The Supreme Council and Syndics

[27] To ensure that all patricians stand on equal terms in making decisions and in electing ministers of state and that all business is speedily dispatched, the system observed by the Venetians deserves our full approval.

To nominate ministers of state, they appoint some members of the council by 10�37 and when these have nominated in due order the candidates for office, every patrician votes for or against the candidate by secret ballot, with the result that it is not known thereafter who voted one way or the other.

Through this procedure not only do all patricians stand on equal terms in making decisions and business is speedily dispatched, but also each is absolutely free to cast his vote without incurring unpopularity, which is of first importance in councils.

[28] In the council of syndics, too, and in other councils the same procedure is to be followed; that is, voting must be by secret ballot.

But the right to summon the council of syndics and to set its agenda ought to belong to their president, who should sit every day with ten or more other syndics to hear complaints and secret accusations'8 by the commons against ministers,39 to take into custody the accused if circumstances so require, and to summon the council even before its appointed time if any one of them considers that there is danger in delay.

This president and those who meet with him every day must be appointed by the supreme council and out of the number of syndics, not for life but for six months, and their term of office is not to be renewed except after an interval of three or four years.

Confiscated goods and monetary fines, or some portion of these, are to be assigned to them. Other matters concerning the syndics we shall discuss in their proper place.

[29] The second council, called a “senate”, will be subordinate to the supreme council.40

Its duty will be to deal with public business, such as to:

• to promulgate the laws of the state
• to organise the fortifications of cities
• to give military commissions
• to impose taxes on subjects and to arrange for the disbursement of the revenue
• to reply to foreign envoys
• to decide where their own envoys are to be sent

Appointing the envoys should be the duty of the supreme council.

It is of first importance to ensure that no patrician may be appointed to any office of state except by the supreme council, lest patricians themselves seek to curry favour with the senate.

Next, all measures are to be referred to the supreme council if in any way they effect a change in the existing state of affairs, such as decisions on war and peace.

Therefore, the senate’s decisions on war and peace, to be valid, must be confirmed by the authority of the supreme council. And for this reason I would hold that the imposition of new taxes is a question for the supreme council alone, not for the senate.41

[30.] To determine the number of senators the following points should be taken into consideration. Firs� all patricians should have an equal hope of attaining senatorial rank; secondly, senators whose term of office has expired may nevertheless be eligible for reelection after no great interval, thus ensuring that the state may always be governed by men of skill and experience.

Finally, among the senators there should be quite a number who have ga ined a reputation for wisdom and virtue.

To secure all these objectives, no more effective means can be devised than this: It should be ordained by law that no one below the age of fifty may be admitted to senatorial rank and that 400- that is, about a twelfth part of the patricians-should be appointed for a year, and when this term has expired they should be eligible for reappointment after an interval of two years.42

In this way there will always be about a quarter4’ of the patricians serving as senators, with only short intervals between their periods of service; and this number, together with the number of syndics, is unlikely to be much less than the number of patricians who have reached their fiftieth year.

Thus for all patricians there will always be a good prospect of atta ining the rank of senator or syndic, and yet these same patricians will always be holding senatorial rank with only brief intervals between, as we have said, and (by what was said in Section 2 of this Chapter) the senate will never lack men of outstanding wisdom and skill.

Because this law cannot be broken without arousing the bitter jealousy of many patricians, no steps need to be taken to ensure its constant enforcement other than that every patrician who has reached the above-mentioned age should give proof thereof to the syndics.

These will then enter his name on the roll of candidates for senatorial office and read it out in the supreme council, so that he may take a seat in the supreme council assigned to such persons, next to the seats of senators, along with others of the same status.

[31] The remuneration of senators must be of such a kind that they derive more advantage from peace than from war ‘4 So they should be assigned a 1-2% duty on imports and exports; for we cannot doubt that they will then safeguard peace as vigorously as they can and will never seek to prolong a war.

Nor should even senators, if some of them are merchants, be exempt from paying this duty; for such exemptions cannot be granted without great loss to commerce, as I think is generally realised. On the other hand, it should be ordained by law that no senator or ex-senator may fill any mil itary post;

No one whose father or grandfather is a senator, or has held senatorial office within the previous 2 years, may be appointed commander in chief or colonel, officers who, as we said in Section 9 of this Chapter, are to be appointed only in time of war. We cannot doubt that those patricians who are not members of the senate will uphold these laws with all their might, with the result that senators will always have more to ga in from peace than from war and will therefore never advocate war unless pressed to do so by the state’s most urgent need.

It may be objected that by this arrangement, i.e., the assigning of such considerable payments to syndics and senators, an aristocracy will be no less burdensome to subjects than any monarchy.

But royal courts require greater expenditure, which does nothing, however, to safeguard peace, and peace cannot be purchased at too high a price; apart from which there are the following considerations.

First, everything that in a monarchy is conferred on one man or a few men is here conferred on a great number.

Next, kings and their ministers do not bear the burdens of the state in company with their subjects, whereas here the reverse is true; for the patricians, who are always chosen from the wealthier classes, make the greatest contribution to the commonwealth.

Finally, the burdens of monarchy arise not so much from royal expenditure as from its secret policy. For however great may be the state burdens imposed on its citizens for the sake of safeguarding peace and freedom, yet they are borne and endured for the benefits of peace.

What nation ever had to pay such heavy taxes as the Dutch?

Yet they, so far from being exhausted, has become so prosperous as to be the envy of all.

So if the burdens of monarchy were imposed for the sake of peace, citizens would not find them oppressive. But as I said, it is because of the secret policy of this kind of government that subjects sink beneath their burden.

It is because the worth of kings counts for more in war than in peace, and because those who wish to reign alone must do their best to keep their subjects in a state of poverty.46

I here omit other points noted some time ago by that wise Dutchman V. H.47 because they are irrelevant to my purpose, which is merely to describe the optimum of each kind of state.