Creation

That God is the creator of all things we have already established; here we shall now try to explain what is to be understood by creation. Then we shall provide solutions as best we can to those questions that are commonly raised regarding creation. Let us then begin with the first subject.

[What creation is. ]

Creation is an operation in which no causes concur beyond the efficient cause.

A created thing is that which presupposes nothing except God for its existence.

[The common definition of creation is reiected. ]

We should note the following:

1. We omit the words ‘from nothing’, which are commonly used by philosophers as if ’nothing’ were the matter from which things were produced.

This usage of theirs arises from the fact that, being accustomed in the case of generated things to suppose something prior to them from which they are made, in the case of creation they were unable to omit the preposition ‘from’.

The same confusion has befallen them in the case of matter.

Seeing that all bodies are in a place and surrounded by other bodies, when they asked themselves where matter as a whole might be, they replied, “In some imaginary space.” So there is no doubt that they have not considered ’nothing’ as the negation of all reality but have imagined or pictured it as something real.

[OUT own definition is explained. ]

2. In creation no other causes concur beyond the efficient cause. I might indeed have said that creation denies or excludes all causes beyond the efficient cause. However, I have preferred to say ‘concur’ so as to avoid having to reply to those who ask whether God in creation did not set before himself an end on account of which he created things.

For better explanation, I have added this second definition, that a created thing presupposes nothing but God; because if God did set before himself some end, then obviously that end was not extemal to God. For there is nothing extemal to God by which he may be urged to act.

[Accidents and Modes are not created. ] 3. From this definition it clearly follows that there is no creation of accidents and modes. For these presuppose a created substance besides God.

[There was no time or duration before creation.] 4. Finally, neither time nor duration can be imagined before creation; these began along with things. For time is the measure of duration; or rather, it is nothing but a mode of thinking. Therefore it presupposes not just some created thing, but, in particular, thinking men.

As for duration, it ceases when created things cease to be and begins when created things begin to exist -created things, I say, because we have already shown beyond doubt that to God there pertains not duration but eternity. Therefore duration presupposes, or at least posits, created things. Those who imagine duration and time prior to created things labor under the same misconception as those who suppose a space outside matter, as is self-evident. So much for the definition of creation.

[God’s action is the same in creating the world and in preserving it. ] Again, there is no need for us to repeat here what we have demonstrated in Axiom 10 Part I, namely, that the same amount of force is required for the creation of a thing as for its preservation; that is, God’s action in creating the world is the same as in its preservation.

Having noted these points, let us proceed to what we promised in the second place. First, we must ask what is created and what is uncreated; and second, whether what is created could have been created from etemity.

[What created things are.] To the first question we reply, in brief, that the created is every thing whose essence is clearly conceived without any existence, and which is nevertheless conceived through itself: for example, matter, of which we have a clear and distinct conception when we conceive it under the attribute of extension, and which we conceive just as clearly and distinctly whether it exists ar not.

[How God’s thought differs from ours. ] But perhaps someone will say that we perceive thought clearly and distinctly without existence, and that we nevertheless attribute it to God. To this we reply that we do not attribute to God such thought as is ours, subject to being acted on and confined by the nature of things, but such as is pure activity and thus involving existence, as we have already demonstrated at sufficient length. For we showed that God’s intellect and will are not distinct from his power and his essence, which involves existence.

[There is not something external to God and caetemal with him. ] So because every thing whose essence does not involve existence must, in order to exist, necessarily be created by God and be continuously preserved by the creator as we have already abundantly explained, we shall spend no time in refuting the opinion of those who have maintained that the world, or chaos, or matter stripped of all form, is coetemal with God and thus independent of him. Therefore we must pass on to the second question and enquire whether what has been created could have been created from eternity.

[What is here denoted by the phrase ‘from eternity’.] For this to be rightly understood, we must examine this phrase ‘from eternity’, for by this we here mean something entirely different from that which we explained previously when we spoke of God’s eternity. Here we rnean nothing other than duration without any beginning, or such duration as, even if we were to multiply it by many years or tens of thousands of years, and this product again by tens of thousands, we could still never express by any number, however great.

[Proof that there could not have been something created from eternity. ] But that there can be no such duration is clearly demonstrated. For if the world were to go backward again from this point of tirne, it could never have such a duration; therefore neither could the world have reached this point of tirne frorn such a beginning. You will perhaps say that for God nothing is impossible; for he is omnipotent, and so can bring about a duration other than which there could be no greater. We reply that God, being omnipotent, will never create a duration other than which a greater cannot be created by him.

For the nature of duration is such thata greater or lesser than a given duration can always be conceived, as is the case with number. You will perhaps insist that God has been from eternity and so has endured until the present, and thus there is a duration other than which a greater cannot be conceived. But in this way there is attributed to God a duration consisting of paris, which we have abundantly refuted when we demonstrated that there pertains to God not duration, but eternity. Would that men had thoroughly considered this truth, for then they might very easily have extricated thernselves from many argumenls and absurdities, and have given themselves up with the greatest delight to the blessed contemplation of this being.

Some people try to show the possibility of such an infinite duration stretching from the past.

God is eternal. But his effects are not from eternity.

First, then, they assert that the thing produced can be contemporaneous with ils cause; but because God has been from eternity then his effecls could also have been produced from eternity.

And then they further confirm this by the example of the son of God, who was produced by the father from eternity. But from what has already been said, one can clearly see that they are confusing duration with eternity, and they are attributing to God merely a duration from eternity, as is also clear from the example they cite.

For they hold that the same eternity that they ascribe to the son of God is possible for creatures.

Again, they imagine time and duration as prior to the foundation of the world, and they seek to establish a duration without created things, just as others seek to establish an eternity oUlside God.

Both these assertions are already shown to be quite remote from the truth. Therefore we reply that it is quite false that God can communicate his eternity to his creatures, nor is the son of God a creature, but he is, like his father, eternal. So when we say that the father has begotten the son from eternity, we mean simply this, that the father has always communicated his eternity to the son.

[If God acted necessarily, he would not be of infinite potency. ] Secondly, they argue that, when God acts freely, he is no less powerful than when he acts necessarily; but if God acts necessarily, being of infinite potency he must have created the world from eternity.

But this argument, too, can be readily met if we examine its basis. These good people suppose that they can entertain quite different ideas of a being of infinite potency. For they conceive God as of infinite potency both when he acts from the necessity of nature and when he acts freely.

We, however, deny that God would be of infinite potency if he were to act from the necessity of nature; and this we may well deny-and indeed they have also necessarily to concede it-now that we have demonstrated that the most perfect being acts freely and can be conceived only as unique.

If they retort that, even if it is impossible it can nevertheless be posited that God, in acting from the necessity of nature, is of infinite potency, we reply that it is no more permissible to suppose this than to suppose a square circle so as to conclude that all the lines from the center to the circumference are not equal. Not to repeat what we said at an earlier stage, this is well established from what we have just said. For we have just demonstrated that there can be no duration whose double, or whose greater or lesser, cannot be conceived, and therefore a greater or lesser than a given duration can always be created by God, who acts freely with infinite potency.

But if God were to act from the necessity of nature, this would in no way follow, for only that duration, which resulted from his nature, could be produced by him, not an infinite number of other durations greater than the given.

Therefore we thus argue in brief; if God were to create the greatest duration, one so great that he could not create one greater, he would necessarily be diminishing his own power. But this latter statement is false, for his power does not differ from his essence; therefore, etc. Again, if God were to act from the necessity of nature, he would have to create a duration such that he h imself cannot create a greater.

But God, in creating such a duration, is not of infinite potency, for we can always conceive a duration greater than the given.

Therefore if God acted from the necessity of nature, he would not be of infinite potency.

[Whence we hcrve the concept of a duration greater than that which belongs to this world. ] At this point someone may find some difficulty in seeing how, since the world was created five thousand years ago (or more, if the calculations of chronologers are correct), we can nevertheless conceive a greater duration, which we have asserted is not intelligible without created things.

This difficulty will be easily removed if he takes note that we understand that duration not simply from the contemplation of created things but from the contemplation of the infinite power of God for creation. For creatures cannot be conceived as existing and having duration through themselves, but only through the infinite power of God, from which alone they have all their duration. See Prop. 12 Part I and its Corollary.

Finally, to waste no time here in answering trivial arguments, these points only are to be noted: the distinction between duration and eternity, and that duration is in no way intelligible without created things, nor eternity without God.

When these points have been properly perceived, all arguments can very readily be answered; so we think it unnecessary to spend any more time on these matters.