Superphysics Superphysics
Propositions 5-7

The Existence of God

by Spinoza
4 minutes  • 742 words
Table of contents

Proposition 5: The existence of God is known solely from the consideration of his nature

Proof: To say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a thing is the same as to say that it is true of that thing (Def. 9).

But necessary existence is contained in the concept of Cod (Ax. 6). Therefore it is true to say of Cod that there is necessary existence in him, or that he exists "

Scholium From this proposition there follow many important consequences.

On this fact alone- that existence pertains to the nature of God, or that the concept of God involves necessary existence just as the concept of a triangle involves its 3 angles being equal to 2 right angles, or that his existence, just like his essence, is an eternal truth -depends alrnost all knowledge of the attributes of God through which we are brought to love of hirn and to the highest blessedness.

Therefore it is rnuch to be desired that rnankind should corne round to our opinion on this subject.

There are sorne prejudices that prevent this frorn being so easily understood by everyone.33

If anyone, moved by goodwill and by the simple love of truth and his own true advantage, comes to look at the matter closely and to reflect on what is contained in the “Fifth Meditation” and the end of “Replies to the First Set of Objections,” and also on what we say about Eternity in Chapter I Part 2 of our Appendix, he will undoubtedly understand the matter quite clearly and will in no way be able to doubt whether he has an idea of God (which is, of course, the first foundation of hurnan blessedness).

For when he realizes that God is completely different in kind from other things in respect of essence and existence, he will at once see clearly that the idea of God is far different from the ideas of other things. Therefore there is no need to detain the reader any longer on this subject.

Proposition 6: The existence of God is proved a posteriori from the mere fact that the idea of him is in us.

Proof: The objective reality of any of our ideas requires a cause in which that same reality is contained not just objectively but formally or eminently (Ax. 9).

We do have the idea of God (Defs. 2 and 8), and the objective reality of this idea is not contained in us either formally or eminently (Ax. 4), nor can it be contained in anything other than God himself (Def. 8). Therefore this idea of God, which is in us, requires God for its cause, and therefore God exists (Ax. 7) .‘4

Scholium: There are some who deny that they have any idea of God, and yet, as they declare, they worship and love him. And though you were to set before them the definition of God and the attributes of God, you will meet with no more success than if you were to labor to teach a man blind from birth the differences of colors as we see them.

However, except to consider them as a strange type of creature halfway between man and beas� we should pay small heed to their words.

How else, I ask, can we show the idea of some thing than by giving its definition and explaining its attributes?

Because this is what we are doing in the case of the idea of God, there is no reason for us to be concerned over the words of men who deny the idea of God simply on the grounds that they cannot form an image of him in their brain.

Furthermore, we should note that when Descartes quotes Axiom 4 to show that the objective reality of the idea of God is not contained in us either formally or eminently, he takes for granted that everyone knows that he is not an infinite substance, that is, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, etc., and this he is entitled to do.

For he who knows that he thinks, also knows that he doubts many things and that he does not understand everything clearly and distinctly.

Finally, we should note that it also follows clearly from Definition 8 that there cannot be a number of Gods, but only one God, as we clearly demonstrate in Proposition II of this Part, and in Part 2 of our Appendix, Chapter 2.

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