God's Intellect

[God is omniscient.] We previously listed among the attributes of God omniscience, which quite obviously pertains to God because knowledge implies perfection, and God, as a most perfect being, must not lack any perfection. Therefore 7 [ThIS is probably a reference to Metaphysics XII. VII ( 1072b27-29).] 8 [The reference IS to GenesIs 42. 1 5-16.] 9 [ From what IS demonstrated In the next three chapters In which we treat of God’s mtellect, hiS will

knowledge must be attributed to God in the highest degree, that is, a knowledge that does not presume or posit any ignorance or privation of knowledge; for then there would be some imperfection in the attribute itself, that is, in God. From this it follows that God’s intellect has never been merely potential, nor does he reach a conclusion by reasoning. [The objects orGod’s knowledge are not things external to God. ]

Furthermore, from God’s perfection it also follows that his ideas are not defined, as ours are, by objects that are external to God. On the contrary, the things created by God external to God are determined by God’s intellect. (N.B.: From this it clearly follows that God’s intellect, by which he understands created things, and his will and power, by which he has determined them, are one and the same thing.) For otherwise these objects would have their own nature and essence through themselves and would be prior, at least by nature, to the divine intellect-which is absurd. And because some people have failed to take careful note of this, they have fallen into gross errors.

Some have maintained that external to God there is matter, coeternal with him and existing of itself, and that God, understanding this matter, has, according to some, merely reduced it to order, and according to others, has in addition impressed forms on it. Others again have maintained that things of their own nature are either necessary or impossible or contingent, and so God knows the latter also as contingent and is quite ignorant as to whether they exist or not.

Finally, others have said that God knows contingent things from their relation to other things, perhaps because of his long experience. Besides these errors I could here mention others of this kind, did I not consider it to be superfluous, because from what has already been said their falsity makes itself apparent.

[The object or God’s knowledge is God himself ] Let us therefore return to our theme, that outside God there is no object of his knowledge, but he is himselfthe object ofhis knowledge, or rather, he is his own knowledge. Those who think that the world is also the object of God’s knowledge are much less discerning than those who would maintain that a building constructed by some distinguished architect is the object of the architect’s knowledge.

For the builder is forced to seek suitable material outside himself as well, whereas God has not sought any material outside himself. Things have been constructed by his intellect or will, both with regard to their essence and their existence.

Does God know evil or sin, entities of reason, and things of that kind?

We regard to his power, it follows quite clearly that the essences of things and the necessity of thetr eXistIng from a given cause IS nothing other than God’s deterIIDnate will or decree. Therefore God’s will is most apparent to us when we conceive things clearly and dtsttnctly. So It IS ndiculous that phtlosophers, when they are ignorant of the causes of things, take refuge in the Will of God. We constantly see thiS happening when they say that the thmgs whose causes are unknown to them have come about only from God’s good pleasure and absolute decree. The common people, too, have found no stronger proof of God’s providence and guidance than that WhiCh they draw from their ignorance of causes. This clearly shows that they have no knowledge whatever of the nature of God’s will, attributing to him a human will that is truly quite dIStinct from our mtellect. This I conSider to have been the basic cause ofsuperstttion, and perhaps of rrruch roguery - P.B.] Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chapter 7 199 ply that God must necessarily know those things of which he is the cause, especially so because they cannot exist even for a moment except with the divine concurrence. Therefore, because evil and sin have no being in things but only in the human mind when it compares things with one another, it follows that God does not know them as separate from human minds. Entities of reason we have said to be modes of thinking, and it is in this way that they must be understood by God, that is, insofar as we perceive him as preserving and continuing to create the human mind, in whatever way that is constituted. But we are not saying that God has such modes of thinking in himself in order that he may more easily retain what he understands.

And if only proper attention is given to these few points we have made, no problem can arise concerning God’s intellect that cannot quite easily be solved.

[How God knows particular things, and how universals. ]

But meanwhile we must not pass over the error made by certain people who maintain that God knows nothing but eternal things such as angels and the heavens, which they suppose to be by their own nature not subject to generation and corruption, but that of th is world he knows nothing but species, these being likewise not subject to generation and corruption. Such people do indeed seem set on going astray, contriving utter absurdities. For what can be more absurd than to cut off God’s knowledge from particular things, which cannot even for a moment be without God’s concurrence? Again, they are maintaining that God is ignorant of really existing things, while ascribing to God knowledge of universals, which have no being nor any essence apart from that of particular things. We, on the other hand, attribute to God knowledge of particular things and deny him knowledge of universals except insofar as he understands human minds. [In God there is only one simple idea.] Finally, before bringing this discussion to a close, we ought to deal with the question as to whether there is in God more than one idea or only one most simple idea. To this I reply that God’s idea through which he is called omniscient is unique and completely Simple. For in actual fact God is called omniscient for no other reason than that he has the idea of himself, an idea or knowledge that has always existed together with God. For it is nothing but his essence and could have had no other way of being. [What is God’s knowledge concerning created things.] But God’s acquaintance with created th ings cannot be referred to God’s knowledge without some impropriety; for, if God had so willed, created things would have had a quite different essence, and this could have no place in the knowledge that God has of himself. Still, the question will arise as to whether that knowledge of created things, properly or improperly so termed, is manifold or only single. However, in reply, this question differs in no way from those that ask whether God’s decrees and volitions are several or not, and whether God’s omnipresence, or the concurrence whereby he preserves particular things, is the same in all things. Conceming these matters, we have already said that we can have no distinct knowledge. However, we know with certainty that, just as God’s concurrence, if it is referred to God’s omnipotence, must be no more than one although manifested in various ways in its effects, so too God’s volitions and decrees (for thus we may term his knowledge concerning created things) considered in God are not a plurality, even though they are expressed in various ways through created things, or rather, in created things. Finally, if we look to the whole of Nature by analogy, we can consider it as a single entity, and consequently the idea of God, or h is decree concerning Natura naturata, will be only one.