Is Tax Farming Or Commission Better?

THE managing of the revenues by commission is like the conduct of a good father of a family, who collects his own rents himself with economy and order. It:

• allows the prince to press or retard the levy of the taxes, either according to his own wants or to those of his people
• saves the state the immense profits of tax collectors [tax farmers], who impoverish it a thousand ways
• lets the prince prevent the people from being mortified with the sight of sudden fortunes
• lets the public money pass through few hands, go directly to the treasury, and consequently makes a quicker return to the people.
• lets the prince avoid an infinite number of bad laws, extorted from him by the avarice of the collectors who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to posterity.

The moneyed man is always the most powerful. The tax collector renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself. He is not the legislator, but he obliges the legislator to give laws.

It is sometimes useful to farm out a new duty, for there is an art in preventing frauds which mo tives of interest suggest to the farmers, but commissioners never think on.

The manner of levying it being once established by the farmer, it may afterwards be safely entrusted to a commission.

In England, the management of the excise and of the post-office was borrowed from that of tax collectors.

In republics, the state’s revenues are generally managed by commission. The contrary practice was a great defect in the Roman government.

In despotic governments, the people are infinitely happier where this management is established; witness Persia and China. The unhappiest of all are those where the prince farms out his sea-ports and trading cities. The history of monarchies abounds with mischiefs done by the farmers of the revenue.

Incensed at the oppressive extortions of the publicans, Nero formed a magnanimous but impracticable scheme of abolishing all kinds of imposts. He did not think of managing the revenues by commissioners. Instead, he made four edicts:

1. The laws enacted against publicans, which had hitherto been kept secret, should be promulged
2. that they sh ould exact no claims for above a year backward;
3. that there should be a praetor established to determine their pretensions without any formality;
4. that the merchants should pay no duty for their vessels. These were the halcyon days of that emperor.

Chapter 20: The Tax Collectors [Farmers of the Revenues]

The state is ruined when the lucrative profession of a tax farmer becomes a post of honour.

It may do well enough in despotic governments, where this employment is often times exercised by the governors themselves.

But it is improper in a republic. This is because a custom of the like nature destroyed that of Rome.

It is also improper in monarchies. It is the most opposite to the spirit of a monarchy because:

• all the other orders of the state are dissatisfied
• honour loses its whole value
• the gradual and natural means of distinction are no longer respected

Scandalous fortunes were raised in former times. But this was one of the calamities of the Fifty Years War.

• These riches were then considered as ridiculous
• Now we admire them.

Every profession has its particular reward.

• Tax-gathering is wealth.

• Glory and honour fall to the share of that nobility who are sensible of no other h appiness.
• Respect and esteem are for those ministers and magistrates whose whole life is a continued series of labour, and who watch day and night ove r the welfare of the empire.