Natural Right

⁸ We therefore conclude that it is not in every man’s power1 3 always to use reason and to be at the highest pitch of human freedom, but yet he always endeavours as far as in him lies to preserve his own being and (since every man has right to the extent that he has power), whether he be wise or ignorant, whatever he endeavours and does, he endeavours and does by the sovereign right of Nature.

From this it follows that Nature’s rightand established order, under which all men are born and for the most part live, forbids only those th ings that no one desires and no one can do; it does not frown on strife, or hatred, or anger, or deceit, or on anything at all urged by appetite.

This is not surprising, for Nature’s bounds are set not by the laws of human reason whose aim is only man’s true interest and preservation, but by infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a tiny part.

It is from the necessity of this order alone that all individual things are determined to exist and to act in a definite way.

So if something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, or evil, this is due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are for the most part ignorant of the order and coherence of Nature as a whole, and that we want all things to be directed as our reason prescribes. Yet that which our reason declares to be evil is not evil in respect of the order and laws of universal Nature, but only in respect of our own particular nature.

⁹ Furthermore, it follows that every man is subject to another’s right for as long as he is in the other’s power,15 and he is in control of his own right to the extent that he can repel all force, take whatever vengeance he pleases for in jury done to him, and, in general, live as he chooses to live.

¹⁰ One man has another in his power if he holds him in bonds, or has deprived him of the arms and means of self-defence or escape, or has terrorised him, or has so attached the other to himself by benefit conferred that the man would rather please his benefactor than himself and live as the other would wish rather than at his own choosing.

He who holds another in his power in the first or second way holds only the other’s body, not his mind; in the third or fourth way he has made the other’s body and his mind subject to his own right, but only as long as fear or hope endures. When one or the other is removed, the man remains in control of his own right 16

¹¹ The faculty of judgmen� too, can be subject to another’s right to the extent that one man can be deceived by another.

Hence it follows that the mind is fully in control of itself only to the extent that it can use reason aright Indeed, since human power should be assessed by strength of mind rather than robustness of body, it follows that those in whom reason is most powerful and who are most guided thereby are most fully in control of their own right So I call a man altogether free insofar as he is guided by reason, because it is to that extent that he is determined to action by causes that can be adequately understood solely through his own nature, even though he is necessarily determined to action by these causes.

For freedom (as I have shown in Section 9 of this Chapter) does not remove the necessity of action, but imposes it

¹² If a man has given his pledge to someone, promising only verbally to do this or that which it was within his right to do or not to do, the pledge remains valid for as long as he who made it has not changed his mind.

For he who has the power17 to break faith has in reality not given up his right; he has given no more than words.

Therefore, being by natural right judge of his own case, ifhe judges rightly or wrongly (for to err is human) that the loss resulting from the pledge he has given outweighs the advantage, his own belief will lead him to conclude that the pledge should be broken, and it is by natural right (Section 9 of this Chapter) that he will break his pledge. 18

¹³ If two men come together and join forces, they have more power over Nature, and consequently more righ� than either one alone; and the greater the number who form a union in this way, the more right they will together possess.

¹⁴ Insofar as men are assailed by anger, envy, or any emotion deriving from hatred, they are drawn apart and are contrary to one another and are therefore the more to be feared, as they have more power and are more cunning and astute than other animals. And since men are by nature especially subject to these emotions (as we said in Section 5 of the previous Chapter), men are therefore by nature enemies.

For he is my greatest enemy whom I must most fear and against whom I must most guard mysel£

¹⁵ Now (by Section 9 of this Chapter) every man in the state of Naturel9 is in control of his own right just as long as he can guard himself from being subjugated by another, and it is va in for one man alone to try to guard himself aga install others.

Hence it follows that as long as human natural right is determined by the power of each single individual and is possessed by each alone, it is of no account and is notional rather than factual, since there is no assurance that it can be made good. And there is no doubt that the more cause for fear a man has, the less power, and consequently the less right, he possesses.

Furthermore, it is scarcely possible for men to support life and cultivate their minds without mutual assistance.

We therefore conclude that the natural right specific to human beings can scarcely be conceived except where men have their rights in common and can together successfully defend the territories which they can inhabit and cultivate, protect themselves, repel all force, and live in accordance with the judgment of the entire community.

For (by Section 13 ofthis Chapter) the greater the number of men who thus unite in one body, the more right they will all collectively possess.

If it is on these grounds-that men in a state of Nature can scarcely be in control of their own right- that the Schoolmen want to call man a social animal, I have nothing to say against them.

¹⁶ When men hold their rights in common and are all guided, as it were, by one mind,2l it is certain (Section 13 of this Chapter) that each of them has that much less right the more he is exceeded in power by the others collectively.

That is to say, he has in reality no right over Nature except that which is granted him by the communal right.

For the rest, he is bound to carry out any command that is laid on him by communal consensus, or else (Section 4 of this Chapter) he may be rightly compelled to do so.

¹⁷ This right, which is defined by the power of a people,22 is usually called sovereignty," and is possessed absolutely by whoever has charge of affairs of state, namely, he who makes, interprets, and repeals laws, fortifies cities, makes decisions regarding peace and war, and so forth.

If this charge belongs to a council composed of the people in general, then the state is called a democracy; if the council is restricted to certain chosen members, the state is called an aristocracy;

If the management of affairs of state and consequently the sovereignty is in the hands of one man, then the state is called a monarchy.

19 [in statu ntlturali. A more literal rendenng would be “10 the natural state,” but this may suggest to the modem reader a readmg of presocletai conditions more close to Rousseau or Locke . The translahon “state of Nature” has been used consIStently ID what follows.]

20 [So Spinoz3 conceIVes the natural state as one of almost total bondage, In contrast to Hobbes, who regards It as a state of human freedom 1

21 [The Latin- una veluti mente- denotes a counterfactuaJ condition, because CIVil SOCiety Itself does not have a rmod m the theoretical sense ofthlS term deployed by Spmoza ID the Ethica.]

22 [potentia multitudinis. In what follows, multitudo IS usually rendered as “people,” the English term “rrruititude” having a somewhat pejorative connotation more akin to Sp1Ooza’s term vulgus. The phrase IS common 10 seventeenth-century JUfidtcal wnhngs.]

23 [imperium.]

¹⁸ From what we have shown in this Chapter, it becomes quite clear that in a state of nature there is no sin; or if a man sins, he sins against himself, not against another.

For no one is bound by the law of Nature to pander to another’s humour unless he so chooses, nor to regard as good or bad anything other than what he decides is good or bad from his own way of thinking.

The law of Nature forbids nothing at all except that which is not within anyone’s power to do. (See Sections 5 and 8 of this Chapter.) But sin is action that cannot lawfully be done.

If it were the case that men are bound by Nature’s ordinance to be guided by reason, then they would all necessarily be guided by reason; for Nature’s ordinances are the ordinances of God (Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter), which God has established by that same freedom by which he exists.

These ordinances therefore follow from the necessity of the divine nature (Section 7 of this Chapter) and are thus eternal and inviolable.

But the fact is that men are mainly guided by appetite devoid of reason; yet even so they do not violate Nature’s order but necessarily conform to it.

Therefore the ignorant or weak-willed man is no more bound by the law of Nature to live his life wisely than the sick man is bound to be of sound body.

¹⁹ Therefore sin cannot be conceived except in a state, that is, where what is good and bad is decided by the common law of the entire state and where (Section 16 of this Chapter) no one has the right to do anything other than what is in conformity with the common decree and consent.

For (as we said in the previous Section) sin is that which cannot lawfully be done, i.e., is prohibited by law, while obedience is the constant will to do what by law is good and what the common decree requires to be done.

²⁰ However, the term ‘sin’ is also commonly used of that which is contrary to the dictates of sound reason.

The term ‘obedience’ of the constant will to control the appetites as prescribed by reason.

If human freedom consisted in giving free rein to appetite, and human servitude to the rule of reason, I would entirely agree with this.

But since human freedom is the greater as a man is more able to be guided by reason and control his appetites, it would be incorrect to call the life of reason ‘obedience’, and apply the term ‘sin’ to that which is in fact a weakness of the mind rather than an instance of the mind’s freedom from its own control, someth ing through which a man can be called a slave rather than free.

²¹ However, reason teaches men to practise piety" and to be calm and kindly in their disposition, which is possible only in a state.

Moreover, it is impossible for a people to be guided as if by one mind, as is required in a state, unless its laws are such as are prescribed by reason.

Therefore it is not so improper for men who are accustomed to live in a state to apply the term ‘sin’ to that which is contrary to the dictates of reason.

For the laws of a good state (Section 18 of this Chapter) should be established in accordance with the dictates of reason.

I have said that man in a state of Nature, if he sins at all, sins against himself, see Chapter 4, Sections 4 and 5, where it is shown in what sense it can be said that he who holds the sovereign power and is possessed of the right of Nature can be bound by laws and can sin.

²² As far as religion is concerned, it is also quite certain that the more a man loves God and worships him with all his heart, the more he is free and the more completely obedient to his own self Still, when we have regard not to Nature’s order-of which we are ignorant-but only to the dictates of reason as they concern religion (at the same time realising that these are revealed to us by God as though speaking within us, or that they were also revealed to the prophets in the form of laws) then, speaking in human fashion, we say that he who loves God with all his heart is obedient to God, and he who is guided by blind desire is a sinner.25

But we must always remember that we are in God’s hands as clay in the hands of the potter,26 who from the same lump makes some vessels unto honour and others unto dishonour. 27

So a man can indeed act contrary to these decrees of God insofar as they have been inscribed as laws upon our minds or the minds of the prophets, but he cannot act against the eternal decree of God, which is inscribed on universal Nature and which takes into account the order of Nature in its entirety.

²³ Therefore, just as sin and obedience, taken in the strict sense, can be conceived only in a state, the same is true of justice and injustice.

For there is nothing in Nature that can rightly be said to belong to one man and not another; all things belong to all, that is, to all who have the power28 to ga in possession of them.

But in a state, where what belongs to one man and not to another is decided by common laws, a man is called just who has the constant will to render to every man his own; and he is called unjust who endeavours to appropriate to himself what belongs to another.

²⁴ With regard to praise and blame, we have explained in our Ethics that these are feelings of pleasure and pain accompanied by the idea of human virtue or weakness as a cause.29