Socartes' Cross-Examination Skills

People delight talking with me because they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom.

• There is amusement in it.

This duty of cross-examining others has been imposed on me by God.

It has been signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever intimated to anyone.

If have been corrupting the youth, those of them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take their revenge.

If they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands.

Now is their time.

I see many of them in the court.

There is:

• Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself
• his son Critobulus, whom I also see
• Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present
• Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes

There are the brothers of several who have associated with me.

There is:

• Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus
• Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages
• Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present
• Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see.

I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech. Let him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him.

Let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce.

Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth.

For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives.

Why should they too support me with their testimony?

Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I have to offer.

Perhaps some people have pleaded mercy from the judges through tears, bringing their children and friends and relatives in court.

• They would be offended at me not doing such things for my life.

To such people, I say: My friend, I am a man of flesh and blood, and not “of wood or stone” as Homer says. have a family and sons:

• 2 young
• 1 adult.

Yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal because it would be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole state.

One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not to demean himself.

Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct!

I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than women.

These things should not be done by those of us who have a reputation.

If they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to condemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city ridiculous, than him who holds his peace.

There seems to be something wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead of informing and convincing him.

For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment.

He has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure.

We should not encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety in that.

Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus.

For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not believing in them. But that is not so—far otherwise.

I do believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers believe in them.

And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.