Aph. 96.* The governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron].

Aph. 97.* In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

Aph. 98.* The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authorative evidence].

Aph. 99.* The internal organ,1 through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].

Aph. 100.* The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.

Aph. 101.* Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence, is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

Aph. 102.* Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the decaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

Aph. 103.* The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

Aph. 104.* Experience [whether of pain or pleasure, ends with the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

Aph. 105.* The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c.

Aph. 106.* Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].

Aph. 107.* And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

Aph. 108.* [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].

Aph. 109.* Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility.

Aph. 110.* [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

Aph. 112.* Still, since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

Aph. 113.* Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

Aph. 114.* The production of what is no entity, as a man’s horn, does not take place.

Aph. 115.* Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

Aph. 116.* Because everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the case] if materials could be dispensed with].

Aph. 117.* Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it].

Aph. 118.* And because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product].

Aph. 119.* If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that’s becoming which already is [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

Aph. 120.* No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term ‘production’] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not].

Aph. 121.* Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].

Aph. 122.* Because they seek each other reciprocally,3 as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity].

Aph. 123.* Or, [at all events, our theory of ‘manifestation’ is as] blameless as [your theory of] ‘production.’

Aph. 124.* [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

Aph. 125.* There is the establishment of these [twenty-four ‘Qualities’ of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

Aph. 126.* Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property].

Aph. 127.* The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves].

Aph. 128.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ.

Aph. 129.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like.

Aph. 130.* Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one].

Aph. 131.* Because they conform [to Nature].

Aph. 132.* And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

Aph. 133.* On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

Aph. 134.* If they were other than these two they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides soul and Nature].

Aph. 135.* The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it.

Aph. 136.* The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect. [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

Aph. 137.* There is no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

Aph. 138.* [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] ‘merit,’ there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].