Aph. 139.* Soul is something else than the body, &c.

Aph. 140.* Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible].

Aph. 141.* [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

Aph. 142.* And [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature].

Aph. 143.* [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer.

Aph. 144.* [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].

Aph. 145.* Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

Aph. 146.* It [Soul,] has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality.

Aph. 147.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence or qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary].

Aph. 148.* [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

Aph. 149.* From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

Aph. 150.* [The Vedántís say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

Aph. 151.* The investment is different, [according to the Vedántís], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

Aph. 152.* Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sánkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul p. 170 supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].

Aph. 153.* Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].

Aph. 155.* Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3

Aph. 156.* No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

Aph. 157.* Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense].

Aph. 158.* Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

Aph. 159.* As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

Aph. 160.* It [Soul,] is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].3

Aph. 161.* It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation].

Aph. 162.* [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.5

Aph. 163.* And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike].

Aph. 164.* [Soul’s fancy of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature],1 from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.