The Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements

The judgements of subject to predicate is from a relation created in 2 ways:

1. The predicate B belongs to the subject A

This is passive-thinking [analytical judgement] and is explicative.

Passive-thinking happens when the predicate is connected to the subject through identity.

“All bodies occupy space” is passive-thinking because:

• I do not need to go beyond the idea of body to find extension connected with it.
• I merely need to become conscious of the many properties in that idea-subject to discover this predicate in it.

2. The predicate B lies completely out of the subject A but is connected with it

This is active-connective-thinking [synthetical judgement] and is augmentative.

These are not connected by identity.

In “All bodies are heavy” the predicate is something totally different from the idea of a body.

The addition of the predicate makes it require active-connective-thinking. [because heavy is not inherent in a body, but space is]

Judgements of experience, as such, are always of active-thinking.

Passive-thinking cannot be groundied on experience.

This is because in passive-thinking, I do not need to go out of the ideas in my mind.

“Bodies occupy space” is not a sense-based judgement. It is a within-the-mind proposition.

This is because, I already have all the ideas needed for that idea.*

I only need to extract the predicate or sub ideas from the main idea. I could never do this from experience.

My main idea of body does not have inherently the sub ideas of weight. The idea of weight in a body is an effect of experience which lets me add more ideas to the idea of a body.

This is from observing that bodies are heavy.

I can add ideas of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc.

This adds to my knowledge.

From this, I can make the main idea: “All bodies are heavy.”

But for active-connective-thinking within-the-mind, such aid is entirely wanting.

I can think of idea B being connected to idea A. But what more can I say about them?

For example, “Everything that happens has a cause.”

In the idea “something that happens” I think an existence from which I can derive ideas from passive-thinking.

But the active-connective-thinking of a cause lies quite out of the above idea. The idea of cause indicates something entirely different from “that which happens,” and is consequently not contained in that idea [of effect].

The general idea of effect [that which happens] is entirely different from effect.

That cause is unknown, but is connected to the idea of effect.

The principle in “Everything that happens has a cause” connects cause with effect [everything] universally and relationally.

Therefore, it is completely within-the-mind and from pure conceptions.*

The aim of our speculative within-the-mind knowledge depends on such active-thinking augmentative propositions.

Passive-thinking judgements are highly important and necessary.

But its goal is only to arrive at that clearness of ideas needed for a sure and extended synthesis of ideas.