The Simplicity of God

[The threefold distinction between things: real, modal, and a distinction of reason. ]

Descartes said in Principia Philosophiae Part I Arts. 48 and 49 that in Nature there is nothing but substances and their modes, whence in Arts. 60, 61, and 62 he deduces a threefold distinction between things-real, modal, and a distinction of reason.

What is called a real distinction is that whereby two substances, whether of different or of the same attribute, are distinguished from one another; for example, thought and extension, or the parts of matter.

This distinction is recognized from the fact that each of the two can be conceived, and consequently can exist, without the help of the other. Modal distinction is of two kinds, that between a mode of substance and the substance itself, and that between two modes of one and the same substance.

The latter we recognize from the fact that, although either mode can be conceived without the help of the other, neither can be conceived without the help of the substance of which they are modes.

The former distinction we recognize from the fact that, although the substance can be conceived without its mode, the mode cannot be conceived without the substance. Finally, what is termed a distinction of reason is that which arises between a substance and its attribute, as when duration is distinguished from extension.

This is also recognized from the fact that such a substance cannot be understood without that attribute.

[How all composition arises, and how many kinds there are. ] All composition arises from these three kinds of distinction. The first composition is that of two or more substances either of the same attribute, as is the case with all composition 5 [Note that thiS can be Inlch more clearly seen If we attend to the nature of God’s wtll and his decrees. For, as I shall show In due course, God’s will, through which he has created thmgs, is not diStmct from hiS mtellect, through which he understands them. So to say that God understands that the 3 angles of a triangle are equal to two nght angles is the same as to say that God has willed or decreed that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two nght angles Therefore, for us to conceive that God can change hiS decrees IS lust as Impossible as to thmk that the three angles of a trtangle are not equal to two rtght angles. Furthermore, the fact that there can be no change In God can also be proved in other ways; but, because we aim at breVity, we prefer not to pursue this further. - P.B.]

of two or more bodies, or of different attributes, as is the case with man. The second composition results from the union of different modes. The third composition is not a composition, but is only conceived by reason as if it were so, in order that a thing may thereby be more easily understood. Whatever is not a composition of the first two kinds must be said to be simple.

[God is a most simple Being.]

It must therefore be shown that God is not a composite thing, from which we can conclude that he is a most simple being; and this we shall easily accomplish. Because it is self-evident that component parts are prior at least by nature to the composite whole, then of necessity those substances from whose coalescence and union God is composed will be prior to God by nature, and each can be conceived through itself without being attributed to God. Again, because they are necessarily distinct from one another in reality, then necessarily each of them can also exist through itself without the help of the others. And thus, as we have just said, there could be as many Gods as there are substances from which it was supposed that God is composed.

For because each can exist through itself, it must exist of itself, and therefore it will also have the force to give itself all the perfections that we have shown to be in God, as we have already explained fully in Prop. 7 Part I, where we demonstrated the existence of God. Now because nothing more absurd than this can be said, we conclude that God is not composed of a coalescence and union of substances. That there is also no composition of different modes in God is convincingly proved from there being no modes in God.

For modes arise from an alteration of substance-see Prine. Part 1 Art. 56. Finally, if someone wishes to imagine another kind of composition, from the essence of thing. and their existence, we by no means oppose him. But let him remember that we have already sufficiently demonstrated that these two are not distinct in God.

[God’s Attributes are distinguished only by Reason. ] Hence we can cl early conclude that all the distinctions we make between God’s attributes are nothing other than distinctions of reason, and that they are not distinct from one another in reality. Understand these distinctions of reason to be such as I have just referred to, namely, distinctions that are recognized from the fact that such-and-such a substance cannot be without that particular attribute.

Hence we conclude that God is a most simple being. So now, disregarding the medley of distinctions made by the Peripatetics, we pass on to the life of God.