The Unity and Immeasurableness of God

We have often wondered at the futile arguments with which writers attempt to prove the unity of God. They use arguments such as:

• If one could have created the world, others would have been superfluous
• If all things work together to the same end, they have been produced by one maker
• and other arguments like these

These are drawn from the relationship of things or their extrinsic characteristics.

We dismissing all these arguments and give our proof as clearly and as briefly as possible, as follows.

[God is unique.]

Among God’s attributes we have also listed the highest degree of understanding, adding that he possesses all his perfection from himself and not from any other source. If you now say that there are more than one God, or supremely perfect beings, these must all necessarily possess understanding in the highest degree.

That this may be so, it is not enough that each should understand only himself; for because each must understand all things, he must understand both himself and the others. From this it would follow that the perfection of the intellect of each one would depend partly on himself and partly on another.

Therefore no one of them can be a supremely perfect being, that is, as we have just noted, a being that possesses all its perfection from itself, and not from any other source.

Yet we have already demonstrated that God is a most perfect being, and that he exists. So we can now conclude that he exists as one alone; for if more than one God existed, it would follow that a most perfect being has imperfection, which is absurd. 3 So much for the unity of God.

Chapter 3: The Immeasurableness of God

[How God is called infinite, and how immeasurable.]

We have previously shown that no being can be conceived as finite and imperfect (i.e., as participating in nothingness) unless we first have regard to the perfect and infinite being, that is, God.

So only God must be said to be absolutely infinite, in that we find him to consist in actual fact of infinite perfection. But he can also be said to be immeasurable or boundless insofar as we have regard to this point, that there is no being by which God’s perfection can be limited.

From this it follows that the infinity of God, in spite of the form of the word, is something most positive; for it is insofar as we have regard to his essence or consummate perfection that we say that he is infinite.

But measurelessness is attributed to God only in a relational way; for it does not pertain to God insofar as he is considered absolutely as a most perfect being, but only insofar as he is considered as a first cause that, even though it were most perfect only in relation to secondary beings, would nevertheless be measureless. For there would be no being, and consequently no being could be conceived, more perfect than he by which he might be limited or measured.

[What is commonly understood by the immeasurableness or God.]

Yet writers on all sides, in treating of the immeasurableness of God, appear to attribute quantity to God.

For from this attribute they wish to conclude that God must necessarily be present everywhere, as if they meant that if there were any place where God was not, his quantity would be limited. This same point is even more clearly apparent from another argument they produce to show that God is infinite or measureless (for they confuse these two terms) and also that he is everywhere.

If God, they say, is pure activity, as indeed he is, he is bound to be everywhere and infinite. For if he were not everywhere, then either he cannot be wherever he wants to be, or else (note this) he must necessarily move about. This clearly shows that they attribute immeasurableness to God insofar as they consider him to be quantitative; for it is from the properties of extension that they derive these arguments for asserting the immeasurableness of God. Nothing could be more absurd.

[Proof that God is everywhere. ] If you now ask how, then, shall we prove that God is everywhere, I reply that we have abundantly demonstrated this when we showed that nothing can exist even for a moment without being continuously created by God at every single moment.

[God’s omnipresence cannot be explained. ]

For God’s ubiquity or his presence in individual things to be properly understood, we should necessarily have to have a clear insight into the inmost nature of the divine will whereby he created things and continuously goes on creating them. Because this exceeds human capacity, it is impossible to explain how God is everywhere 4

[Some hold, wrongly, that God’s immeasurableness is threefold. ] Some claim that God’s immeasurableness is threefold-that of his essence, his power, and his presence. But this is nonsense, for they seem to distinguish between God’s essence and his power.

[God’s power is not distinct {rom his essence. ] Others, too, have said the same thing more openly, asserting that God is everywhere through power, but not through essence, as if God’s power were distinct from all his attributes or his infinite essence.

But in fact it can be nothing else; for if it were something else, it would either be some creature or something accidental to the divine essence without which the divine essence could be conceived. Both of these alternatives are absurd; for if it were a creature, it would need God’s power for its preservation, and this would give rise to an infinite progression. And if it were something accidental, God would not be a most simple being, contrary to what we have demonstrated previously.

[Noris his omnipotence. ] Finally, by the immeasurableness of his presence they again seem to mean something besides the essence of God, through which things have been created and are continuously preserved. This is surely a great absurdity, into which they have fallen through confusing God’s intellect with human intellect, and frequently comparing his power with the power of kings. 4 [Here it should be noted that when ordmary folk say that God IS over all, they are deplcttng him as the spectator of a play From tins it is evident, as we say at the end of this chapter, that men are CODstantly confusing the divine nature with human nature -PRJ