New Methods of preserving a Conquest

The Mongols, who now govern China, has ordained that every military corps in the provinces, as well as the courts of judicature, should be composed half of Chinese and half Mongols. Their goal is to:

• end the jealousy between the Chinese and Mongols
• prevent the Chinese, the vanquished nation, from falling into despair
• prevent the Mongols, the victors, from growing insolent and proud
• the government from becoming military
• contain the two nations within their duty

This is an amirable policy for monarch that has subdued a large country. It has several good effects:

1. The two nations are a check to one another.
2. They both preserve the civil and military power, and one is not destroyed by the other.
3. The conquering nation may spread itself without being weakened and lost. It is likewise enabled to withstand civil and foreign wars.

The lack of so wise an institution as this has caused the ruin of almost all the conquerors.

Chapter 16= Conquests made by a despotic Prince

WHEN a conquest happens to be vastly large, it supposes a despotic power. And then the army dispersed in the provinces is not sufficient.

There should be always a body of faithful troops nea r the prince, ready to fall instantly upon any part of the empire that may chance to waver. This military corps ought to awe the rest, and to strike t error into those, who, through necessity, have been intrusted with any auth ority in the empire.

The emperor of China has always many Mongols near his person, ready upon all occasions.

In India, Turkey, and Japan, the prince has always a bodyguard, independent of the other regular forces. This particular corps keeps the dispersed troops in awe.

Chapter 17= The same Subject continued.

The countries subdued by a despotic monarch should be held by a vassal. Historians are very lavish of their praises on the generosity of those conquerors who restore d the princes to the throne whom they had vanquished.

Extremely generous, then, were the Romans, who made such a number of kings, in order to have instruments of slavery. A proceeding of that kind is absolutely necessary. If the conqueror intends to preserve the country which he has subdued, neither the governors he sen ds will be able to contain the subjects within duty, nor he himself the gov ernors.

He will be obliged to strip his ancient patrimony of troops in orde r to secure his new dominions. The miseries of each nation will be common t o both; civil broils will spread themselves from one to the other.

On the contrary, if the conqueror restores the legitimate prince to the throne, he will of course have an ally; by the junction of whose forces his own power will be augmented. We have a recent instance of this in Shah Nadir, who conquered the Mogul, seized his treasures, and lef t him in possession of Indostan.