Aristocracy: The First Model

An aristocracy should consist of many patricians.

Its strength is that it comes closer than monarchy to an absolute form of government.

• Therefore, it is more suitable for the preservation of freedom.

I have defined aristocracy as a state where the government is in the hands of a certain number of men, called patricians, chosen from the people.

I say expressly, “in the hands of a certain number of chosen men”.

The chief difference between this and a democracy is that:

• in an aristocracy the right to govern depends solely on selection
• in a democracy it depends mainly on a kind of innate right, or a right acquired by chance.

So even if the entire population were chosen as patricians, then the government will still be an aristocracy since the patricians were chosen.

• This is as long as the choice is not hereditary nor bequeathed in accordance with some general law,

If those chosen are only 2 in number, the one will try to gain superiority over the other.

• This will cause the state to split into 2 factions.
• It will split into 3, 4, or 5 factions if the government is in the hands of 3, 4, or 5 men.

The more there are to share in the government, the weaker the fuctions will be.

For an aristocracy to be stable, the minimum number of patricians must be determined by the size of the state.

[2]

Let us suppose a medium size state needs 100 best men on whom the sovereign power of the state is conferred.

They have the right to appoint their patrician colleagues when any one of their number dies.

These men will naturally do their utmost to ensure that their children or their nearest kinsmen shall succeed them.

Hence the sovereign power of the state’ will always be vested in those whose fortune it is to be the children or kinsmen of patricians.

Out of 100 men whom fortune raises to office, hardly 3 are singularly gifted with skill and understanding.

The sovereignty will thus be in the hands of 2 or 3 men who excel in mental power and who will easily contrive to gather everything into their hands.

Each of them, ambitious as is the way of humans, preparing his path to monarchy.

Thus, if our calculations are correct in the case of a state which by reason of its size requires at least a hundred men of leading rank, the sovereign power 5 must be in the hands of at least 5,000 patricians.

In this way there will never fail to be found 100 men of outstanding mental gifts, it being assumed that out of fifty men who seek and attain office there will always be one not inferior to the best, as well as others who seek to emulate the qualities of the best and are therefore also worthy to govern.

[3]

Patricians are most commonly the citizens of one city that is the capital of the entire state, so that the commonwealth or republic takes its name from that city, as was once the case with Rome, and is today with Venice, Genoa, etc.

But the republic of Holland takes its name from a whole province, which is the reason why the subjects of this state enjoy greater freedom.

What is the difference between government in the hands of one man and government in the hands of a large council?

1. Section 5, Chapter 6 explained that the power of a single man is far from being equal to bearing the whole burden of government.

This cannot be said of a sufficiently large council, for in asserting that a council is suffiCiently large one is also denying that it is not equal to the burden of government.

Counsellors are quite indispensable to a king. But this is not the case with a council of this kind.

2. Kings are mortal, whereas councils are everlasting.

And so the sovereign power 6 that has once been conferred on a council never reverts to the people.

This is not so with a monarchy, as shown in Section 25 of the previous Chapter.

3. The rule of a king is often precarious by reason of his minority, sickness, old age, or for other causes, whereas the power of a council of this kind remains always one and the same.

4. The will of one man is very changeable and inconstant.

This is why all law is the king’s declared will (as we said in Section I of the previous Chapter). But not everything the king wills must be law.

This cannot be said of the will of a council which is sufficiently large.

The council itself does not need counsellors.

• And so, all the declared will of the council must necessarily be law.

Thus, the sovereignty 7 conferred on a council of sufficient size is absolute, or comes closest to being absolute.

[4] Yet, insofar as this form of aristocratic sovereignty never reverts to the people and does not involve any consultation ofthe people, and since everything willed by this same council is unconditionally law, it must be considered as quite absolute.

Therefore its foundations should rest only on the will and judgment of that same council and not on the vigilance of the people, they being debarred both from offering advice and from voting.

So the reason why in practice the government is not absolute can only be this, that the people is an object offear to the rulers, thereby maintaining some degree offreedom for itself, which it asserts and preserves, if not by express law, by tacit understanding.

[5] Therefore, this kind of state will be most efficient if it is so organised as to approach absolute sovereignty – if the people are as little as possible an object of fear and if they retain no freedom except such as must necessarily be granted by the constitution of the state itself.

This freedom is therefore a right belonging not so much to the people as to the state as a whole, a right which is upheld and preserved solely by the aristocrats as their own concern.

For in this way practice will agree most closely with theory, as is clear from the previous Section and is also self-evident.

The more rights are asserted by the common people, the less sovereignty is in the hands of the patricians, as is the case in lower Germany,9 where the corporations of artisans, commonly called Guilds, to possess such rights.

[6] The fact that sovereignty is conferred absolutely on the council need not give the common people any reason to fear oppressive slavery at its hands.

For when a council is so large its will is determined by reason rather than mere caprice, because evil passions draw men asunder; and it is only when they have as their objective what is honourable, or at least appears so, that they can be guided as if by one mind

[7] So in determining the foundations for an aristocratic government one must ensure above all that they rest solely on the will and power of that same supreme council so that the council is as far as possible in control of its own right and in no danger from the people. To determine these foundations, resting as they do solely on the will and power of the supreme council, let us review those foundations for peace which, peculiar to a monarchy, are unsuited to this form of state.

For if we replace these with other equally effective basic institutions suitable for an aristocracy, leaving the rest as already laid down, all causes of civil strife will undoubtedly be removed, or at least this government will be no less secure than a monarchy.

On the contrary, it will be that much more secure and its condition that much superior as it comes closer than monarchy to absolute sovereignty, without endangering peace and freedom (see Sections 3 and 6 of this Chapter).

For the greater the right of the sovereign the more does the form of the state agree with the dictates of reason (Section 5, Chapter 3), and therefore the fitter it is for the preservation of peace and freedom. Let us therefore run through what we said

in Chapter 6 from 12 Section 9 on, so that we can reject what is unsuited to aristocratic government and see what is consistent with it.

[8] That it is necessary in the first place to found one or more cities, no one can doubt. But particular attention should be paid to the fortifications of that city that is the capital of the whole state, and also to those that are on the state’s frontiers.

For the city that is the capital of the whole state and holds the supreme right should be more powerful than all the others. However, in this kind of state it is quite unnecessary for all the inhabitants to be divided into clans.

[9] As for the armed forces, since in this kind of state equality is to be sought not between all citizens but only between patricians, and in particular the power of the patricians is greater than that of the common people, clearly the requirement that the armed forces should be formed only of subjects has no part to play in the laws or fundamental ordinances of this state.

But it is of prime importance that no one should be enrolled as a patrician unless he is well tra ined in the art of war. Still, to exclude subjects from the armed forces, as some suggest, is surely foolish.13

For military pay given to subjects remains within the realm, whereas that which is paid to foreign troops is a complete loss; and what is more, a most important bulwark of the state is weakened, since those who fight for hearth and home are sure to fight with especial valour. Hence it is also clear that those are no less mistaken who maintain that generals, colonels, captains, etc. should be appointed only from patricians.

For what valour in battle is to be expected from soldiers who are deprived of all hope of winning glory and promotion? On the other hand, to establish a law forbidding the patricians to hire foreign troops when the situation requires it,14 either for their protection and the suppression of civil strife or for any other reasons, is not only unwise but contrary to the supreme right of the patricians, concerning which see Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Chapter.

However, the commander of a single army or of the entire armed forces should be appointed only in time of war and only from the patricians; his command should last for a year at the most, with no possibility of extension of command or oflater reappointment.

Such a law, necessary in a monarchy, is even more so in an aristocracy.

It is much easier for sovereignty to be transferred from one man to another, than from a free council to one man.

Yet it often happens that patricians are subjugated by their own commanders, to the much greater harm of the commonwealth.

When a monarch is removed, there is merely a change in tyrant, not a change in the form of the state; but in the case of aristocratic government this change cannot take place without the overthrow of the state and the destruction of the most prominent men. Of such an event Rome has offered the most grievous examples.

However, our reason for saying that in a monarchy the armed forces should serve without pay does not apply to a state of this kind.

Subjects are debarred both from counselling and from voting. They are to be regarded on the same footing as foreigners, and should therefore be engaged for military service on no less favourable terms than foreigners.

Nor is there here any danger that these may be distinguished above the rest by the council.

Rather, to avoid a situation where everyone, as is generally the case, sets an exaggerated value on his own deeds, it would be wiser for the patricians to assign a fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.

[10] Again, for this same reason, that all but patricians are foreigners, it cannot be without danger to the whole state that lands, houses, and all the soil should belong to the state and be let to the inhabitants at an annual rent.

For subjects who have no stake in the state would all be likely to desert their cities in times of danger if they could carry wherever they pleased what goods they possessed.

Therefore in this state lands and farms are to be sold, not let, to subjects, but on this condition, that they should also pay every year a certain proportion of their annual income and so on, as is done in Holland.