The Immutability of God

[What change is, and what transformation.] By ‘change’ we here understand all the variation that can occur in a subject while the essence of the subject remains as it was.

But this term is also commonly taken in a broader sense to mean the corruption of things-not an absolute corruption, but such as also includes generation following on the corruption, as when we say that peat is changed into ashes, or men into beasts. But to denote this latter meaning philosophers use yet another word-transformation.

Here we are speaking only of that change in which there is no transformation of the subject as when we say that Peter has changed his color, or his character, etc.

[In God there can be no transfonnation.] We must now see whether such changes are applicable to God, for there is no need to say anything about transformation, now that we have shown that God exists necessarily, that is, that God cannot cease to be, or be transformed into another God. For then he would both cease to be, and also there could be more than one God at the same time. Both of these possibilities we have shown to be absurd.

[What are the causes of change. ] However, for a clearer understanding of what here remains to be said, we must take into consideration that all change proceeds either from external causes, with or without the subject’s consent, or from an internal cause and the subject’s free choice.

For example, that a man becomes darker, falls ill, grows, and the like, all proceed from external causes, the first two against the subject’s will, the last in accordance with it. But that he wills, walks, displays anger, etc., proceed from internal causes.

[God is not changed by something else. ]

Now the first-named changes, those that proceed from external causes, cannot possibly apply to God; for he alone is the cause of all things and is not acted on by anyone.

Moreover, nothing created has in itself any force to exist, and so far less can it have any force to act on anything outside itself or on its own cause. And although there are many places in Holy Scripture where God has been angry, or sad, etc., because of the sins of men, in these passages the effect is taken as the cause, just as we also say that the sun is stronger and higher in summer than in winter, although it has not changed its position or renewed its strength. And that such is often the teaching even of Holy

Scripture is to be seen in Isa iah; for he says in chapter 59, verse 2, when he is rebuking the people: “Your iniquities separate you from your God.”

[Nor again by himself ] Let us therefore proceed and ask whether any change can come about in God from God h imself. We do not grant that there can be such a change in God; indeed, we deny it completely. For every change that depends on the will is designed to change its subject to a better state, and this cannot apply to a most perfect being. Then again, there can be no such change except for the purpose of avoiding something disadvantageous or of acquiring some good that is lacking. In the case of God there can be no place for either of these purposes. Hence we conclude that God is an immutable being.5

Note that I have here deliberately omitted the commonly accepted divisions of change, although we have also in a sense covered them. For there was no need to deny them individually of God because in Prop. 16 Part I we have demonstrated that God is incorporeal, and those commonly accepted divisions refer only to changes in matter.

Chapter 5 The Simplicity of God

[The threefold distinction between things: real, modal, and a distinction of reason. ] Let us proceed to the simplicity of God. In order that this attribute of God may be rightly understood, we must recall what Descartes said in Princip. Philosophiae Part I Arts. 48 and 49, to wit, that in Nature there is nothing but substances and their modes, whence in Arts. 60, 61, and 62 he deduces a threefold distinction between things-real, modal, and a distinction of reason. What is called a real distinction is that whereby two substances, whether of different or of the same attribute, are distinguished from one another; for example, thought and extension, or the parts of matter. This distinction is recognized from the fact that each of the two can be conceived, and consequently can exist, without the help of the other. Modal distinction is of two kinds, that between a mode of substance and the substance itself, and that between two modes of one and the same substance. The latter we recognize from the fact that, although either mode can be conceived without the help of the other, neither can be conceived without the help of the substance of which they are modes. The former distinction we recognize from the fact that, although the substance can be conceived without its mode, the mode cannot be conceived without the substance. Finally, what is termed a distinction of reason is that which arises between a substance and its attribute, as when duration is distinguished from extension. And this is also recognized from the fact that such a substance cannot be understood without that attribute. [How all composition arises, and how many kinds there are. ] All composition arises from these three kinds of distinction. The first composition is that of two or more substances either of the same attribute, as is the case with all composition 5 [Note that thiS can be Inlch more clearly seen If we attend to the nature of God’s wtll and his decrees. For, as I shall show In due course, God’s will, through which he has created thmgs, is not diStmct from hiS mtellect, through which he understands them. So to say that God understands that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two nght angles is the same as to say that God has willed or decreed that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two nght angles Therefore, for us to conceive that God can change hiS decrees IS lust as Impossible as to thmk that the three angles of a trtangle are not equal to two rtght angles. Furthermore, the fact that there can be no change In God can also be proved in other ways; but, because we aim at breVity, we prefer not to pursue this further. - P.B.] 196 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy of two or more bodies, or of different attributes, as is the case with man. The second composition results from the union of different modes. The th ird composition is not a composition, but is only conceived by reason as if it were so, in order that a thing may thereby be more easily understood. Whatever is not a composition of the first two kinds must be said to be simple. [God is a most simple Being.] It must therefore be shown that God is not a composite thing, from which we can conclude that he is a most simple being; and this we shall easily accomplish. Because it is self-evident that component parts are prior at least by nature to the composite whole, then of necessity those substances from whose coalescence and union God is composed will be prior to God by nature, and each can be conceived through itself without being attributed to God. Again, because they are necessarily distinct from one another in reality, then necessarily each of them can also exist through itself without the help of the others. And thus, as we have just said, there could be as many Gods as there are substances from which it was supposed that God is composed. For because each can exist through itself, it must exist of itself, and therefore it will also have the force to give itself all the perfections that we have shown to be in God, as we have already explained fully in Prop. 7 Part I, where we demonstrated the existence of God. Now because nothing more absurd than this can be said, we conclude that God is not composed of a coalescence and union of substances. That there is also no composition of different modes in God is convincingly proved from there being no modes in God. For modes arise from an alteration of substance-see Prine. Part 1 Art. 56. Finally, if someone wishes to imagine another kind of composition, from the essence of thing. and their existence, we by no means oppose him. But let him remember that we have already sufficiently demonstrated that these two are not distinct in God. [God’s Attributes are distinguished only by Reason. ] Hence we can cl early conclude that all the distinctions we make between God’s attributes are nothing other than distinctions of reason, and that they are not distinct from one another in reality. Understand these distinctions of reason to be such as I have just referred to, namely, distinctions that are recognized from the fact that such-and-such a substance cannot be without that particular attribute. Hence we conclude that God is a most simple being. So now, disregarding the medley of distinctions made by the Peripatetics, we pass on to the life of God. Chapter 6 Of the Life of God [What philosophe .. commonly und … tand by Life. ] For the correct understanding of this attribute, the life of God, it is necessary to explain in general terms what in the case of each individual thing is meant by its life. We shall first examine the opinion of the Peripatetics. By life they understand ’the continuance of the nutritive soul, accompanied by heat’ -see Aristotle De Respirat. Book 1 Chapter 8.6 And be6 [The reference may be to De respiratione 474325, but see also De anima 415a23-2 5 J Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chapter 7 197 cause they imagined there to be three souls, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective, which they attribute exclusively to plants, animals, and men, it follows, as they themselves acknowledge, that all else is devoid ofl ife. Even so, they did not venture to say that minds and God are without life. Perhaps they were afraid of fulling into the contrary view, that if these were without life, they were dead. So Aristotle in his Metaphysics Book 11 Chapter 7 gives yet another definition of life, applicable only to minds, namely, that life is the operation of the intellect, and in this sense he attributes life to God, as one who understands and is pure activity? However, we shall not spend much effort in refuting these views. For as regards the three souls that they attribute to plants, animals, and men, we have already sufficiently demonstrated that these are nothing but fictions, having shown that in matter there is nothing but mechanical structures and their operations. As to the life of God, I do not know why in Aristotle it should be called activity of intellect rather than activity of will, and the like. However, expecting no reply to this, I pass on to explain, as promised, what life is. [To what things life can be attributed. ] Although this term is often taken in a figurative sense to mean the character of a man, we shall briefly explain only what it denotes in a philosophical sense. It should be noted that iflife is also to be attributed to corporeal things, nothing will be devoid of life; but if only to those things wherein soul is united to body, then it must be attributed only to men, and perhaps also to animals, but not to minds or to God. However, because the word ’life’ is commonly used in a wider sense, there is no doubt that it should also be attributed to corporeal things not united to minds and to minds separated from body. [What life is, and what it is in God.] Therefore by life we for our part understand the force through which things persevere in their own being. And because that force is different from the things themselves, we quite properly say that things themselves have life. But the force whereby God perseveres in his own being is nothing but his essence, so that those speak best who call God 1 ife.’ There are some theologians who hold the opinion that it is for this reason - that God is life and is not distinct from life-that the Jews when they swore an oath used to say “by the living Jehovah,” and not “by the life of Jehovah;’ as Joseph, when swearing by Pharaoh’s life, said “by the life of Pharaoh.“B Chapter 7 DrGod’s Intellect9 [God is omniscient.] We previously listed among the attributes of God omniscience, which quite obviously pertains to God because knowledge implies perfection, and God, as a most perfect being, must not lack any perfection. Therefore 7 [ThIS is probably a reference to Metaphysics XII. VII ( 1072b27-29).] 8 [The reference IS to GenesIs 42. 1 5-16.] 9 [ From what IS demonstrated In the next three chapters In which we treat of God’s mtellect, hiS will 198 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy knowledge must be attributed to God in the highest degree, that is, a knowledge that does not presume or posit any ignorance or privation of knowledge; for then there would be some imperfection in the attribute itself, that is, in God. From this it follows that God’s intellect has never been merely potential, nor does he reach a conclusion by reasoning. [The objects orGod’s knowledge are not things external to God. ] Furthermore, from God’s perfection it also follows that his ideas are not defined, as ours are, by objects that are external to God. On the contrary, the things created by God external to God are determined by God’s intellect. (N.B.: From this it clearly follows that God’s intellect, by which he understands created things, and his will and power, by which he has determined them, are one and the same thing.) For otherwise these objects would have their own nature and essence through themselves and would be prior, at least by nature, to the divine intellect-which is absurd. And because some people have failed to take careful note of this, they have fallen into gross errors. Some have maintained that external to God there is matter, coeternal with him and existing of itself, and that God, understanding this matter, has, according to some, merely reduced it to order, and according to others, has in addition impressed forms on it. Others again have maintained that things of their own nature are either necessary or impossible or contingent, and so God knows the latter also as contingent and is quite ignorant as to whether they exist or not. Finally, others have said that God knows contingent things from their relation to other things, perhaps because of his long experience. Besides these errors I could here mention others of this kind, did I not consider it to be superfluous, because from what has already been said their falsity makes itself apparent. [The object or God’s knowledge is God himself ] Let us therefore return to our theme, that outside God there is no object of his knowledge, but he is himselfthe object ofhis knowledge, or rather, he is his own knowledge. Those who think that the world is also the object of God’s knowledge are much less discerning than those who would maintain that a building constructed by some distinguished architect is the object of the architect’s knowledge. For the builder is forced to seek suitable material outside himself as well, whereas God has not sought any material outside himself. Things have been constructed by his intellect or will, both with regard to their essence and their existence. [How God knows sin, entities or reason, etc.] The question now arises as to whether God knows evil or sin, entities of reason, and things of that kind. We reand his power, it follows quite clearly that the essences of things and the necessity of thetr eXistIng from a given cause IS nothing other than God’s deterIIDnate will or decree. Therefore God’s will is most apparent to us when we conceive things clearly and dtsttnctly. So It IS ndiculous that phtlosophers, when they are ignorant of the causes of things, take refuge in the Will of God. We constantly see thiS happening when they say that the thmgs whose causes are unknown to them have come about only from God’s good pleasure and absolute decree. The common people, too, have found no stronger proof of God’s providence and guidance than that WhiCh they draw from their ignorance of causes. This clearly shows that they have no knowledge whatever of the nature of God’s will, at· tributing to him a human will that is truly quite dIStinct from our mtellect. This I conSider to have been the basic cause ofsuperstttion, and perhaps of rrruch roguery - P.B.] Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chapter 7 199 ply that God must necessarily know those things of which he is the cause, especially so because they cannot exist even for a moment except with the divine concurrence. Therefore, because evil and sin have no being in things but only in the human mind when it compares things with one another, it follows that God does not know them as separate from human minds. Entities of reason we have said to be modes of thinking, and it is in this way that they must be understood by God, that is, insofar as we perceive him as preserving and continuing to create the human mind, in whatever way that is constituted. But we are not saying that God has such modes of thinking in himself in order that he may more easily retain what he understands. And if only proper attention is given to these few points we have made, no problem can arise concerning God’s intellect that cannot quite easily be solved. [How God knows particular things, and how universals. ] But meanwhile we must not pass over the error made by certain people who maintain that God knows nothing but eternal things such as angels and the heavens, which they suppose to be by their own nature not subject to generation and corruption, but that of th is world he knows nothing but species, these being likewise not subject to generation and corruption. Such people do indeed seem set on going astray, contriving utter absurdities. For what can be more absurd than to cut off God’s knowledge from particular things, which cannot even for a moment be without God’s concurrence? Again, they are maintaining that God is ignorant of really existing things, while ascribing to God knowledge of universals, which have no being nor any essence apart from that of particular things. We, on the other hand, attribute to God knowledge of particular things and deny him knowledge of universals except insofar as he understands human minds. [In God there is only one simple idea.] Finally, before bringing this discussion to a close, we ought to deal with the question as to whether there is in God more than one idea or only one most simple idea. To this I reply that God’s idea through which he is called omniscient is unique and completely Simple. For in actual fact God is called omniscient for no other reason than that he has the idea of himself, an idea or knowledge that has always existed together with God. For it is nothing but his essence and could have had no other way of being. [What is God’s knowledge concerning created things.] But God’s acquaintance with created th ings cannot be referred to God’s knowledge without some impropriety; for, if God had so willed, created things would have had a quite different essence, and this could have no place in the knowledge that God has of himself. Still, the question will arise as to whether that knowledge of created things, properly or improperly so termed, is manifold or only single. However, in reply, this question differs in no way from those that ask whether God’s decrees and volitions are several or not, and whether God’s omnipresence, or the concurrence whereby he preserves particular things, is the same in all things. Conceming these matters, we have already said that we can have no distinct knowledge. However, we know with certainty that, just as God’s concurrence, if it is referred to God’s omnipotence, must be no more than one although manifested in various ways in its effects, so too God’s volitions and decrees (for thus we may term his knowledge 200 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy concerning created things) considered in God are not a plurality, even though they are expressed in various ways through created things, or rather, in created things. Finally, if we look to the whole of Nature by analogy, we can consider it as a single entity, and consequently the idea of God, or h is decree concerning Natura naturata, will be only one. Chapter 8 Of God’s Will [We do not know how God’s essence, his intellect by which he understands himself. and his will by which he loves himself. are distinguished. ] God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows necessarily from his infinite intellect, by which he understands himself, but how these three are distinguished from one anotherhis essence, his intellect by which he understands himself, and his will by which he wills to love himself- this we fail to comprehend. We are acquainted with the word ‘personality’, which theologians commonly use to explain this matter. But although we know the word, we do not know its meaning, nor can we form any clear and distinct conception of it, although we firmly believe that in the most blessed vision of God, which is promised to the faithful, God will reveal this to his own. [God’s will and power, as externally manifested, are not distinguished from his intellect. ] Will and power, as externally manifested, are not distinguished from God’s intellect, as is now well established from what has preceded. For we have shown that God has decreed not only that things should exist, but also that they should exist with a certain nature; that is to say, both their essence and existence must have depended on God’s will and power. From this we clearly and distinctly perceive that God’s intellect and his power and will, whereby he has created, understood, and preserves or loves created things, are in no way distinct from one another save only in respect of our thought. [It is improper to say that God hates some things and loves other things. ] Now when we say that God hates some things and loves other things, this is said in the same sense as when Scripture tells us that the earth will vomit forth men, and other things of that kind. But from Scripture itself it can be sufficiently inferred that God is not angry with anyone, and that he does not love things in the way that is commonly believed. For this is in Isaiah, and more clearly in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Chapter 9: “For the children being not yet born (that is, the sons of Isaac), neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth, it was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger, etc.“l0 And a little farther on, “Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt 10 [Romans 9· 1 1-12 j Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chapter 9 20 I then say unto me, ‘Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?’ Nay but, 0 man, who art thou that replieth against God? Shall the thing formed say unto him who formed it, ‘Why has thou made me thus?’ Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? etc,“ll [Why God admonishes men, why he does not save without admonition, and why the impious are punished.] If you now ask why, then, does God admonish men, to this there is a ready answer: The reason why God has decreed from eternity that he would warn men at a particular time is this, that those whom he has willed to be saved might turn from their ways. If you go on to ask whether God could not have saved them without that warning, we reply that he could have done so. “Why then does he not so save them?” you will perhaps again ask. To this I shall reply when you have told me why God did not make the Red Sea passable without a strong east wind, and why he does not bring about all particular motions without other motions, and innumerable other things that God does through mediating causes. You will again ask, why then are the impious punished, since they act by their own nature and in accordance with the divine decree. But I reply, it is also as a result of the divine decree that they are punished. And if only those ought to be punished whom we suppose to be sinning from free will alone, why do men try to destroy poisonous snakes? For they sin only from their own nature, and can do no other. [Scripture teaches nothing that is opposed to the natural light. ] Finally, whatever other passages there are in Holy Scripture that cause uneasiness, this is not the place to explain them. For here the object of our enquiry is confined to what can be attained most certainly by natural reason, and to demonstrate these things clearly is sufficient to convince us that the Holy Book must be teaching the same. For truth is not opposed to truth, nor can Scripture be teaching the nonsense that is commonly supposed. If we were to find in it anything contrary to the natural light, we could refute it with the same freedom with which we refute the Koran and the Talmud. But far be it from us to think that something can be found in Holy Scripture opposed to the light of Nature. Chapter 9 Of God’s Power [How God’s omnipotence should be understood. ] That God is omnipotent has already been suffiCiently demonstrated. Here we shall attempt only to explain in brief how this attribute is to be understood; for many speak of it without proper piety and not according to truth. They say that, by their own nature and not from God’s decree, some things are possible, some things impossible, and some things necessary, and that God’s omnipotence is concemed only with the possible. We, I I [Romans 9'18-2 1 ] 202 Principles of Cartesian Philosophy however, who have already shown that all things depend absolutely on God’s decree, say that God is omnipotent. But having understood that he has decreed some things from the mere freedom of his will, and then that he is immutable, we say now that he cannot act against his own decrees, and that this is impossible simply because it is at variance with God’s perfection. [All things are necessary with respect to God’s decree. It is wrong to say that some things are necessary in themselves, and other things with respect to his decree.] But perhaps someone will argue that some things we find necessary only wh ile having regard for God’s decree, while on the other hand some things we find necessary without regard for God’s decree. Take, for example, that Josiah bumed the bones of the idolaters on the altar of Jeroboam. 12 If we attend only to Josiah’s will, we shall regard the event as a possible one, and in no way having necessarily to happen except from the prophet’s having predicted it from God’s decree. But that the three angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles is something that manifests itself. But surely these people are inventing distinctions in things from their own ignorance. For if men clearly understood the whole order of Nature, they would find all things to be equally as necessary as are the things treated in mathematics. But because this is beyond the reach of human knowledge, certain things are judged by us as possible and not as necessary. Therefore we must say either that God is powerless-because all things are in actual fact necessary- or that God is all-powerful, and that the necessity we find in things has resulted solely from God’s decree. [If God had made the nature of things other than it is, he would also have had to give us a different intellect. ] Suppose the question is now raised: What if God had decreed things otherwise and had rendered false those things that are now true? Would we still not accept them as quite true? I answer, yes indeed, if God had left us with the nature that he has given us. But he might then, had he so wished, have also given us a nature-as is now the case-such as to enable us to understand Nature and its laws, as they would have been laid down by God. Indeed, if we have regard to his faithfulness, he would have had to do so. This is also evident from the fact, as we have previously stated, that the whole of Natura naturata is nothing but a unique entity, from which it follows that man is a part of Nature that must cohere with the rest. Therefore from the simplicity of God’s decree it would also follow that if God had created things in a different way, he would likewise have also so constituted our nature that we could understand things as they had been created by God. So although we want to retain the same distinction in God’s power as is commonly adopted by philosophell>, we are nevertheless constrained to expound it in a different way. [The divisions of Gad’s power-absolute, ordered, ordinary, and extraordinary. ] We therefore divide God’s power into Ordered and Absolute. We speak of God’s absolute power when we consider his omnipotence without regard to his decrees. We speak of his ordered power when we have regard to his decrees. 1 2 [ I Kings 13,2; 2 Kings 23’ 16, 20 I Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part 2, Chaptsr /0 203 Then there is a further division into the Ordinary and Extraordinary power of God. His ordinary power is that by which he preserves the world in a fixed order. We mean his extraordinary power when he acts beyond Nature’s orders-for example, all miracles, such as the ass speaking, the appearance of angels, and the like. 13 Yet concerning this latter power we may not unreasonably entertain serious doubts, because for God to govern the world with one and the same fixed and immutable order seems a greater miracle than if, because of the folly of mankind, he were to abrogate laws that he himself has sanctioned in Nature in the best way and from pure freedom-as nobody can deny unless he is quite blinded. But we shall leave this for the theologians to decide. Finally, we pass over other questions commonly raised concerning God’s power: Does God’s power extend to the past? Can he improve on the things that he does? Can he do many other things than he has done? Answers to these questions can readily be suppl ied from what has already been said.