The Sovereign

This formula shows that:

• the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals
• each individual, in making a contract, with himself, is bound in a double capacity

As a member of the Sovereign, he is bound to the individuals. As a member of the State, he is bound to the Sovereign.

The maxim of civil right is that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself.

This does not apply in this case because there is a great difference between:

• incurring an obligation to yourself and
• incurring one to a whole of which you form a part.

Public deliberation is competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign.

This is because of the 2 different capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the opposite reason, bind the Sovereign to itself;

It is consequently against the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot infringe.

Being able to regard itself in only one capacity, it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with himself.

This makes it clear that there neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the people—not even the social contract itself.

This does not mean that the body politic cannot enter into undertakings with others, provided the contract is not infringed by them; for in relation to what is external to it, it becomes a simple being, an individual.

But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.

As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it.

Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.

The Sovereign is formed wholly of the individuals who compose it. His interest is never contrary to theirs.

Consequently, the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members.

It cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is is always what it should be.

This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security that they would fulfil their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity.

In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen.

His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself;

Regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a persona ficta, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject.

The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic.

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.

This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence.

In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.

CHAPTER 8: THE CIVIL STATE

The passage from the wild state to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man by:

• replacing instinct with justice
• giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked

He deprives himself of advantages in the wild.

But he gains in return other great advantages .

He gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses.

Natural liberty is based on his individual strength.

Civil liberty is limited by the general will.

Possession is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier.

Property is founded only on a positive title.