The Supreme Council and Syndics

[32] Some of the syndics, appointed by the supreme council, are to:

• sit on the senate but without the right to vote
• see whether the laws concerning that council are duly observed
• summon the supreme council when any matter has to be referred from the senate to the supreme council.

The right to summon the supreme council and submit matters for its decision lies with the syndics.

But before a vote is taken on matters like this, the president of the senate at that time will explain the state of affairs, giving the senate’s view of the matter in question and the reasons for it.

Thereafter the vote should be taken in the usual way.

[33] The entire senate should not meet everyday, but, like all councils of considerable size, should assemble at certain fixed times ‘8

However, since in the meantime state business has to be dealt with, a certa in number of senators need to be chosen to act on behalf of the senate when it is not sitting.

Their duties should be to summon the senate when there is need, to carry out its decisions on public business, to read letters addressed to the senate and the supreme council, and, finally, to discuss what matters are to be brought before the senate. But in order that all these things and the organisation of the council as a whole may be more easily grasped, I shall give a more detailed account of the en tire matter.

[34] The senators, who, as we have sa id, must be appointed for a year, should be divided into four or six sections.49 The first of these should preside over the senate for the first two or three months. When this time has expired, the second section should take the place of the first, and so on , each section taking first position in its turn at regular intervals, so that the section taking first position in the first period takes last position in the second period.

Furthermore, for each section there should be appointed a president, together with a vice president to take his place when needed.

That is to say, from each section two men are to be appointed, a president and a vice president, and the president of the first section should also preside over the senate during the first months, or in his absence his vice president should take his place, to be succeeded by the rest of the presidents in order as described above.

Next, out of the first section a number should be chosen, by lot or vote, to depu tise for the senate when it is not in session along with the presiden t and the vice president, for such a period of time as their section holds first place in the senate.

When this time has expired, a like number of men are again to be chosen, by lot or vote, from the second section to succeed the first section together with their own president and vice president, to deputise for the senate; and so on with the rest.

But it is not necessary that the election of these menthose who, as I said, should be chosen by lot or vote for periods of two or three months, and whom we shall hereafter call consuls-should be in the hands of the supreme council.

For the reason we gave in Section 29 of th is Chapter does not apply here, and much less so the reason stated in Section 1 7. It will therefore suffice if they are appointed by the senate and the syndics present at the meeting.

[35] As to their number, I cannot be quite precise, but they must certainly be sufficiently numerous as to make it difficult to corrupt them.

For although they do not by themselves make any decisions on matters of state, yet they can defer the proceedings of the senate or, worst of all, lead the senate astray by bringing forward matters of no importance while holding back matters of greater importance; not to mention that if they were too few in number, the absence of one or two could bring public business to a halt.

But since, on the other hand, these consuls are appointed for the very reason that large councils cannot attend every day to public business, a middle way must be sought, and the inadequacy of their number counterbalanced by the brevity of their term of office. Thus if only thirty or so are appointed for two or three months,‘O they will be too numerous to be corrupted in such a short period.

This is why I suggested that their successors should never be appointed until the very time when they take over the duties of their predecessors.

[36] Their duty is to summon the senate when any number of them, however few, think it necessary to put before it matters for its decision, to adjourn the senate, and to carry out its decisions on public business.

How this is to be done in good order so as not to hold up business by useless discussions, I shall now briefly explain.

The consuls should consider the matter to be put before the senate and the action that needs to be taken, and if they are all of one mind, they should summon the senate and, after duly explaining the poin t at issue, declare their own view and put it to the vote in the usual way without waiting for any other view.

But if the consuls are divided in their opinions, the view taken by the majority must be put to the senate first, and if this is not approved by the majority of the senate and consuls and the total of doubtful and negative votes outnumber the affirmative- this being ascertained by secret ballot, as we have already mentioned - they should then bring forward the second opinion which had fewer votes from the consuls than the first opinion, and so on with the rest of the opinions.

If none of these views is approved by a majority of the senate, there must be an adjournment to the next day or for a short period so that the consuls can meanwhile see whether they can find other measures which may give more satisfaction. If they can find no others, or if the majority of the senate does not approve those they have found, then the opinion of each senator is to be heard.

If none of these, again, is supported by a majority of the senate, then each opinion is again to be put to the vote and a count be taken not only of affirmative votes, as hitherto, but also of the doubtful and the negative votes. If the affirmative votes prove to be more numerous than either the doubtful or the negative votes, that opinion is to be regarded as carried, and on the contrary as lost if the negative votes prove more numerous than either the doubtful or the affirmative votes.

But if in every case the doubtful votes are more numerous than the negative or affirmative votes, then the council of syndics should join with the senate, voting along with the senators, the votes being restricted to “for” and “against;’ ignoring votes that indicate indecision. In respect of matters referred by the senate to the supreme council, the same procedure should be followed. So much for the senate.

[37] As for the court of justice or tribunal, it cannot rest on the same foundations as the one under a monarchy, as described in Chapter 6, Sections 26 and following. For (Section 14 of this Chapter) it does not accord with the fundamental laws of this kind of state to take any account of families or clans.

There is this further consideration, that judges appointed solely by patricians might indeed be restrained by fear of their patrician successors from pronouncing an unjust verdict on one of their own class and perhaps might not even have the hardihood to punish him as he deserved; but, on the other hand, aga inst the commons their audacity would know no bounds, and the rich would every day fall prey to their rapacity.

I am aware that for this reason the policy of the Genoese, that of appointing judges not from patricians but from foreigners, is widely approved; but as a matter of principle it seems to me an absurd arrangement to call on foreigners rather than patricians to interpret the laws. For what are judges but interpreters of the laws?

I am therefore convinced that here, too, the Genoese have had regard to their native character rather than to the real nature of this kind of state.

So we, considering this question in principle, must devise means best suited to this form of government.