Essence, Existence, Idea, Potency

So that one may clearly grasp what should be understood by these four terms, it is only necessary to reflect upon what we have sa id about uncreated substance or God, to wit:

[Creatures are in God eminently. ]

I. God contains eminently what is to be found formally in created things; that is, God possesses attributes of such a kind Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part I, Chapter 2 lSI that in them are contained in a more eminent way all created things. See Part I Ax. 8 and Cor. I Prop. 1 2.

For example, we clearly conceive extension without any existence, and so, because it has of itself no force to exist, we have demonstrated that it is created by God (last Prop. of Part I .) And because there must be at least as much perfection in the cause as in the effect, it follows that all the perfections of extension are in God. But because we then saw that an extended thing is of its own nature divisible, that is, it contains imperfection, we therefore could not attribute extension to God (Prop. 16 Part I), and so we were compelled to take the view that there is an attribute in God that contains in a more excellent way all the perfections of matter (Schol. Prop. 9 Part I) and that can fulfil the role of matter.

2. God understands himself and all other things, too; that is, he also has in himself all things in the form of thought (Prop. 9 Part I).

3. God is the cause of all things, and he acts from absolute freedom of will. [What Essence is, what Existence is, what Idea is, what Potency is. ] From this, therefore, it can clearly be seen what must be understood by those four things. First, that which is essence is nothing other than the way in which created things are comprehended in the attributes of God. That which is idea refers to the manner in which all things are contained in the idea of God in the form of thought. That which is potency has reference only to the potency of God, whereby from absolute freedom of will he could have created all things not already existing. Finally, that which is existence is the essence of things outside God when considered in itself and is attributed to things after they have been created by God.

[These four are distinguished from one another only in creatures.] From this it is evident that these four are distinguished from one another only in created things, but not at all in God. For we do not conceive God to have been in potency in another thing, and his existence and his intellect are not distinguished from h is essence.

[A reply to certain questions concerning Essence. ] From this we can readily reply to the questions that are commonly raised regarding essence. These questions are as follows: whether essence is distinct from existence; if so, whether it is something different from idea, and if that is the case, whether it has any being outside the intellect.

To this last question we must surely give assent. Now to the first question we reply by making this distinction, that in God essence is not distinct from existence, because the former cannot be conceived without the latter, but that in other things essence differs from existence, seeing that it can be conceived without existence. To the second question we say that a thing that is clearly and distinctly (i.e., truly) conceived outside the intellect is something different from an idea. But then there is the further question as to whether this being outside the intellect is self-generated or whether it is created by God. To this we reply that formal essence is not self-generated nor again is it created-for both of these would presuppose that it is a thing existing in actuality-but it depends on the divine essence alone, in which all things are contained. And so in this sense we agree with those who say that the essences of things are eternal. It could still be asked how we, not yet understanding the nature of God, understand the essences of things, because they depend on the nature of God alone, as we have just said. In reply I say that this arises from the fuct that things are already created. If they had not been created, I would entirely agree that it would be impossible to understand them except after an adequate knowledge of the nature of God, just as it is impossible- indeed, even less possible- to know the nature of the coordinates of a parabola without yet knowing the nature of a parabola.

[Why in his definition of essence the Author has recourse to the attributes of God. ]

The essences of nonexisting modes are comprehended in their substances, and that which is their essence is in their substances.

But we have nevertheless chosen to have recourse to God so as to give a general explanation of the essence of modes and substances. Another reason for this procedure is that the essence of modes has been in their substances only since the creation of the substances, and what we were seeking was the eternal being of essences.

[Why the Author has not reviewed the definitions of others.]

I do not think it is worthwhile to refute those writers whose views differ from ours, nor again to examine their definitions or descriptions of essence and existence; for we would thus be obscuring what is clear.

What can be clearer than our understanding of what essence is and what existence is, seeing that we cannot give the definition of anything without at the same time explaining its essence? [How the distinction between essence and existence is easily learned. ] Finall y, if any philosopher still doubts whether essence is distinguished from existence in created things, he need not toil away over definitions of essence and existence in order to remove that doubt. For if he merely approaches a sculptor or a woodcarver, they will show him how they conceive in set order a nonexistent statue and thereafter bring it into existence for him.