Rights of Sovereign Powers

[I] The right of sovereigns, which is determined by their power, has been set forth in the previous Chapter, and we have seen that it consists primarily in this, that sovereigns are,l as it were, the mind of the state whereby all citizens must be guided.

So they alone have the right to decide what is good, what is bad, what is fair, what is unfair-that is to say, what must be done and what must not be done by individual citizens or by all collectively. We see, therefore, that to the sovereign alone belongs the right to make laws, to interpret them in particular cases when there is any doubt, and to decide whether a given action is aga inst or in conformity with the law (see Sections 3, 4, 5 of the previous Chapter).

Again, the sovereign alone has the right to make war, to decide upon and to offer terms of peace, or to accept them when offered.2 See Sections 12 and 13 of the previous Chapter.

[2] Since all these functions, and all the means required to execute them, are matters’ that concern the state in its entirety, that is, are affairs of state, it follows that affairs of state depend on the guidance of him alone who holds the sovereignty.’ It follows that it is within the sovereign’s right alone to judge the actions of any man, to demand of anyone an account of his actions, to punish wrongdoers, to decide legal disputes between citizens, or to appoint experienced lawyers’ to act in his place. Furthermore, it is his right alone to employ and to organise all the means to war and peace, namely, to found and fortify cities, to levy militia, to assign military duties, to issue commands as to what he wants done, to send out and to give audience to envoys for peaceful purposes, and, finally, to tax the people so as to meet all these expenses.

[3] Since the sovereign alone has the right to deal with public affairs or to appoint ministers for that purpose, it follows that a subject is committing treason if he engages in any public business on his own initiative without the knowledge of the supreme council, even though he believes that what he intended was in the best interests of the commonwealth.

[4] The question is often raised as to whether the sovereign is bound by the laws, and consequently whether he can do wrong. But since the words ’law’ and ‘wrongdoing’ are quite often used with reference not only to the laws of a comI [I read sint for sit as found In Gebhardt ( 1925, 291, lme 31).-S.S.]

2 [See Hobbes, D. ci"" VI, 18 1 3 [I omit omnia found m Gebhardt (1925, 292, line 9).-S.S.] 4 [imperium.] 5 [legum [atarum peritos, i.e., those experienced in the adrrumstratlon of the law(s). Spmoza’s cus.­ tomary term for “lawyer” IS juris peritU8 Here It appears to be a matter of those to be appomted lawyers, rather than of appointmg lawyers for some other task 1 Chapter 4 697 monwealth but also to the universal rules governing natural things in general and reason in particular, we cannot without qualification assert that a commonwealth is not bound by laws, or that it cannot do wrong.

For if a commonwealth were not bound by the laws or rules without which the commonwealth would not be a commonwealth, then it would have to be regarded not as a natural thing but as a chimera. So a commonwealth does wrong when it does, or suffers to be done, things that can cause its own downfall; and we then say that it does wrong in the sense in which philosophers or doctors say that Nature does wrong, and it is in this sense we can say that a commonwealth does wrong when it does something contrary to the dictates of reason. For it is when a commonwealth acts from the dictates of reason that it is most fully in control of its own right (Section 7 of the previous Chapter).

Insofar, then, as it acts contrary to reason, it falls short of its own self, or does wrong. This can be more clearly understood if we reflect that when we say that every man has the power to do whatever he likes with an object over which he has right, this power has to be limited not only by the potency of the agent but also by the suitability of that which is the object ofthe action. If, for example, I say that I have the right to do whatever I like with this table, I am hardly likely to mean that I have the right to make this table eat grass. Similarly, although we say that men are not in control of their own right but are subject to the right of the commonwealth, we do not mean that men lose their human nature and assume another nature, with the result that the commonwealth has the right to make men fly, or-and this is just as impossible-to make men regard as honourable th ings that move them to ridicule or disgust.

No, what we mean is this, that there are certain conditions that, if operative, entail that subjects will respect and fear their commonwealth, while the absence of these conditions entails the annulment of that fear and respect and together with this, the destruction of the commonwealth. Thus, in order that a commonwealth should be in control of its own right, it must preserve the causes that foster fear and respect; otherwise it ceases to be a commonwealth. For if the rulers or ruler of the state runs drunk or naked with harlots through the streets, acts on the stage,6 openly violates or holds in contempt those laws that he himselfhas enacted, it is no more possible for him to preserve the dignity of sovereignty than for something to be and not be at the same time. Then again, to slaughter subjects, to despoil them, to ravish maidens and the like turns fear into indignation, and consequently the civil order into a condition of war.

[5] We see, then, in what sense it can be said that a commonwealth is bound by laws and can do wrong. But if by law we understand the civil law, which can be enforced by the civil law itself, and by wrongdoing that which is forbidden by civil law- that is to say, if these words are taken in their proper sense-then in no way can we say that a commonwealth is bound by laws and can do wrong. For the rules that govern and give rise to fear and respect, which the commonwealth is bound to preserve in its own interests, have regard not to civil law but to natural 6 [Tacitus (Annals XVI, IV) accuses Nero oftllls practice 1 right, since (by the previous Section) they are enforceable not by civil law but by right of war. And a commonwealth is bound by them in just the same way as a man in a state of Nature who, so as to be in control of his own right or to avoid being his own enemy, is bound to take heed not to kill himself. And this taking heed is not a form of obedience; it is the exercising of human freedom. But civil laws depend solely on the commonwealth’s decree, and the commonwealth, to maintain its freedom, does not have to please anyone but itself and to deem nothing as good or bad other than that which it itself decides is good or bad for itself.

Therefore it has the right not only to be its own champion , to enact laws and interpret them, but also to repeal them and to pardon any offender from the fullness of its power.

[6] The contract> or laws whereby a people transfers its right to one council or one man should undoubtedly be broken when this is in the interests of the general welfare. But the right to judge whether or not it is in the interests of the general welfare to do so cannot rest with any private person but only with the ruler of the state (Section 3, this Chapter). So by civil right the ruler of the state remains the sole interpreter of these laws. Furthermore, no private person has the right to enforce these laws, and so in actual fact they are not binding on the ruler of the state. But if the laws are such that they cannot be broken without at the same time weakening the commonwealth-that is, without at the same time turning into indignation the common fear felt by the majority of the citizens-then by their violation the commonwealth is dissolved and the contract comes to an end. Thus the contract depends for its enforcement not on civil right but on right of war. So the ruler is bound to observe the terms of the contract for exactly the same reason as a man in the state of nature, in order not to be his own enemy, is bound to take care not to kill himself, as we said in the previous Section.