws, and secondly, to appoint ministers of state.

The laws or general ordinances of the state are not to be altered as soon as they are instituted.

However, if time and circumstances make it advisable to enact a new law or to change one already in force, the question can first be discussed in the senate. Once the senate has reached agreement, thereafter envoys should be sent by the senate to the cities to inform the patricians in each city of the senate’s opinion, and if there is then a majority of cities in favour of the senate’s opinion, it shall be valid, but otherwise void.

This same procedure may be followed in appointing army commanders, in sending ambassadors abroad, and also in making decisions about waging war and accepting terms of peace. But in appointing the other ministers of state, since (as we have explained in Section 4 ofthis Chapter) each city should remain as far as possible in control of its own right and should hold as much more right in government as it exceeds other cities in power, it is necessary to observe the following procedure.

Senators are to be chosen by the patricians of each city; that is, the patricians of any one city will appoint in their own council a certa in number of senators from their citizen colleagues, a number that will be in the ratio of I to 12 to the number of patricians of that same city (see Section 30 of previous Chapter), and they will name those whom they wish to belong to each section, first, second, third and so on.

In the same way, the patricians of the other cities will appoint a number of senators varying in proportion to their own number and will distribute them between as many sections as we have said will constitute the senate (see Section 34, previous Chapter). As a result, in each section of the senate there will be a number of senators for every city proportionate to its size. But the presidents and

vice presidents of the sections, being fewer in number than the cities, should be chosen by lot by the senate from those who have been appointed consuls. In appointing the supreme judges of the state, too, the same procedure should be followed, i.e., the patricians of each city should choose from their colleagues a number of judges in proportion to their own number.

Thus it will come about that in appointing ministers every city will as far as possible be in control of its own right and that both in the senate and the court oflaw the right possessed by each city will be proportionate to its power; supposing, that is, that in deciding matters of state and in settling disputes the senate and the court of law follow the same procedure as we described in Sections 33 and 34 of the previous Chapter.

[7] Company commanders and colonels should also be appointed by the patricians.8

For the common safety of the whole state, each city should be required to levy a a certa in number of soldiers in proportion to its size,

The patricians of each city, to match the number of regimen they are required to maintain, should be permitted to appoint as many colonels, commanders, ensigns, etc. as are needed to take charge of that part of the armed forces they provide for the state.