Book 1

Aph. 56.* Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].2

Aph. 56.* The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.

Aph. 57.* Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].

Aph. 58.* It is merely verbal, and not a reality1 [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul].

Aph. 59.* Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by argument; as that of a person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

Aph. 60.* The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference; as that of fire [when not directly perceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c.

Aph. 61.* Nature (prakṛiti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankára); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five.

Aph. 62.* [The knowledge of the existence] of the five ‘Subtile Elements’ is [by inference,] from the ‘Gross Elements.’

Aph. 63.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,] from the external and internal p. 75 [organs], and from these [‘Subtile Elements,’ mentioned in Aph. 62].

Aph. 64.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63].

Aph. 65.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from that [‘Intellect,’ § 64].

Aph. 66.* [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

Aph. 67.* Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.3

Aph. 69.* Alike, in respect of Nature, [and of both Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].2

Aph. 70.* There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions.

Aph. 71.* The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called ’the Great one,’ is Mind.

Aph. 72.* ‘Self-consciousness’ is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

Aph. 73.* To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness].

Aph. 74.* Moreover, mediately, through that [i.e., the ‘Great one’ (§ 71)] the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause [of all products]; as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.].

Aph. 75.* While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul,] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature].

Aph. 76.* What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things].

Aph. 77.* And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature].

Aph. 78.* A thing is not made out of nothing.

Aph. 79.* It [the world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

Aph. 80.* If it [the substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]?

Aph. 81.* No; for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product].

Aph. 82.* The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births.

Aph. 83.* There is Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e. Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.

Aph. 84.* From pain [occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water.

Aph. 85.* [Liberation cannot arise from acts]; because whether the end be something desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory].

Aph. 86.* Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute:3 there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth].

Aph. 87.* The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is ‘right notion’ (pramá). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given ‘right notion’], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramáṉa)].

Aph. 88.* Proof is of three kinds:1 there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs].

Aph. 89.* Perception (pratyakska) is that discernment which, being in3 conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

Aph. 90.* It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga]; because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception.

Aph. 91.* Or, there is no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.4

Aph. 92.* [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is not proved that there is a Lord (íśwara).

Aph. 93.* [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the ‘Lord,’] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other.

Aph. 94.* [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient.

Aph. 95.* [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the ‘Lord’ are either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized3 [deities of the Hindu pantheon].4