The Turkey Company (1581-1825)

⁹⁹ The fee for admission into the Turkey Company was formerly:

• £25 for all persons under 26 years old, and
• £50 for all persons above 26 years old.

Only mere merchants could be admitted.

This restriction excluded all shop-keepers and retailers.

By a bylaw, British manufactures could be exported to Turkey only on the company’s ships.

• Those ships always sailed from the expensive port of London.
• This restriction confined the trade to London and its traders.

By another bylaw, the following could not be admitted as a member:

• persons living within 20 miles of London, and
• persons not free of the city.

These 2 restrictions excluded all but the freemen of London.

• The time for the loading and sailing of those ships depended on the directors.
• They could easily fill them with the goods of their own and their friends.
• Others were excluded as making their proposals too late.

This company was a strict and oppressive monopoly.

• Those abuses created the act of the 26th of George 2nd chapter 18.

It reduced the admission fee to £20 for all persons without:

• any age distinction, and
• any restriction to mere merchants or freemen of London.

It granted to all such persons the liberty of:

• exporting permitted British goods from all British ports to any Turkish port,
• importing all permitted Turkish goods from Turkey after:
  • paying general customs duties,
  • paying the particular duties for defraying the company’s costs, and
  • submitting to:
    • the authority of the British ambassador and consuls in Turkey, and
    • the company’s bylaws.

To prevent any oppression by those bylaws, the same act ordained that if 7 company members were aggrieved by any bylaw enacted after this act was passed:

• they can appeal to the Board of Trade and Plantations (now a privy council) provided such appeal was brought within 12 months after the bylaw was enacted, and
• they can bring a like appeal, provided it was within 12 months after the day this act was to take place.

One year may not always be enough to reveal the pernicious tendency of a bylaw to all the members of a big company.

If they discover it, the Board of Trade and the committee of council cannot give them any redress.

The object of most of the bylaws of all regulated companies and all other corporations, is not so much to oppress existing members. Its object is more to discourage others from becoming members. This may be done through:

• a high admission fee and
• many other contrivances.

The constant view of such companies is always:

• to raise their own profit rate as high as they can, and
• to keep the market as understocked with goods as much as possible.

These can only be done:

• by restraining the competition, or
• by discouraging new adventurers from entering the trade.

A fee even of £20 might be insufficient to discourage anyone from entering the Turkey trade with an intention to continue in it. It might be enough to discourage a speculative merchant.

In all trades, the regular established traders, even those not incorporated, naturally combine to raise profits.

• Their profits are most likely to be kept down to their proper level at all times by speculative competition.
• The Turkey trade was somewhat laid open by this act.
  • But it is still very far from being free.

The Turkey Company maintains 1 ambassador and 2-3 consuls.

• Those ministers should be maintained by the state like other public ministers.
• The trade should be laid open to all.
• The taxes levied by the Turkey company might afford a revenue to enable the state to maintain such ministers.

¹⁰⁰ Sir Josiah Child observed that regulated companies frequently supported public ministers.

Those companies never maintained any forts or garrisons in the countries where they traded.

• On the other hand, joint stock companies frequently maintained forts.

In reality, private regulated companies seem more unfit for maintaining forts than joint stock companies.

1. The executives of a regulated company have no interest in the prosperity of the company’s general trade which maintains such forts.

The decay of that general trade may even be advantageous to their own private trade. It would:

• lessen their competitors, and
• enable the executives to buy cheaper and sell dearer.

On the contrary, the executives of a joint stock company only have their share in the profits made on the common stock they manage.

• They have no private business which can interfere with the company’s general business.

Their private interest is connected with:

• the prosperity of the company’s general business, and
• the maintenance of the forts and garrisons necessary for its defence

They are more likely to have that continual and careful attention which that maintenance requires.

2. The executives of a joint stock company always manage a large capital.

They may properly use part of this large capital in building, repairing, and maintaining such forts and garrisons.

But the executives of a private regulated company have no common capital to manage.

• They have no other fund to use for forts and garrisons other than the casual revenue from:
  • the admission fees, and
  • the corporation duties on the company’s business.
• They can seldom have the same ability as joint stock company to maintain such forts and garrisons.

The maintenance of a public minister requires no attention and only a moderate and limited expence.

• It is much more suitable for a private regulated company.