Sovereign Powers

⁷ 1. In a state of Nature (Section 2, previous Chapter), the man who is guided by reason is most powerful and most in control of is own right.

Similarly, the commonwealth that is based on, and directed by, reason is most powerful and most in control of its own right.

For the right of a commonwealth is determined by the power of a people that is guided as though by a single mind.

But this union of minds could in no way be conceived unless the chief aim of the commonwealth is identical with that which sound reason teaches us is for the good of all men.

⁸ 2. We must also take into consideration that subjects are not in control of their own right and are subject to the commonwealth’s right only to the extent that they fear its power or its threats, or to the extent that they are firmly attached to the civil order (Section 10 of previous Chapter).

Hence it follows that all such things as no one can be induced to do by reward or threats do not fall within the rights of the commonwealth.

For example, no one can surrender his faculty of judgment; for what rewards or threats can induce a man to believe that the whole is not greater than its parts, or that God does not exist, or that the body, which he sees to be finite is an infinite being, !O in short, to believe something that is contrary to what he perceives or thinks? Likewise, what rewards or threats can induce a man to love one whom he hates, or to hate one whom he loves?

In this category must also be included those things so abhorrent to human nature that it regards them as the worst of all evils, such as that a man should bear witness against himself, should torture himself, should kill his own parents, should not endeavour to avoid death, and the like, to which no one can be induced by rewards or threats.

If we still persist in saying that the commonwealth has the right or power to command such things, we can conceive this only in the sense in which it might be sa id that a man has the right to be mad or to rave.

For what else but lunacy would such a right be when no one can be bound by it?

Here I am speaking expressly of those things which cannot be part of the commonwealth’s right and from which human nature for the most part recoils.

For despite the fact that a fool or a madman cannot be induced by any rewards or threats to carry out orders, and that a few men, devoted to some religious cult, regard the laws of the state as the worst of all evils,!2 yet the laws of the commonwealth are 10 [This IS perhaps a reference to the Incarnation, which Spinoza reJects’ See Ep73 ]

not rendered void, since most of the citizens are restrained by them.

Therefore, since those who fear nothing and hope for nothing are to that extent in control of their own right (Section 10 of the previous Chapter), they are therefore enemies of the state (Section 14 of the previous Chapter), and the state has the right to coerce them.

⁹ The third and final point to be considered is this, that matters which arouse general indignation are not likely to fall within the right of the commonwealth.

It is without doubt a natural thing for men to conspire together either by reason of a common fear or through desire to avenge a common injury.

Since the right of the commonwealth is defined by the corporate power of the people, 13 undoubtedly the power of the commonwealth and its right is to that extent diminished, as it affords reasons for many citizens to join in a conspiracy.

There are certainly some things to fear for a commonwealth, and justas every citizen, or every man in a state of nature, as he has more reason to fear, is the less in control of his own right, the same is true of a commonwealth. So much, then, for the right of the sovereign over his subjects.

But before dealing with his right as aga inst others, I think I ought to resolve a question that is wont to arise regarding religion.

¹⁰ The following objection can be ra ised: Does not the civil order and the obedience of subjects such as we have shown to be requisite for a civil order do away with the religion whereby we are required to worship God?

Still, if we consider the facts, we shall find nothing here to give us pause; for insofur as the mind uses reason, it is not subject to the rights of the sovereign but is in control of its own rights (Section II of the previous Chapter). So the true knowledge and love of God cannot be subject to anyone’s jurisdiction, as is also the case with charity towards one’s neighbour (Section 8, this Chapter).

If we further reflect that the highest form that charity can take is to safeguard peace and to promote harmony, we shall have no doubt that he truly does his duty who gives to each man such assistance is as consistent with the laws of the commonwealth, that is, with harmony and peace.

As for external rites, it is certa in that they can do nothing at all to help or hinder the true knowledge of God and the love that necessarily follows therefrom.

So they are not to be regarded as of such importance that the peace and tranquillity of the state should be prejudiced on their account.

Moreover, it is certain that I am not the champion of religion by right of Nature, that is (Section 3, previous Chapter), by divine decree.

For I have no power, as Chrisfs disciples once had, to cast out unclean spirits and to perform miracles. This power is so necessary for the propagation of rel igion in places where it is proscribed that without it not only does one lose one’s labour, as the saying goes, but in addition one stirs up a host of troubles.

All ages have beheld the most grievous examples of this. Therefore everyone, wherever he may be, can worship God with true piety and mind his own affairs, as is the duty of a private individual.

But the burden of propagating religion should be left to God or to the sovereign, on whom alone devolves the care of publ ic affairs. However, I return to my subject 130 [See Hobbes, De cive VI, 18.]

¹¹ The right of the sovereign over citizens and also the duty of subjects has been explained, it rema ins for us to consider the sovereign’s right as against the world at large.

This is easily understood from what has already been said.

For since (Section 2 of this Chapter) the sovereign’s right is nothing other than the right of Nature itself, it follows that two states are in the same relation to one another as are two men in a state of Nature, but with this exception, that a commonwealth can take precautions against being subjugated by another commonwealth.

This a man in a state of nature cannot do, seeing that he is every day overcome by sleep, frequently by sickness or mental infirmity, and eventually by old age.

Besides these he is exposed to other troubles against which a commonwealth can render itself secure.

¹² A commonwealth, then, is in control of its own right to the extent that it can take steps to safeguard itself from being subjugated by another commonwealth (Sections 9 and 15 of previous Chapter); and (Sections 10 and 15 of previous Chapter) it is subject to another’s right to the extent that it fears the power of another commonwealth, or is prevented by it from carrying out its own wishes, or, finally, it needs the other’s help for its own preservation or prosperity.

For there can be no doubt that if two commonwealths choose to afford each other mutual help, then both together are more powerful, and consequently have more right conjointly, than either by itself. See Section B of the previous Chapter.

¹³ This can be more clearly understood if we bear in mind that two commonwealths are by nature enemies (Section 14 of previous Chapter), and so those who are outside a commonwealth and retain the right of Nature continue as enemies.

Therefore if one commonwealth chooses to make war on another and to go to all lengths to render the other subject to its right, it may by right attempt to do so, since to wage war it is enough to have the will to do so.

But it cannot come to any decision about peace without the willing cooperation of the other commonwealth.

Hence it follows that the right to make war belongs to each separate commonwealth, whereas the right to peace belongs not to a single commonwealth but to at least two, wh ich are therefore called “allies.“l'

¹⁴ This treaty l5 of alliance remains effectivel6 for as long as the motive for making the treaty-fear ofloss or hope of gain- remains operative.

But if the fear or the hope is lost to either of the two commonwealths, that commonwealth is left in control of its own right (Section 1 0, previous Chapter), and the tie by which the two commonwealths were bound together automatically disintegrates.

Therefore every commonwealth has full right to break a treaty whenever it wishes, and it cannot be said to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking faith as soon as the reason for fear or hope is removed 17 For each of the con14 [confoederatae.] is [foedus.]

tracting parties was on level terms in this respect, that whichever could first rid itself of fear would be in control of its own right, which it could use just is it pleased.

Besides, no one makes a contract respecting the future except in the light of the circumstances of the time; when these change, the entire situation must be reconsidered.

This is why each of the allied commonwealths retains the right to consult its own interests, and each therefore endeavours as far as it can to rid itself of fear and consequently to be in control of its own right and to prevent the other from becoming more powerful.

If, then , a commonwealth complains that it has been deceived, it certainly cannot blame the bad faith of its ally but only its own folly in entrusting its security to another who is in control of his own right and for whom the safety of his own state is the supreme law.

[15J SO to the commonwealths which have made a treaty of peace with each other there belongs the right to settle disputes that may arise concerning the terms or rules of the peace by which they have mutually bound themselves, because the terms of peace are a matter not just for the one commonwealth but for the contracting parties jointly (Section 13 this Chapter). If agreement cannot be reached, by that very fact they revert to a state of war.

[16J The greater the number of commonwealths that make a peace treaty with one another, the less is each to be feared by the others; that is, the less power does each of them have to make war. On the con trary, each is the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is (Section 13 of this Chapter), it is so much the less in control of its own right and must the more adapt itself to the common will of the allies.

[17J However, what we here say does not imply the annulment of that good faith which sound reason and rel igion bids us keep, for neither reason nor Scripture bids us keep every pledge we make. For example, if I have promised someone to keep safe some money which he has given me in secret to look after, I am not bound to keep my word from the time that I know, or believe I know, that the money given me to keep safe is stolen.

I shall act more rightly if! see to it that the money is restored to its owners. So, too, if one sovereign has promised another to do something that time or reason have later shown, or appeared to show, to be prejudicial to the general welfare of his subjects, he is surely bound to break his word.

Since Scripture, then, teaches us to keep faith only in the form of a general rule, leaving to each man to decide which special cases are to be excepted, it teaches nothing contrary to what we have just shown.

[18J But to avoid having to interrupt the thread of my argument repeatedly and to deal with similar objections hereafter, I should like to point out that all those things I have demonstrated follow from the most essential feature of human nature in whatever way it may be considered, namely, from the universal striving of all men to preserve themselves.

This striving is inherent in all men, whether ignorant or wise; and therefore, in whatever way we consider men to be guided, whether by passion or by reason, the result is the same because the demonstration, as we have said, applies in all cases.