Monarchy: Its Organisation

The Persians used to worship their kings as gods. Yet even their kings did not have the powerl to revoke laws once established, as is evident from Daniel, Chapter 6.

No monarch has been chosen on absolute terms without any explicit conditions.

For the fundamental laws2 of the state should be regarded as the king’s eternal decrees, so that his ministers are entirely obedient in refusing to execute his orders if he commands something that is opposed to the fundamental laws of the state.

We may make this point clear with the example of Ulysses. His comrades were carrying out his own command in refusing to release him when he was bound to the ship’s mast and bewitched by the Sirens’ song,3 although he ordered them to do so with all kinds of threats.

It is regarded as a mark of his good sense that he later thanked his comrades for rendering obedience to his first intention. Following this example of Ulysses, kings too are accustomed to instruct judges to have no regard for persons in administering justice, not even for the king himself if by some odd chance he issues a command that they know to be contrary to established law.

For kings are not gods; they are but men, who are often enchanted by the Sirens’ song. So if everything were to depend on the inconstant will of one man, there would be no stability. Thus, if a monarchy is to be stable, it must be so organized that everything is indeed done only by the king’s decree- that is, that all law is the explicit will of the king-but not everything willed by the king is law. On this see Sections 3, 5, and 6 of the previous Chapter.

[2J Next it must be noted that in laying down the fundamental laws it is especially necessary to take account of human passions. It is not enough to have shown what should be done.

The main task is to show how it can be brought about that men, whether led by passion or by reason, may still keep their laws firm and sure. If the right of the state, or public freedom, rests only on the feeble support oflaws, not only can the citizens have no assurance of its maintenance, as we showed in Section 3 ofthe previous Chapter, but this will even prove their ruin. For it is certa inly true that no condition of a commonwealth is more wretched than that of a good commonwealth that is beginning to totter- unless it collapses at one single

blow and plunges into servitude, which seems highly unlikely.'

So it would be far better for subjects to transfer their right unconditionally to one man than to covenant for guarantees of freedom that will prove untrustworthy and vain, or futile, and thus prepare a path to cruel servitude for later generations.

But if show that the foundations of monarchy as I have described them in the previous Chapter are strong and cannot be dismantled without arousing the indignation of the greater part of an armed people and that from them there follow peace and security for king and people, and if ! deduce th is from a general consideration ofhuman nature, no one will be able to doubt that these foundations are good and true, as is evident from Section 9 of Chapter 3 and Sections 3 and 8 of the previous Chapter.

That such is their nature I shall show as briefly as possible.

[3] That it is the duty of the sovereign 5 to be acquainted with the situation and condition of the state, to watch over the common welfare of all, and to bring about that which is to the benefit of the ma jority of his subjects, is universally acknowledged. But since one man alone cannot supervise everything and be always on the alert with a mind set for deliberation, and is often prevented by illness or old age or other causes from attending to public affairs, the monarch must have counsellors who would be acqua inted with current issues and would assist the king with their advice and often act as his deputies, so that the state or commonwealth may continue in one and the same mind.

[4] But human nature is so constituted that each pursues his personal advantage with the utmost keenness, regarding as most equitable those laws which he thinks are necessary for the preservation and increase of his own fortune and upholding another’s cause only so far as he believes his own position to be strengthened thereby.

Hence it follows that counsellors must necessarily be appointed whose private fortune and advantage depend on the general welfare and the peace of all.

So it is evident that if a certain number are appointed from every group or class of citizens, a proposal which receives the most votes in this council will be in the interests of a majority of subjects.

Although this council, being composed of such a large number of citizens, must inevitably have among its members many of an uncultivated mind, it is nevertheless true that every man is reasonably competent and sagacious in matters in which he has been long and attentively engaged.

Therefore if these appointments are restricted to those who up to their fiftieth year have been engaged in their own business without disgrace, they will be well-fitted to give advice relating to their own business, especially if in matters of greater importance they are granted time for reflection.

Furthermore, it is far from true that a smaller council will not have among its members some men of this kind. On the contrary, it is largely composed of such men, since everyone there strives his best to have as colleagues dull-witted men who will look to him for guidance. In large councils there is no opportunity for this.

[5] Furthermore, it is a fact that everyone would rather rule than be ruled, “for no one willingly yields sovereignty to another;’ as Sallust says in his first speech to Caesar 7 It is therefore evident that an entire people will never transfer its right to a few men or to one man if they can reach agreement among themselves and if they do not allow the quarrels which are a common feature oflarge councils to reach the point of civil strife.

So a people freely transfers to a king only that which is absolutely beyond its capacity8 to possess, that is, a facility for settling disputes and for making rapid decisions.

As for the not infrequent practice of appointing a king for the purpose of making war, on the grounds that kings are much more successful at waging war, it is downright folly for men, in order to wage war with greater success, to choose slavery in time of peace- if indeed there is really peace in the sort of state where, simply for the purpose of making war,9 sovereignty has been conferred on one man, who is therefore best able in war to display his worth and his unique value to them all. to On the other hand, the outstanding feature of a democracy is that its excellence is much more manifest in peace than in war.

But whatever be the reason for appointing a king, he cannot, as we have already said,” all alone know what is beneficial to the state; for this purpose he must have a number of citizens as counsellors, as we have shown in the previous Section.

And as it is quite inconceivable that in a matter of policy there can be anything that has escaped the attention of such a large body of men, it follows that there can be no opinion conducive to the people’s welfare that is not included among those submitted to the king by this council. Thus, since the people’s welfare is the highest law, or the king’s supreme right, it follows that the king’s right is to choose one of the opinions advanced in council and not to make any decree or give any judgment contrary to the view of the entire council (see Section 25 of the previous Chapter). However, if all the opinions advanced in council had to be submitted to the king. it is possible that the king would always favour the small cities which have fewer votes. ‘2 For although the council’s regulations should require that opinions be submitted to the king with no indication of their sponsors, it will never be possible to take such strict precau lions that none will be divulged. There. fore there must necessarily be this provision, that an opinion supported by less than a hundred votes should be regarded as void; and this is a law which the larger cities will have to uphold with all their might.

[6] At this point, were it not my purpose to be brief, I might point out many other considerable advantages deriving from this council; but I shall mention just

one that seems to me most importan� namely, that there can be no greater incentive to virtue than the general hope of attaining this office. For it is by ambition that we are all chiefly led, as we have shown at some length in our Ethics. 13

[7] That the greater part of th is council will never be minded to wage war and will always be strongly attached and devoted to peace is beyond all doubt.

For in addition to the constant fear oflosing their property together with their freedom as a result of war, they will have to provide the extra financial resources required for war, and furthermore their children and relations, busy as they are with domestic concerns, will be forced to turn their energies to warfare and to go soldiering, whence they can never bring back home anything but unprofitable scars. Because, as we said in Section 31 of the previous Chapter, the military force must receive no pay, and, by Section 10 of the same Chapter, it must be recruited exclusively from citizens and no others.

[8] Another factor which is also of great importance in promoting peace and harmony is th is, that no citizen may own real estate (see Section 12 of the previous Chapter). Hence the danger from war is practically the same for all; all will have to make a living by engaging in trade or by lending money to their fellow citizens-assuming that, as was once the case in Athens, a law is enacted forbidding the lending of money at interest to any but native inhabitants.

So they will have to engage in commercial deal ings that either make them mutually involved one with another or that require the same means for their furtherance 14 Thus the greatest part of the council will generally have one and the same attitude of mind towards their common interests and peaceful activities; for, as we said in Section 4 of this Chapter, every man upholds another’s cause only so far as he believes his own position to be strengthened thereby.

[9] It is beyond doubt that it will never occur to anyone to bribe this council. For if someone should win over one or two out of so considerable a number of men, he is hardly likely to gain anything from it; for, as we have said, an opinion supported by less than a hundred votes is void.

[!O] Furthermore when th is council is once established, it will not be possible to reduce the number of its members, as we shall see if we take into consideration the common passions of mankind. For all men are chiefly led by ambition, and there is no man of sound physical health who does not hope to live to a good old age. If, then, we calculate the number of those who actually attain their fiftieth or sixtieth year, and if we also take into account the large number of th is council who are appointed every year, we shall see that there can hardly be anyone of those who bear arms who is not possessed of high hopes of rising to this lofty position. So all will uphold, to the best of their ability, this law concerning election to the council.

For it should be noted that corruption, unless it creeps in unobtrusively, is easily prevented. However, a reduction in the number appointed from each single clan is more easily envisaged and would be less invidious than such a reduc13 [See E3App44.]

14 [The use by Spmoza of economic incentives to secure harmony prompted Vlco’s sneer In Scienza Nuova I, 335: “Benedict Spinoza speaks of the commonwealth as a society of shopkeepers “J Chapter 7 713 tion in the case of a few clans or the complete exclusion of one or two clans. Therefore (by Section 15 of the previous Chapter) the number of counsellors cannot be reduced unless a third, or fourth, or fifth part is removed simultaneously, which represents a considerable upheaval and is therefore altogether divorced from common practice. Nor is there any reason to fear delay or negligence in making appointments, since provision is made for this procedure by the council itself.

See Section 16 of the previous Chapter.

[II] The king, then, whether motivated by fear of the people or by his desire to win over the greater part of an armed populace, or whether he is led by nobility of spirit to have regard to the public interest, will always ratify the opinion that is supported by most votes- Leo (by Section 5 of this Chapter), that is of greater advantage to the greater part of the state; or else he will try, if possible, to reconcile the differing opinions submitted to h im so as to gain popularity with all (wherein he will spare no effort) 15 and to show them whata prize they have in his single self, both in peace and in war. Thus he will be most fully in control of his own right and most fully sovereign when he has most regard for the general welfare of his people.

[ 12] For the king by himself cannot restrain all in fear; his power, as we have said, rests upon the number of his soldiers and especially on their valour and loyalty, which will always endure among men just so long as they are bound together by some need, be that need honourable or base. Hence it comes about that kings are more prone to urge on their soldiers than to keep them in check, to gloss over their vices rather than their virtues,16 and generally, so as to exert pressure on the good, to seek out idlers and the debauched, giving them recognition, assisting them with money and influence, clasping their hands, throwing them kisses, and stooping to any form of servility as the price of despotism. 17 Therefore, to ensure that citizens should stand highest in the king’s esteem and should be in control of their own right as far as the civil order or equity permits, it is necessary that the militia be composed solely of citizens and that citizens should be his counsellors; while on the other hand citizens become completely subjugated and are laying the foundations for perpetual warfare from the moment that they allow mercenary troops to be engaged, 18 men whose trade is war and who find their greatest powerl9 amid discord and sedition.2o

[13] That the king’s counsellors should not be appointed for life, but for 3-5 years at the most. This is evident both from Section 10 and Section 9 of this Chapter.

If they were appointed for life, most of the citizens would have scarcely any hope of attaining this office. This would result in great inequality among the citizens, leading to envy and incessant murmurings and finally to outbreaks of sedition -which would no doubt be not unwelcome to kings who are eager to dominate.

In addition, the counsellors, rid of all fear of their successors, would cast off all restraint with little opposition from the king.

For the more they are hated by the citizens, the more they will cling to the king and the more ready they will be to fawn upon him.

Even a five-year term of office still appears excessive, for in this space of time it seems not altogether impossible fur a considerable part of the council, however large it may be, to be corrupted by bribes or favours.

So it will be a much safer arrangement if every year, two out of each clan retire and are replaced by a like number (assuming that each clan is to have five counsellors) except in that year when the lawyer of a clan retires and another lawyer is appointed in his place.

[ 14] Moreover, no king can promise himself greater security than one who reigns in a commonwealth of th is kind. For apart from the fact that he soon perishes whose safety is not desired by his own soldiers, it is quite certain that the greatest danger to kings is from those nearest them. So the fewer in number and consequently the more powerful the counsellors, the greater the danger to the king of their transferring the sovereignty to another. Indeed, nothing caused David more alarm than that his counsellor Achitophel had taken Absalom’s side 2l Then again, if all power22 has been transferred absolutely to one man, it is23 much simpler for it to be transferred from one man to another. Two common soldiers undertook to transfer the Roman Empire, and they succeeded (Tacitus, Histories, Book 1).24 I pass over the devices and cunning wiles which counsellors must employ to avoid falling victim to jealousy; for these are known only too well, and no reader of history can be unaware that the loyalty of counsellors has often proved their ruin. So for their own protection they have to be cunning, not loyal.

But if counsellors are too many in number to unite in the same crime and are all equal with one another, and their term of office does not exceed four years, they cannot possibly be an object of fear to the king unless he attempts to deprive them of their freedom, whereby he will offend all citizens equally 25 For (as Antonio Perez well remarks) the exercise of absolute dominion is very dangerous to the ruler, very hateful to his subjects, and opposed to the established laws both divine and human, as is shown by countless examples 26

[15] Besides these laws, in the previous Chapter we have laid down other fundamental laws which are effective in securing for the king his sovereignty and for the citizens their freedom and peace. These we shall go into in due course, for it

was my purpose first of all to explain those laws that concern the supreme council and which are of the greatest importance. I shall now go on to deal with the rest of them in the order in which I propounded them.

[16] There can be no doubt that citizens are that much more powerful and therefore more fully in control of their own right as their cities are larger and better fortified.

For the safer their dwelling place, the more capable they are of safeguarding their freedom, that is, the less they need fear an enemy, without or within; and it is an assured fact that the wealthier men become, the more natural it is for them to take measures to protect themselves.27

But those cities that stand in need of another’s power for their preservation do not have equal right with that other; they are subject to another’s right to the extent that they stand in need of the other’s power. For we have shown in Chapter 2 that right is defined by power alone.

[17] It is also for th is same purpose-viz. that citizens may keep control over their own right and may safeguard their freedom-that the military force should be composed only of citizens, with no exemptions. For an armed man is more fully in control of his own right than an unarmed man (see Section 12 of th is Chapter), and in giving up their arms and entrusting their cities’ defences to another, citizens are making an absolute transfer of their right to him, committing it entirely to his good faith.

A further consideration is men’s avarice, which is generally a prevailing motive; for it is impossible for mercenaries to be hired except at great expense, and citizens find very irksome the exactions needed to maintain soldiers in idleness. The fact that no one should be appointed to command the entire military force or a great part of it except under urgent necessity and then for a year at the most is familiar to all who have read history, sacred or profane.

There is nothing that reason teaches more clearly than this; for it is obvious that the might of the state is then entrusted to one who will find opportunity enough to monopolise military glory and surpass the king in renown or to win the loyalty of the army by indulgence, generosity, and the other arls usually practised by generals whose aim is slavery for others and despotism for themselves. Finally, for the greater security of the state I have added this provision, that these army commanders are to be chosen from the king’s counsellors or ex-counsellors, that is, from men who have reached an age when people choose the traditional and the safe in preference to the new and the perilous.28

[18] My purpose in saying that the citizens should be divided into clans and that an equal number of counsellors should be appointed from each clan was this, that the larger cities should have more counsellors proportionately to the number of their citizens and should have more voting power, as is fa ir. For the power of a state, and consequently its right, must be assessed from the number of its citizens; nor do I think that any more su itable means can be devised for maintaining th is equality between citizens, because29 all men are so constituted by nature that

each wants to be identified with his own kind and to be distinguished by lineage from others.

[ 19] Furthermore, in a state of Nature the one thing a man cannot appropriate to himself and make his own is land30 and whatever is so fixed to the land that he cannot conceal it anywhere or carry it away where he pleases.31 Thus the land and whatever is fixed to it in the way we have described is especially the public property of the commonwealth, that is, of all those who by their united strength can claim it, or of him to whom all have delegated the power32 to claim it.33 Consequently, the land and whatever is fixed thereto must have, in the eyes of the citizens, a value as great as is their need to set their feet thereon and to be able to defend their common right or freedom. In Section 8 of this Chapter we have shown the advantages that must thereby accrue to the commonwealth.

[20] In order that the citizens should be, as far as possible, on terms of equality-a prime necessity in a commonwealth - none are to be regarded as noblemen except those of royal descent. 34 But if it were permissible for all of royal descent to marry or to have children, they would in time increase to a very large number and would become not only a burden to the king and all the citizens but very much an object of fear as well. For men who enjoy abundant leisure are prone to contemplate crime. Hence it is mainly on account of their nobles that kings are induced to go to war because, surrounded by nobles, they find more safety and security in war than in peace. But this being a well-known fact, I pass it by, as also my remarks in Sections 15 t0 27 of the previous Chapter. For the main points have been established in this Chapter, and the rest are self-evident.

[21] The following points are also universally accepted: That the number of the judges should be too great to allow of a considerable part of them being bribed by a private individual; that they should not vote openly but by secret ballot; and that they deserve to be paid for their services. But it is the general custom to pay them an annual salary, with the result that they are in no great hurry to settle law suits and disputes frequently reach no end. Again, in cases where confiscated goods fall to the crown, it is not always justice or truth that are the main considerations, but the extent of a man’s wealth. Informers are everywhere, and the wealthy are seized as prey. These evils, grievous and intolerable as they are, are excused on the grounds of the urgency of war but are continued even in time of

30 [ThlS passage summanzes nicely the dlSl:mchon between Spinoza’s ‘state of Nature’ ($latus naturalis) and Locke’s ’natural state’ A central role of the social contract ID Locke is the mamtenance and preservation of property fights which preexist the contract. For Spmoza, property Itself IS a creation of Civil society.]

peace.35 Still, the avarice of judges, those that are appointed for two or three years at the most, is kept in bounds by fear of their successors, not to mention again that the judges cannot own real estate; and to make a profit they must lend money to their fellow citizens. Thus they are compelled to have regard for the interests of their fellow citizens rather than to victimise them, particularly if there are a large number of judges, as we have said.

[22] But the military force, as we have said, is to be assigned no pay,36 freedom being the supreme reward for military service. In a state of Nature it is simply for freedom’s sake that each strives his best to defend himself, and he expects no other reward for his valour in war but his independence. Now in a civil order the citizens as a body are to be considered as a man in a state of Nature; so in fighting on behalf of that civil order they are all battling for themselves and serving themselves. But counsellors, judges, magistrates, etc. are serving others rather than themselves, and it is therefore right that they should be paid for their service. Moreover, in time of war there can be no nobler or more powerful incentive to victory than the idea of freedom. But if, on the other hand, only a portion of the citizens were to be detailed for military service-for which reason they must also be assigned some fixed pay-the king will necessarily distinguish these above the rest (as we have shown in Section 12 of this Chapter). Yet these are men skilled only in the arts of war, and in peace time, having too little to do, they become debauched and in the end are driven by poverty to think of nothing but rapine, civil discord, and war. 37 Thus we can assert that a monarchy of this kind is really a state of war; it is only the soldiers who enjoy freedom, the rest being slaves.

[23] Our remarks in Section 32 of the previous Chapter concerning the admission of foreigners I believe to be self-evident. Moreover, I think no one can doubt that those who are near kinsmen to the king should be at some distance from him and engaged in matters not of war but of peace, such as may bring honour to them and tranquillity to the state. Yet not even this has been deemed a sufficient precaution by TUrkish despots who therefore regard it as an obl igation to slaughter all their brothers. Nor is this surprising; for the more absolutely sovereignty has been transferred to one man, the more easily it can be transferred from one to another (as we have illustrated by an example in Section 14 of th is Chapter). But in the case of a monarchy such as we are here describing-that is, one in which there is no mercenary soldiery- there can be no doubt that the measures we have proposed will be a sufficient provision for the king’s safety. [24] Nor can anyone call into question the measures we proposed in Sections 34 and 35 of the previous Chapter. And that the king should not marry a foreigner is easily proved. For apart from the fact that two commonwealths, even when united by treaty, remain in a state of hostility (Section 14, Chapter 3), it is of the �5 [Tacitus, Histories II, lxxxiv, 1-2 J 36 [See TP6131. Spmoza appear.; to regard payments to rank and file in wartime as a subsistence allowance rather than a salary.] 37 [TIllS passage is an adaptation of Sallust, Catiline 5.] 718 Political Treatise utmost importance to see to it that the king’s domestic concerns do not lead to war. And since quarrels and disputes are especially likely to arise from an alliance based on marriage, and since questions at issue between two commonwealths are generally decided by right of war, it follows that it is fatal for a state to enter into so close an alliance with another state. Of this we have a deadly example in Scripture. On the death of Solomon, who had married the daughter of the king of Egypt, his son Rehoboam waged a disastrous war against Shishak, king of Egypt, by whom he was utterly defeated.38 Aga in, the marriage of Louis XIV, king of France, with the daughter of Philip IV sowed the seeds of another war.39 And besides these, history provides numerous examples. [25] The form of the state must be preserved unchanged; and so there must be but one king, a male, and the sovereignty must be indivisible. I have said that the king’s eldest son should succeed his father by right; or else, if the king is without issue, his nearest kinsman. This is evident not only from Section 13 of the previous Chapter but also because the election of a king by the people should, if possible, be for all time; otherwise it will necessarily come about that the sovereignty of the state will frequently pass into the hands of the people, a drastic and therefore a very dangerous development. Those who maintain that the king, being master of the state and holding it by absolute right, can hand it on to whom he pleases40 and choose whatever successor he pleases and that therefore the king’s son is heir to the throne by right, are quite mistaken.4l The king’s will has the force oflaw just as long as he holds the sword of the commonwealth, for the right to rule is determined by power alone. Therefore a king can indeed abdicate, but he cannot hand over his sovereignty to another without the acquiescence of the people or its stronger part. To understand this more clearly, it should be noted that children are heirs to their parents not by natural right but by civil right, for it is only through the power of the commonwealth that one can be the owner of a particular property.” Therefore, by that same power or right whereby a man’s will concerning his own property is held to be valid, that same will continues to be valid even after his death as long as the commonwealth endures. And it is for th is reason that everyone in a civil order retains even after death the same right that he held when al ive, because, as we have said, it is not so much by his own power as by the commonwealth’s power, which is a continuing power, that a man can make decisions concerning his property. But with the king the case is quite different, for the king’s will is the civil law itself, and the king is the commonwealth itsel£43 So there is a sense in which, with the death of the king, the common- " [2 ChroDicies 8.1 1 , 12.2-9.1 �9 [The War of Succession for the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, 1 667-1668.] 40 [I read “,,[it for vellet. -S S 1 41 [Hobbes argued In the De eive that It was best for subJects to be the inhentance of thelf kmg (X, 1 8). that the kmg was empowered to give or sell hiS sovereignty to another (IX, 1 3). and that he could bequeath It to anyone he pleased (VII, 15 and IX, 12).] 42 [Again an anhcipatIon and rejectIOn of the Lockean account of property.J 43 [See Hobbes’ definitIon of a commonwealth III De cive V, 9] Chapter 7 719 wealth dies, and civil order reverts to natural order; and thus sovereignty reverts naturally to the people, which therefore has the right to enact new laws and repeal the 01d 4’ So it is plain that no man succeeds the king by right except the one whom the people wills to be his successor, or, in the case of a theocracy like the ancient commonwealth of the Hebrews, one whom God has chosen through his prophet. We could also deduce this from the fact that the king’s sword or right is in reality the will of the people or of its stronger part; or again from the fact that men, endowed with reason, can never give up their right so completely as to cease to be men and be accounted as sheep. But there is no need to pursue this further. [26] Religious right, or the right to worship God, is something no one can transfer to another. However, we have discussed this at some length in the last two chapters of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. And now I think I have set forth briefly, butwith sufficient clarity, the fundamental laws of a good monarchy. Their interconnection or conformity with the state will be readily apparent to anyone who will examine them all together with some attention. It remains only for me to remind the reader that the monarchy I here have in mind is one established by a free people, for whom alone these suggestions can be helpful; for a people accustomed to a different form of government will not be able to tear up the traditional foundations of their state, changing its entire structure, without great danger of overthrowing the entire state 4S [27] Yet perhaps our suggestions will be received with ridicule by those who restrict to the common people the faults that are inherent in all mankind, saying, “There is no moderation in the mob; they terrorise unless they are frightened;” 6 and, “The common people is either a humble servant or an arrogant master, there is no truth or judgment in it;47 and the like. But all men share in one and the same nature; it is power and culture that mislead us, with the result that when two men do the same thing we often say that it is permissible for the one to do it and not the other, not because of any difference in the thing done, but in the doer 48 Pride is appropriate to rulers. Men are made proud by election to office for a year; so what about nobles who hold their distinction without end? But their arrogance is bedecked by an air of disdain, by magnificence, by lavishness, by a certain blending of vices and a kind of cultivated folly and a refined depravity, so that vices, each of which when taken separately and thus rendered conspicuous is seen as foul and base, appear to the na· ive and the ignorant as honourable and becoming. Then again, “There is no moderation in the mob; they terrorise unless they are frightened.” For freedom and slavery do not go well together. Finally, that “there is no truth or judgment in the common people” is not surprising, since the H [So the “eternal election” of the king IS fictitious. Spmo:za’s view here bas more m common with Locke than With Hobbes J

important affairs of state are conducted without their knowledge, and from the little that cannot be concealed they can only make conjecture. For to suspend judgment is not a common virtue. So to seek to conduct all business without the knowledge of the citizens and then to expect them not to misjudge things and to put a bad interpretation on everything, this is the height of folly. For if the common people could practise restra int and suspend judgment on matters insufficiently known , or form correct judgment on the basis of scanty information , it would surely be more fit to rule than to be ruled. However, as we have sa id, all men have the same nature-all grow haughty with rule, terrorise unless they are frightened-and everywhere truth becomes a casualty through hostility or servility,49 especially when despotic power is in the hands of one or a few 50 who in trials pay attention not to justice or truth but to the extent of a person’s wealth. [28J Again, mercenary troops, accustomed to military discipline and inured to cold and hunger, usually despise the mass of citizens as being by far their inferiors in the matter of storming cities or fighting pitched battles. But no one of sound mind will assert that for this reason a state will be less successful or less durable. On the contrary, no impartial observer will deny that a state is most durable of all if it just has enough power to protect its possessions without coveting what belongs to others and therefore strives by every means to avoid war and to preserve peace. [29J The policies of this state, I admit, can hardly be concealed;51 but everyone will also agree with me that it is far better for the honest policies of a state to be open to its enemies than for the guilty secrets of tyrants to be kept hidden from the citizens. Those who are able to shroud in secrecy their dealings with affairs of state have the state completely in their hands,52 and their treatment of the citizens in peace is no less hostile than their attitude to the enemy in war. No one can deny that secrecy is often of service to a state, but no one can ever prove that the same state cannot subsist without it. But on the other hand, it is quite impossible to entrust absolute control of public affairs to any man while also maintaining one’s freedom, and so it is folly to choose to avoid a small loss at the cost of a grave calamity. Naturally, it has always been the constant refrain of those who lust after dominion that, for a state, secrecy in the conduct of its affairs is of vital importance and they make other such assertions that, the more they are cloaked with a show of utility, the more they are likely to lead to oppressive slavery. 53 [ 30J Finally, although no state, as far as I know, has included in its constitution all the features I have here described, we can nevertheless confirm from actual experience that this form of monarchy is the best, if we will but consider the reasons for the preservation of any civilised state and for its overthrow. But this is a task I

could not here undertake without wearying the reader. Nevertheless, I cannot pass over in silence one example which seems worthy of mention: I refer to the state of the Aragonese,54 whose singular loyalty to their kings was matched by the steadfastness with which they preserved unbroken the constitution of their kingdom. As soon as they had rid themselves of the slavish yoke of the Moors they resolved to choose themselves a king. Being unable to agree among themselves as to the conditions for this election, they therefore decided to consult the Pope55 on this matter. He, who in this affair conducted himself truly as the vicar of Christ, rebuked them because, not taking sufficient warning from the example of the Hebrews, they were so utterly set on seeking a king. But if they would not change their minds, he advised them to choose a king only after creating institutions that were equitable and suited to the character of the people; in particular, they should bring into being a supreme council, like the Ephors of the Spartans, which would provide a counterbalance to the kings and which would possess the absolute right to decide any disputes that might arise between king and citizens. Following this advice, then, they established laws that they considered to be the most equitable of which the supreme interpreter, and consequently the highest judge, should be not the king but a council called “The Seventeen,” whose president is called “The Justice.” So this Justice and the Seventeen, appointed for life not by vote but by lot, had absolute right to review and annul all judgments passed upon any citizen by other councils, whether political or ecclesiastical, or even by the king himself, so that any citizen had the right to summon the king himself before this tribunal. Furthermore, they at one time even had the right to elect and to depose the king. 56 But after the passage of many years, their king, Don Pedro, called “The Dagger:57 by means of canvassing, bribery, promises, and fuvours of every kind, finally secured the revocation of this right. (As soon as he had ga ined his point in the presence of all, he cut off- or, as I think more likely, wounded-his hand with a dagger,58 declaring that the right of subjects to choose their king was bound to involve the shedding of royal blood.j59 But he succeeded only on this condition, “that they have had, and continue to have, the right to take up arms aga inst any violent action whereby anyone may seek to encroach on their dominion to their hurt, yea, even aga inst the king himself and the prince, his heir, if he thus encroaches (on their 54 [Spinoza’s remarks on Aragon are probably derived from the RelaclOnes de Rafael Peregrina of An� tonia Perez (Geneva, 1 644).] " [GregOlY VII I 56 [habuerunt regem ellgendi et potestate fJrivandi.] 57 [Pedro IV (1336-1387) I 58 [Spinoza reads Perez’ use COTt6 la mano"as “he cut off his hand ttl 59 [Perez wrote’ uQue tal fuero, y {uero de (loder eligir Rey los vasallos, sangre de Rey avia de costar.” The traditional mterpretabon, fostered by the anonymous English translation of Perez publIShed ID 1715, interprets Pedro’s sheddmg hiS blood ID exchange for the abohtlon of such a pnvilege. Spmoza Interprets Perez as c1almmg Instead tbat sucb a pnvilege (being able to elect or to depose the king) IS dangerous to the king (see TP7/25), and tbls IS probably the more correct reading.]

dominion).” It is obvious that by this condition they did not so much abolish as amend the above-mentioned right. For, as we have shown in Sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 4, it is not by civil right but by right of war that a king can be deprived of his power to rule; in other words, it is by violence alone that his subjects may resist his violence. Besides this condition they stipulated others,60 which are irrelevant to our purpose. These usages, drawn up with universal consent, continued inviolate for an incredible space of time, kings and subjects behaving with equal loyalty to one another. But after Ferdinand, the first of them all to be styled “The Catholic; inherited the kingdom of Castile,6l the Castil ians, becoming envious of this privilege of the Aragonese, never ceased to urge Ferdinand to abolish those rights. But he, being not yet accustomed to absolute rule, did not venture to take action and replied to his counsellors as follows: “Apart from the fact that he had accepted the kingship of Aragon on terms with which they were acquainted, and had sworn faithfully to observe those terms and that to break one’s faith is the act of a savage, he had come to the conclusion that his kingdom would be stable only as long as the king had no greater measure of security than that enjoyed by his subjects, so that neither would the king outweigh his subjects nor his subjects their king. For if either party were to become more powerful than the other, the weaker would attempt not only to recover its former equality but to retaliate upon the other through resentment at the injury it had suffered. This would result in the ruin of one or both.” These are indeed wise words, which I could not sufficiently admire had they been uttered by a king accustomed to rule over slaves, not over free men. So the Aragonese retained their freedom after the time of Ferdinand-though no longer by right but by the favour of their kings, who exceeded them in powerright up to the time of Phil ip II, who oppressed them with more success but with no less cruelty than he oppressed the United Provinces. And although Philip III is supposed to have restored completely the original position, the Aragonese, of whom the majority were motivated by eagerness to flatter the powerful (for it is folly to kick against the pricks)62 while the remainder were terrorised, have retained nothing but the plausible names and empty forms of freedom. 63 [31] We conclude, therefore, that a people can preserve quite a considerable degree of freedom under a king, provided that it ensures that the king’s power is determined only by the people’s power and depends on the people for its maintenance. This has been the one and only guideline I have followed in laying down the foundations of monarchy.

60 [The king ID fact had to take an oatb to mamtam the rights, freedom, and customs of Aragon before bemg crowned J 6 1 [Ferdmand of Aragon (1476-1516) became regent of Castile through the testament OrblS wife Isabella I 62 [Terence, Phonnio 77-78.} 630 [TaCitus, Annals I, lXXXI, 3.]