Superphysics Superphysics
Chapter 8c

The Supreme Council and Syndics

by Spinoza
7 minutes  • 1281 words

[19.] The sovereignty of this kind of state is vested in this council as a whole and not in each individual member.

The patricians must be so bound together by laws as to form a single body directed by a single mind.

But laws simply by themselves are weak and are easily broken when their guardians are the very persons who can transgress and the only persons who should take warning from the punishment of transgressors, and whose reason for punishing their colleagues is to curb their own desires through fear of the same punishment-which is quite absurd.

So a way should be found:

  • to keep the orderly procedure of this supreme council and the laws of the state inviolable
  • to ensure the greatest possible equality among patricians.

[20.] The appointment of a single governor or leader who also has the right to vote in council is bound to result in considerable inequality.

Therefore, it is most beneficial to the common welfare to set up another council, subordinate to this supreme council.

It would consist of patricians whose sole duty would be:

  • to ensure that the laws of the state regarding assemblies and ministers of state are kept inviolate
  • to have the power27 judge any minister of state guilty of transgressing the regulations pertaining to his office

I call these as “syndics”. 28

[21.] These syndics are to be appointed for life; for if they were appointed for a set period so as to be eligible later to fill other offices of state, we would fall into the absurdity which we have just indicated in Section 19 of this Chapter.

But lest they should become too arrogant through a very long period of rule, none are to be elected to this office but those who are at least sixty years old and are exsenators (see below).

[22] It will be easy for us to determine the number of these syndics, too, if we reflect that they stand to the patricians in the same relation as the entire body of patriCians to the populace, which the patricians cannot govern if they fall below the right number.

Therefore the number of syndics to patricians must be the same as that of patricians to the populace, that is, as I to 50 (Section 13 of this Chapter).

[23] Furthermore, to enable this council to discharge its duty in security, a part of the armed forces must be assigned to it, to which it may give whatever orders it pleases z9

[24] No salary is to be paid to syndics or to any minister of state, but they are to be assigned emoluments such that they cannot maladminister affairs of state without great loss to themselves. We cannot doubt that it is fa ir for the ministers of this state to be remunerated for their services, because the larger part of this state consists of the common people whose security is safeguarded by the patricians, while the commons themselves devote their time not to public affairs but

to their own private concerns. But on the other hand, since no one (as I said in Section 4, Chapter 7) upholds the cause of another except insofar as he believes his own interests to be served thereby, matters must be so arranged that ministers attending to public affilirs serve their own interests best when they are most vigilant for the common good.

[25] Therefore the syndics, whose duty, as we have sa id, is to ensure that the laws of the state are kept inviolate, are to be assigned the following emoluments.

Every householder who dwells anywhere within the state must pay to the syndics every year a coin oflittle value, say a quarter of an ounce of silver, so that the syndics may ascertain the number of inhabitants and may thus be informed what proportion of the number the patricians constitute.

Next, every new patrician on his election must pay to the syndics a large sum, say 20-25 pounds of silver.30

In addition, the fines imposed on absent patricians (those who have failed to attend a meeting of the council) must also be assigned to the syndics,’l and when offending ministers have to submit to the syndics’ jurisdiction and are fined a fixed sum or have their possessions confiscated, a portion of their goods must also be assigned to the syndics-not indeed to all of them, but only to those who are every day in session32 and whose duty it is to summon the council of syndics, concerning which see Section 28 of this Chapter.

To ensure that the council of syndics is always maintained at its proper number, when the supreme council is summoned at its customary time, priority must be given to an enquiry on this point.

If this duty is neglected by the syndics, it should then be the task of the presiden t of the senate (of whom we shall have occasion to speak presently) to bring this to the attention of the supreme council, to demand from the president of the syndics the reason for his silence, and to seek the opinion of the supreme council on this matter.

If he too is silent, the question should be taken up by the presiden t of the supreme court of justice, or if he too is silent, by any other patrician, who should demand a reason for their silence from the president of the syndics as well as from the presidents of the senate and of the court of law.

To ensure in addition the strict observance of the law excluding younger men, there should be a requirement that all who have attained the age of thirty and are not excluded by express law from taking office should cause their names to be entered on a roll kept by the syndics, from whom they should receive at some set price a mark of honour conferred on them, this being permission to wear a particular ornament, granted only to them as a mark of distinction and prestige.

The law should decree that no patrician may nominate for election anyone whose name is not entered on the general roll, under threat of a heavy penalty, and also that no one be permitted to refuse an office or duty that he has been elected to undertake."

Finally, to ensure the permanence of all the absolutely

fundamental laws of the state, it must be ordained that if anyone in the supreme council calls into question any fundamental law such as that conceming the extension of command of any general or the reduction of the number of patricians and the like, he is guilty of treason, and not only must he be condemned to death with confiscation of his goods, but some sign of his punishment should be displayed in public as a permanent record of the event. But to give stability to the other general laws of the state, it is enough merely to ordain that no law can be repealed or new law enacted without the agreement first of the council of syndics and then of three-quarters or four-fifths of the supreme council.

[26] The right to summon the supreme council and to propose matters for its decision should rest with the syndics,34 who should also be given first place in the council but without the right to vote.

However, before they take their seats they must swear by the well-being of that supreme council and by the people’s freedom that they will endeavour with the utmost zeal to preserve inviolate their traditional laws'5 and to act for the common good.

Thereafter, through their secretary, they should disclose in due order the matters for discussion.

Any Comments? Post them below!