Duration and Time

What is Eternity, Duration, and Time?

From our previous division of being into being whose essence involves existence and being whose essence involves only possible existence, there arises the distinction between eternity and duration.

Of eternity we shall speak later at greater length. Here we say only that it is the attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God.

Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things, insofar as they persevere in their actuality. From this it clearly follows that duration is distinguished only by reason from the total existence ofa thing.

For as much as you take away from the duration of a thing, so much you necessarily take away from its existence. Now in order that duration may be determined, we compare it with the decree IS understood only when we conceive the thmg clearly and distinctly. For the essence of the thmg, considered In rtself.

is nothmg other than God’s decree, or his deternnnate wIll. But we are also saying that the necessity of existence is no different from the necessity of essence (Chapter 9 of Part 2); that is, when we say that God has decreed that the triangle should exist, we are saying nothing other than that God has so arranged the order of nature and of causes that the triangle should necessarily eXISt at a particular time. So if we were to understand the order of causes as established by God, we should fmd that the triangle nrust exist at a particular time with the same necessity as we now fmd, when we attend to the triangle’s nature, that its three angles are equal to two nght angles -

duration of other things that have a fixed and determinate motion, and this comparison is called time.

Therefore time is not an affection of things, but a mere mode of thinking, or, as we have previously called it, a being of reason; for it is a mode of thinking serving to explicate duration. Here with regard to duration we should note something that will be useful to us later when we speak about eternity, to wit, that it is conceived as longer and shorter and as if composed of parts, and, secondly, that it is an attribute of existence only, not of essence.

Chapter 5 Opposition, Order, Etc.

[ What are Opposition, Order, Agreement, Difference, Subject, Adjunct, etc.] From our comparing things with one another there arise certain notions that are nevertheless nothing outside things themselves but modes of thinking. This is shown by the fact that if we wish to consider them as things having a place outside thought, we immediately render confused the otherwise clear conception we have of them. Such notions are opposition, order, agreement, difference, subjec� adjunct, and any others like these. These notions, I say, are quite clearly perceived by us insofur as we conceive them not as something different from the essences of the things that are opposed, ordered, etc., but merely as modes of thinking whereby we more easily retain or imagine the things themselves. I therefore do not consider it necessary to speak of them at greater length, but pass on to the terms commonly called transcendental.

Chapter 6: The One, the True, and the Good

These terms are considered by almost all metaphysicians as the most general affections of being; for they say that every being is one, true and good even though this may not be in anyone’s thought. But we shall see what is to be understood regarding these terms when we examine each of them separately.

What is Unity is?

The term “one” signifies something real outside the intellect. But they cannot explain what this adds to being, and this is a clear indication that they are confusing beings of reason with real being and are thereby rendering confused that which they clearly understand. But we on our part say that unity is in no way distinct from the thing itself or additional to being and is merely a mode ofthinking whereby we separate a thing from other things that are similar to it or agree with it in some respect.

[What plurality is, and in what respect God can be called one, and in what respect unique. ] The opposite of unity is plurality, which likewise obviously adds nothing to things, nor is it anything but a mode of thinking, just as we clearly and distinctly understand.

Nor do I see what more rema ins to be said regarding a thing so clear, except that here it should be noted that, insofar as we separate God from other being., he can be said to be one; but insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, he is called unique. In truth, if we wished to look into the matter more rigorously, we might perhaps show that God is only improperly called one and unique. But this question is of little importance- indeed, it is of no importance- to those who are concerned with thing. rather than words. Therefore we leave this and pass on to the second term, at the same time explaining what the false is.

[What is the true and what the false, both in the common acceptance and according to philosophers.] In order that these two, the true and the false, may be correctly perceived, we shall begin with the meaning of words, from which it will be evident that these are only the extrinsic marks of thing., and it is only figuratively that they are attributed to things. But because it is the common people who first invent words that are then used by philosophers, it seems relevant for one who seeks the original meaning of a word to enquire what it first denoted among common people, especially when other causes, which might have been derived from the nature of language, are not available for the investigation.

The first meaning of true and false seems to have had its origin in storytelling, and the tale was said to be true if it was of something that had occurred in actuality, and false if it was of something that had nowhere occurred. Later, philosophers made use of this signification to denote the agreement or disagreement of an idea with its object (ideatum). Therefore an idea is said to be true if it shows us the thing as it is in itself, false if it shows us the thing otherwise than as it really is.

For ideas are merely mental narrations or accounts of nature. And hence these terms came to be applied metaphorically to lifeless thing., as when we talk about true or false gold, as if the gold presented before us were telling us something about itself that either is in itself or not [The true is not a transcendental term. ]

Therefore those who have held that ’the true’ is a transcendental term or an affection of being are quite wrong. For this term can be applied to thing. themselves only improperly, or if you prefer, figuratively. [The difference between truth and a true idea. ] If you go on to ask what is truth other than a true idea, ask also what is whiteness other than a white body. For the relationship is the same in both cases.

We have already discussed the cause of the true and the cause of the false. So now there remains nothing to be noted, nor would it have been worthwh ile noting even what we have said if writers had not so tied themselves up in trifles like these that they could not then extricate themselves, always looking for a difficulty where there is none.

[What are the properties of truth? Certainty is not in things. ] The properties of truth, or a true idea, are (I) that it is clear and distinct, (2) that it removes all doubt, or, in a word, that it is certain. Those who look for certainty in thing. themselves are making the same mistake as when they look for truth in thing. themselves.

Although we may say that a thing is uncertain, we are figuratively taking the ideatum for the idea. In the same way we also call a thing doubtful, unless per chance in this case by uncertainty we mean contingency, or a thing that causes us uncerta inty or doubt. There is no need to spend more time on these matters, and so we shall proceed to the third term, at the same time explaining what is to be understood by its contrary.

[Good and Bad are only relative tenns. ] A th ing is not said to be either good or bad when considered in isolation, but only in relation to another thing for which it is useful in ga ining what that thing loves, or contrariwise. Thus each single thing can be called good or bad at the same time in different respects. For example, the counsel that Achitophel gave to Absalom is called good in Holy Scripture, but it was very bad for David, being contrived for his death 4 And many other things are good, which are not good for all. Thus salvation is good for men, but neither good nor bad for animals or plants, for which it has no relevance. God indeed is said to be supremely good because he benefits all, by his concurrence preserving the being of each individual, than which nothing is more desirable. But no absolute evil exists, as is self-evident.

[Why some have maintained that there is a metaphysical good. ]

But those who keep seeking some metaphysical good not qualified by any relation are laboring under a misapprehension, in that they are confusing a distinction of reason with a real or modal distinction.

For they are making a distinction between the thing itself and the conatus [striving] to preserve its own being, which every thing possesses, although they do not know what they mean by conatus. For although the thing and its conatus are distinguished by reason, or rather, by words (and this is the main cause of their error), the two are in no way distinct from one another in reality.

[The distinction between things and the conatus by which they endeavor to persevere in their state.] That this may be clearly understood, we shall take an example of a very simple kind. Motion has force to persevere in its own state. Th is force is surely nothing else than motion itself, the fact that the nature of motion is such as it is. For if! say that in this body A there is nothing else than a certain quantity of motion, from this it clearly follows that, as long as I am attending to the body A, I must always say that the body is moving. For if I were to say that it is losing its force of motion, I am necessarily ascribing to it something else beyond what we supposed in the hypothesis, something that is causing it to lose its nature. Now if this reasoning seems rather obscure, then let us grant that this conatus to motion is someth ing other than the very laws and nature of motion. Because, then, you suppose this conatus to be a metaphysical good, this conatus will also necessarily have a conatus to persevere in its own being, and this again another conatus, and so ad infinitum. I cannot imagine anything more absurd than this. Now the reason why they make a distinction between the conatus of a thing and the thing itself is that they feel in themselves a wanting to preserve themselves, and they imagine a similar wanting in each individual thing.

[Whether God can be called good before things were created. ] However, the question is raised as to whether God could be called good before he created things; and it seems to follow from our definition that God did not possess any such attribute because we say that a thing considered in itself alone cannot be called either good or bad. Many will think this absurd, but why I do not know. We attribute to God many attributes of this kind that did not belong to him, except potentially, before things were created, as when he is called creator, judge, merciful, etc. Therefore arguments like this ought not to be a hindrance to us.

[How perfection may be ascribed in a relative way, and how it may be ascribed absolutely. ] Furthermore, just as good and bad are only relative terms, so too is perfection, except when we take perfection to mean the very essence of a thing. It is in this sense that we previously said that God possesses infinite perfection, that is, infinite essence or infinite being.

It is not my intention to go farther into these matters. The rest of what concerns the general part of Metaphysics I believe to be sufficiently well known, and therefore not worthwhile pursuing any farther.