God's Concurrence

Little or nothing remains to be said about this attribute, now that we have shown that God continuously creates a thing as if anew at every moment. From this we have demonstrated that things never have any power from themselves to affect anything or to determine themselves to any action, and that this is the case not only with things outside man but also with the human will. Again, we have also replied to certain argumen ts concerning this matter; and although many other arguments are frequently produced, I here intend to ignore them, as they principally belong to theology.

However, there are many who, accepting God’s concurrence, interpret it in a sense quite at variance with what we have expounded. To expose their fallacy in the simplest way, it should here be noted, as has previously been demonstrated, that present time has no connection with future time (see Ax. 10 Part I), and that this is clearly and distinctly perceived by us. If only proper attention is paid to this, all their arguments, which may be drawn from philosophy, can be answered without any difficulty. [How God’s (Jreservation is related to his determining things to act. ] Still, so as not to have touched on this problem without profit, we shall in passing reply to the question as to whether something is added to God’s preservation when he determines a thing to act. Now when we spoke about motion, we already hinted at the answer to this question.

For we said that God preserves the same quantity of motion in Nature; therefore if we consider the nature of matter in its entirety, nothing new is added to it. But with respect to particular things, in a sense it can be said that something new is added to it. Whether this is also the case with spiritual things is unclear, for it is not obvious that they have such mutual interdependence. Finally, because the parts of duration have no interconnection, we can say that God does not so much preserve things as continue to create them.

Therefore, if a man has now a determinate freedom to perform an action, it must be said that God has created him thus at that particular time. Nor can it be objected that the human will is often determined by things external to itself, and that all things in Nature are in turn determined to action by one another; for they are also thus determined by God. No thing can determine the will, nor aga in can the will be determined, except by the power of God alone.

But how this is compatible with human freedom, or how God can bring this about while preserving human freedom, we confess we do not know, as we have already remarked on many occasions.

[The common division of God’s attributes is nominal rather than real. ] This, then, I was resolved to say about the attributes of God, having as yet made no division of them. The division generally given by writers, whereby they divide God’s attributes into the incommunicable and the communicable, to speak the truth, seems a nominal rather than a real division. For God’s knowledge is no more like human knowledge than the Dog, the constellation in the sky, is like the dog, the barking animal, and perhaps even less so.

[The Author’s own division.]

Our division, however, is as follows. There are some of God’s attributes that explicate his essence in action, whereas others, unconcerned with action, set forth the manner of his existing. Of the latter kind are unity, eternity, necessity, etc.: of the former kind are understanding, will, life, omnipotence, etc. This division is quite clear and straightforward and includes all God’s attributes.