Monarchy: Its Nature

[I J Since men, as we have said, are led more by passion than by reason , it naturally follows that a people will unite and consent to be guided as if by one mind not at reason’s prompting but through some common emotion, such as (as we said in Section 9, Chapter 3) a common hope, or common fear, or desire to avenge some common injury. Now since fear of isolation is innate in all men inasmuch as in isolation no one has the strength to defend himself and acquire the necessi5 [dominandi bbidine The connotation IS sexual (see the General OeflDltions of the Affects followIng ElDef48).] 6 [Machiavelli. Discourses I, 55.]

7 [No doubt a reference to the executIOn ofEngland’s Charles 1m 1 649. For Spinoza’s more extended View on the subject, see TIP18/556 J

8 [ThIS last sentence is not mcluded in the Nagelate Schriften 1 Chapter 6 701 ties ofl ife, it follows that men by nature strive for a civil order,l and it is impossible that men should ever utterly dissolve this order.

[2] Thus the quarrels and rebellions that are often stirred up in a commonwealth never lead to the dissolution of the commonwealth by its citizens (as is often the case with other associations) but to a change in its form- that is, if their disputes cannot be settled while still preserving the structure of the commonwealth. Therefure, by the means required to preserve a state I understand those that are necessary to preserve the form of the state without any notable change.

[3] Now ifhuman nature were so constituted that men desired most of all what was most to their advantage, no special skill would be needed to secure harmony and trust. But since, admittedly, human nature is far otherwise constituted, the state must necessarily be so established that all men, both rulers and ruled, whether they will or no, will do what is in the interests of their common welfare; that is, either voluntarily or constrained by force or necessity, they will all live as reason prescribes. Th is comes abou t if the administration of the state is so ordered that nothing is entrusted absolutely to the good faith of any man . For no man is so vigilant that he does not sometimes nod, and no one has ever been so resolute and upright as not sometimes to break down and suffer himself to be overcome just when strength of mind is most needed. And it is surely folly to make demands on another that no one can himself satisfy, namely, that he should be more concerned for the interests of another than for his own, that he should avoid greed, envy, ambition, and so on, especially if he is one who is daily exposed to the strongest urges of every passion.

[4] Yet on the other hand experience seems to teach us that peace and harmony are best served if all power2 is conferred on one man . For no state has stood so long without any notable change as that of the Turks, and, conversely, none have proved so short-lived as popular or democratic states, nor have any been so liable to frequent rebellion . But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, there can be nothing more wretched for mankind than peace. Doubtless more frequent and more bitter quarrels are wont to arise between parents and children than between masters and slaves. Yet it is not to the advantage of household management to change paternal right into the right of ownership and to treat children as ifthey were slaves. It is slavery, then, not peace that is promoted by transferring all power’ to one man; for peace, as we have already said, consists not in the absence of war but in the union or harmony of minds.

[5] And in fac� those who believe that one man by himself can hold the supreme right of the commonwealth are greatly mistaken. For right is determined by power alone, but the power of one man is far from being capable of sustaining so heavy a load. As a result, the man whom the people has chosen as king looks about him for generals or counsellors or friends to whom he entrusts his own s& I [Hobbes, De cive I, 2, n. 1.] 2 [pot,sta8.1 , [pot,statem·1 702 Political Treatise curity and the security of all citizens, so that the state, which is thought to be purely a monarchy, is in actual practice an aristocracy- not indeed overtly so, but a concealed one-and therefore of the worst kind. Furthermore, if the king is a boy, or a sick man, or burdened by old age, he is a king only on sufferance, and the sovereignty is really in the hands of those who administer the most important affairs of state, or of those who are nearest the king; not to mention that a king who is a slave to lust has all his governmental decisions controlled by the caprice of one or another concubine or sodomite.’ “I had heard;’ says Orsines, “that women once used to rule in Asia: But for a eunuch to rule is really something new” (Curtius, Book X, Chapter I).

[6] It is also beyond doubt that a commonwealth is always in greater danger from its citizens than from its enemies; for good men are but few. It therefore follows that he on whom the whole right of the state has been conferred will always be more afra id of citizens than of external enemies and will therefore endeavour to look to his own safety, not consulting the interests of his subjects but plotting against them, especially those who are renowned for their wisdom or whose wealth gives them too much power.

[7] There is this to be added, that kings fear their sons, too, more than they love them, and the more so as their sons are more skilled in the arts of peace and war and are more popular with the subjects because of their virtues. As a result, kings seek to bring up their sons in a way that removes cause for alarm. In this matter, his ministers are very zealous in obeying the king, and will make every effort to have as their next king one who is inexperienced and whom they can skilfully manipulate.

[8] From all this it follows that the more absolute the transfer of the commonwealth’s right to a king, the less he is in control of his own right and the more wretched the condition of his subjects. Thus to establish a monarchy in proper order, it is necessary to lay firm foundations on which to build, from which would result security for the monarch and peace for his people, thus ensuring that the king is most fully in control of his own right when he is most concerned for the welfare of his people. I shall first briefly set forth what are these foundations for a monarchy, and then demonstrate them in an orderly way.

[9] One or more cities must be founded and fortified, all of whose citizens, whether dwelling within the walls or beyond them so as to farm the land, are to enjoy the same right of citizenship but on this condition: That each city must provide a fixed number of citizens for its own and the common defence. A city that cannot fulfIl this requirement must be held in subjection on other terms. [!O] The military force must be recruited from citizens alone, with no exemptions and from no other sources ’ So all men are required to possess arms, and no one is to be admitted to the roll of citizens until he has done his military tra ining and has undertaken to practise these skills at appointed times of the year. .. [Possibly a reference to James I of England.J 5 [See Machiavelli, Prince XI I-XI II, and Discourses II, 20.J Chapter 6 703 Next, the military force from each clan6 is to be divided into companies and regiments, and no one is to be chosen to command a company unless he is versed in military engineering 7 Further, while the commanders of companies and regiments are to be appointed for life, the commander of the military force of one entire clan is to be appointed only in wartime, and hold his command for a year at most, and be debarred from extension of his command or from reelection. The latter commanders are to be appointed from the king’s counsellors (of whom we are to speak in Section 15 and following), or from ex-counsellors. [II] The townsmen and countrymen of all the cities,8 that is, all the citizens, are to be divided into clans distingu ished by some name and badge; and all who are born of any of these clans are to be received into the number of citizens and their names entered on the roll of their clans as soon as they reach an age when they can bear arms and know their duty. But an exception is to be made of those who are convicted criminals, or dumb, or mad, or menials gaining a livelihood by some servile occupation. [ 1 2] The fields and the soil and, if possible, the houses as well should be public property,9 that is, should belong to the sovereign, by whom they should be let at an annual rent to citizens, whether townsmen or country-dwellers. Apart from this, all citizens should be free or exempt from any form of taxation in time of peace. Of this rent, part should be allocated to the defence works of the commonwealth, part to the king’s domestic needs. For in time of peace, it is still necessary to fortify cities as for war and to have in a state of readiness ships and other armaments. [13] Mter a king has been chosen from one of the clans, none but his descendants are to be regarded as of noble rank, and they must therefore be distinguished by royal insignia from their own clan and the other clans. [14] The male nobles related by blood to the reigning king and standing in the third or fourth degree of consanguinity to him should be forbidden to marry. Any children they may have should be accounted as illegitimate and unworthy of any office. They should not be acknowledged as heirs to their parents, whose estates should revert to the king. [15] The number of king’s counsellors who are nearest to him or second in rank should be considerable, and they should be chosen only from citizens: Three or four from each clan, or five if the clans number no more than six hundred. Together they will constitute one section of this council. They are elected not for life but for three, four, or five years, so that every year a third, fourth, or fifth part of their number must be appointed afresh. In making these appointments, how6 [familia.] 7 [In the seventeenth century, war was largely concerned With beslegmg or protecting fortresses or cities.] 8 [10 much of what follows in this chapter Spmoza follows Machiavelli closely, but modifies hIS pnociples to the Dutch siruation. The importance that he accords to the Cities IS due ID part to the fact that Holland was, In fact, a nahon of Cities, each a hub of commerce and mdusby.] 9 [publici ;uris.] 704 Political Treatise ever, it is most important that from each clan at least one counsellor should be chosen who is a lawyer. 1 0 [16] This selection of counsellors must be made by the king himself. At the time of 1he year appointed for the election of new counsellors, every clan must submit to 1he king 1he names of all its citizens who have atta ined 1heir fiftie1h year and have been duly proposed for 1his office. Of these, 1he king will choose whom he will. I! But in 1he year when the lawyer of a clan is to be replaced by ano1her, only 1he names oflawyers should be submitted to 1he king. Those who have served in this office of counsellor for the appointed time are not to continue in office nor to be entered on 1he list of candidates within a period of at least five years. The reason why it is necessary for one counsellor to be appointed from each clan every year is this: To avoid a situation where the council is composed alternately of inexperienced newcomers and experienced veterans, which is bound to happen if all the counsellors were to retire and be replaced toge1her. But if one is appoin ted every year from each clan, then only a fifth, a fourth, or at the most a 1hird of the council will consist of newcomers. Fur1hermore, if 1he king, through pressure of o1her business or for any other reason, is prevented for some time from attending to these appointments, then the counsellors 1hemselves should make temporary appointments until the king appoints o1hers or approves 1he council’s choice. [17] The primary duty of this council must be to uphold 1he fundamental laws of 1he state and to give advice on the conduct of affairs so 1hat the king may know what measures to take for the public good, the king not being permitted to take any decision without first hearing the opinion of this council. But if, as will generally be the case, 1he council is not of one mind but continues to be divided even after discussing the same matter two or three times, there must be no fur1her delay; the different opinions must be submitted to the king, as I shall explain in Section 25 of this Chapter. [18] It should also be 1he duty of the council to publish 1he king’s ordinances or decrees, to see that his decisions on matters of state are carried ou� and to supervise 1he entire administration of 1he state as 1he king’s deputies. [ 19] Citizens should not be able to approach the king except 1hrough 1his council, to which all requests or written petitions should be given for presentation to the king. Likewise, ambassadors of o1her commonwealths may be granted permission to address the king only 1hrough 1his council. Letters, too, sent to the king from o1her kings must reach him 1hrough 1his council. To sum up, the king is to be regarded as the mind of 1he commonweal1h, and this council as 1he mind’s external senses orl2 body of the commonweal1h, through which the mind 13 perceives the condition of 1he commonweal1h and does what it decides is best for itself. 10 [In addition to deputies, each of Holland’s eIghteen towns also sent a lawyer, the PenSIOnary, to tbe Provmcial Estates.] II [The stadtholders had the fight to appomt the magIStrates of a town from a hst of candidates presented by tbe town.] 12 [I read seu forceu as found In Gebbardt ( 1925, 302, hne 14) -S S.] 13 [I omit per quod m’l18 as found m Gebhardt ( 1925, 302, Ime 1 5) -S S I Chapter 6 705 [20] Responsibility for bringing up the king’s sons should also rest with th is council, and likewise their guardianship if the king has died, leaving the succession to a child or young boy, 14 But in the meantime, to avoid leaving the council without a king, an elder from among the nobles of the commonwealth should be appointed to fill the king’s place until the rightful heir reaches an age when he can sustain the burden of government. [21] Candidates for election to this council must be such as are well acqua inted with the nature of the government, the fundamental laws, and the state or condition of the commonwealth of which they are subjects. But he who seeks to fill the position oflawyer must know, in addition to the government and condition of his own commonwealth, that of other commonwealths with which it has any dealings. But only those who have reached their fiftieth year without any criminal conviction are to be entered on the list of candidates. [22] In this council no decision is to be taken regarding affairs of state unless all members are present. If anyone is unable to attend through illness or for any other reason, he must send in his place someone from the same clan who is an ex-counsellor or who is entered on the list of candidates. Ifhe fa ils to do this, and the council is forced to defer consideration of some business because of his absence, he should be fined a considerable sum. But the above should apply only when the issue to be debated affects the state as a whole, such as a question of war and peace, of repealing or enacting some law, of trade, etc. If the matter under discussion concerns just one or two cities, written petitions, etc., it will suffice if the greater part of the council is present. [23] To preserve equality between the clans in all things and to establish a regular order in sitting, making proposals, and speaking, each clan is to have its turn for presiding at the sessions, that which is first at this session being last at the next. But among members of the same clan, precedence should go to the one who was first elected. [24] This council should be summoned at least four times a yearl5 to demand from ministers an account of their administration, to ascertain the state of affairs, and to consider whether further measures are called for. For it seems impossible that so great a number of citizens should be continuously available for public business. But since public business must nevertheless be carried on in the meantime, fifty or more members of the council should be appointed to stand in for the council when it is adjourned, l6 meeting every day in a chamber next to the king’s apartment so as to exercise daily supervision over the treasury, the defences of the cities, the education of the king’s son, and, to sum up, all the duties of the great council that we have just enumerated except that they should have no power to deal with fresh matters with regard to which no decision has been taken. 17 14 [So the educatton of the future Wilham III was entrusted to loyal republicans by Jan de WItt 1 I S [The Estates of Holland met With tl1lS frequency J 1 6 [In Holland the dally administration was the charge of the Gecommitteerde Raden, a representative of the Estates of the ProvlDce when they were not m seSSIOn J 17 [These were also the functions of the Gecommitteerde Raden J 706 Political Treatise [25] When the council meets, before any matter is brought forward, five or six or more lawyers from the clans that take precedence in that session should have audience with the king to present any written petitions or letters they may have received, inform him of the condition of affairs, and gather from him what business he requires them to bring forward in this council. When they have learnt this, they should return to the council, and the first in precedence should open the matter to be debated. If the matter is thought by some members to be important, voting must not proceed at once but must be deferred for such time as the urgency of the matter allows. The council therefore being adjourned to a fixed date, the counsellors from each clan will meanwhile be able to discuss the matter separately and, if they think it of sufficient importance, to consult ex-<:ounsellors or candidates for the same council. If within the appointed time they can reach no agreement among themselves, that clan shall be deprived of its vote, for each clan can have but one vote. 18 Otherwise the lawyer of the clan, having received his instructions, should present before council the opinion they have judged best. The others should do likewise, and if, after hearing the grounds for each opinion, the majority of the council decide to consider the matter further, the council should again be adjourned to a date when each clan shall deliver its final opinion. Only then, before a full council, should voting proceed. Any opinion that is not supported by at least a hundred votes should be disregarded; the others should be submitted to the king by all the lawyers presen t at the council so that, after hearing each party’s arguments, he may choose which he pleases. Then the lawyers should leave him and return to the council, where all should wa it on the king at a time he has appointed to hear which opinion of those presented he considers should be adopted and what he decides should be done. [26] For the administration of justice there must be another council composed only oflawyers whose duty should be to decide lawsuits and to punish offenders. But all the judgments they deliver must be confirmed by those acting in place of the Great Council, which will consider whether judgment has been pronounced in accord with proper judicial procedure and without partiality. But if the losing party can prove that one of the judges has been bribed by his adversary, or that he has some other general reason for friendship towards his adversary or hatred towards himself, or that the normal judicial procedure has not been observed, the judgment should be set aside. It may be that the above procedures could not be followed by those whose custom it is to use torture rather than arguments to convict the accused in criminal cases. However, I am not here concerned with any judicial procedure other than that which befits the good government of a commonwealth.19 [27] These judges, too, should be very many, and their number should be odd: E.g., sixty-one or fifty-one at least. No more than one judge should be appointed from each clan, and not for life. Here again some portion of them should retire 1 8 [In tbe Estates of Holland each town had several deputies but only a smgle vote 1 19 [These last two sentences are not included in the Nagelate Schriften 1 Chapter 6 707 every year and an equal number of others be appointed. These should be from other clans and should be aged over forty. [28] In this council no judgment is to be pronounced unless all the judges are present. If any judge is unable to attend the council for some considerable time, through illness or for any other reason, another judge should be appointed temporarily to take his place. In voting, each judge must give his verdict not openly bu t by secret ballot. 20 [29] The remuneration of this council and of the deputies of the above-mentioned council should be as follows- first, the goods of those they have condemned to death and also of those who are fined; secondly, for every judgment delivered in civil suits, they should receive from the unsuccessful litigant a proportion of the total sum involved, and this should be for the benefit of both councils. [ 30] Other councils subordinate to these should be appointed in every city. Here aga in their members should not be appointed for life, but every year a portion should be appointed only from those clans who dwell in that city. But there is no need to go further into these details. [31] No payment for military service is to be made in time of peace. In time of war a daily payment should be made only to those who ga in their livelihood by daily labour. But commanders and other company officers should expect no gain from war other than the spoil of the enemy. [ 32] If an alien marries the daughter of a citizen, his children are to be regarded as citizens and enrolled in the mother’s clan. Those of alien parentage who are born and brought up in the state should be allowed to acquire citizenship at a fixed price from the officers of some clan and to be enrolled in that clan. And even if the officers of the clan are bribed to admit some alien at less than the fixed price, the state cannot take any harm therefrom. On the contrary, means should be devised for facilitating an increase in the number of citizens and securing a great influx of population 2l As for those who are not enrolled as citizens, it is reasonable that at least in wartime they should make up for their exemption from service by labour or some kind of tax. [33] Ambassadors who have to be sent in time of peace to other commonwealths to make peace or to preserve it are to be appointed only from the nobles, and their expenses provided from the state treasury, not from the king’s privy purse.22 [ 34] Those who attend at court and are the king’s servants, being paid by the king from his own privy purse, are to be excluded from every administrative post 20 [Secret balloting was the general procedural rule m Holland J 2 1 [Machiavelli, Discourses I, 6.] 22 [The Dutch version of Spmoza’s text, De Nagelate Schriften, adds here: “Maar men noet zodanige besfJieders verkiezen, dIe aan de Konmg bequaam zullen schijnen.” The Latm translation not appearing in the Opera Posthuma, “Sed tales s{Jeculdtores eligendi runt qui regi perit; videbuntur,” is rendered by Wernham ( 1958, 331) as “But secret agents IIUlst be chosen from such as seem SUitable to the king “J 708 Political Treatise or office in the commonwealth. I say expressly, “being paid by the king from his own privy purse” so as to exclude the king’s bodyguard. For there must be no other bodyguards but citizens of that same city, taking turns at keeping guard at court on the king’s behalf before his doors. [35] War is to be made only for the sake of peace, so that with the end of host ilities arms may be laid aside. Therefore when cities have been captured by right of war and the enemy defeated, the terms of peace must be such as not to entail the garrisoning of the captured cities. Either the enemy, on accepting the peace treaty, must be granted the opportunity of redeeming them at a price,23 or else- if by reason of their menacing position this would result in an enduring threat from the rear-they must be utterly destroyed and their inhabitants resettled elsewhere.24 [ 36] The king should not be allowed to contract a foreign marriage; he should marry only a kinswoman or a fellow citizen.25 But in the event of marriage to a citizen there must be this restriction, that her nearest kinsmen be debarred from holding any state office. [ 37] The state must be indivisible. Therefore if the king has more than one child, the eldest should have the right of succession. By no means must it be permitted that the state be divided between them or be handed on undivided to all or to some of them, and still less is it permissible to give part of the state as a daughter’s dowry. For it should in no way be permitted that daughters should inherit the throne. [ 38] If the king dies without male issue, the nearest to him by blood must be regarded as heir to the throne, unless he should have married a foreign woman whom he refuses to divorce. [ 39] As for the citizens, it is evident from Section 5 of Chapter 3 that each of them is bound to obey all the commands or edicts of the king published by the great council (for this condition see Sections 18 and 19 of this Chapter) even though he regards them as quite irrational; otherwise he may rightfully be compelled to do so. Such, then, are the foundations on which a monarchy should be built if it is to be stable, as we shall demonstrate in the next Chapter. [40] As for religion, no churches whatsoever are to be built at the expense of the cities, nor should any laws be enacted concerning beliefs unless these are seditious and subversive of the commonwealth’s foundations. So those who are granted permission to practise their religion publicly should build a church, if they wish, at their own expense. But the king may have a chapel of his own in the palace to practise the religion to which he adheres. 23 [potestas concedtJtur easckm pretia redimench 1 24 [Again Spinoza follows Machlavelh closely See Prince 111; Discourses II, 23 J 25 [Note also that though the Dages ofVemce were subJect to such a restncbon, Spmoza IS probably here thinking of the connection between the House of Orange and the Bntlsh House of Stuart, which brought autocracy to Holland under Will iam II (who mamed the daughter of Charles I), and which threatened to bnng CatholiCism under William III, who III 1 676 sued for the hand of Mary (the daughter of the future James II).}