The differences of opinion on the Caliphate

24. The differences of Muslim opinion concerning the laws and conditions governing the caliphate

The institution called “the Caliphate” or “imamate” substitutes for Muhammad in as much as it serves, like him, to preserve the religion and to exercise (political) leadership of the world.

Its leader is “the caliph” or “the imam.” In later times, he has also been called “the sultan,” when there were numerous (claimants to the position) or when, in view of the distances (separating the different regions) and in disregard of the conditions governing the institution, people were forced to render the oath of allegiance to anybody who seized power.

The name “imam” is derived from the comparison (of the caliph) with the leader (imam) of prayer, since (the caliph) is followed and taken as a model like the prayer leader. Therefore the caliphate is called the “great imamate.”

The name “caliph” (khalifah) is given to the caliph, because he “represents” (kh-l f) the Prophet in Islam.

One uses “caliph” alone, or “caliph of the Messenger of God.” There is a difference of opinion concerning the use of “caliph of God.”

Some consider (this expression) permissible as derived from the general “caliphate” (representation of God) of all the descendants of Adam, implied in the verse of the Qur’an, “I am making on earth a caliph,” and the verse, “He made you caliphs on earth.” 212

But, in general, it is not considered permissible to use (the expression “caliph of God”), since the verse quoted has no reference to it (in connection with the caliphate in the specific sense of the term).

Abu Bakr forbade the use (of the expression “caliph of God”) when he was thus addressed. He said, “I am not the caliph of God, but the caliph (representative, successor) of the Messenger of God.”

One can have a “caliph” (representative, successor) of someone who is absent, but not of someone who is present (as God always is).

The position of imam is a necessary one. The consensus of the men around Muhammad and the men of the second generation shows that (the imamate) is necessary according to the religious law.

At the death of the Prophet, the men around him proceeded to render the oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr and to entrust him with the supervision of their affairs. Never were the people left in a state of anarchy. This was so by general consensus, which proves that the position of imam is a necessary one.

Some people think that the necessity of the imamate is rational and that the consensus which happens to exist merely confirms the authority of the intellect in this respect. As they say, what makes (the position of imam) intellectually (rationally) necessary is the need of human beings for social organization and the impossibility of their living and existing by themselves. One of the necessary consequences of social organization is disagreement, because of the pressure of cross-purposes.

As long as there is no ruler who exercises a restraining influence, this (disagreement) leads to trouble which, in turn, may lead to the destruction and uprooting of mankind. Now, the preservation of the (human) species is one of the necessary intentions of the religious law.This very idea is the one the philosophers had in mind when they considered prophecy as something (intellectually) necessary for mankind.

They are wrong.

One of its premises is that the restraining influence comes into being only through a religious law from God, to which the mass submits as a matter of belief and religious creed. This premise is not acceptable. The restraining influence comes into being as the result of the impetus of royal authority and the forcefulness of the mighty, even if there is no religious law.

This was the case among the Magians 214 and other nations who had no scriptures and had not been reached by a prophetic mission. Or, we might say (against the alleged rational necessity of the caliphate)= In order to remove disagreement, it is sufficient that every individual should know that injustice is forbidden him by the authority of the intellect.

Then, their claim that the removal of disagreement takes place only through the existence of the religious law in one case, and the position of the imam in another case, is not correct.

Disagreement may be removed as well through the existence of powerful leaders, or through the people refraining from disagreement and mutual injustice, as through the position of the imam. Thus, the intellectual proof based upon that premise does not stand up.

This shows that the necessity of (the position of imam) is indicated by the religious law, that is, by general consensus, as we have stated before.

Some people, such as the Mu’tazilah al-Asamm and certain Kharijites, think that the position of imam is not necessary at all, neither according to the intellect nor according to the religious law. They think that it is necessary only to observe the religious laws.

When Muslims agree upon (the practice of) justice and observance of the divine laws, no imam is needed, and the position of imam is not necessary. Those (who so argue) are refuted by the general consensus.

They believed so because they tried to escape the royal authority and its overbearing, domineering, and worldly ways. They had seen that the religious law was full of censure and blame for such things and for the people who practiced them, and that it encouraged the desire to abolish them.

The religious law does not censure royal authority as such and does not forbid its exercise. It merely censures the evils resulting from it, such as tyranny, injustice, and pleasure-seeking.

It praises justice, fairness, the fulfillment of religious duties, and the defense of the religion. It states that these things will of necessity find their reward (in the other world).

Both the former and the latter come with royal authority.

Thus, censure attaches to royal authority only on account of some of its qualities and conditions, not others. (The religious law) does not censure royal authority as such, nor does it seek to suppress it entirely. It also censures concupiscence and wrathfulness 216 in responsible persons, but it does not want to see either of these qualities relinquished altogether, because necessity calls for their existence.

It merely wants to see that proper use is made of them. 217 David and Solomon possessed royal authority such as no one else ever possessed, yet they were divine prophets and belonged, in God’s eyes, among the noblest human beings (that ever existed).218

Furthermore, we say to them= The (attempt to) dispense with royal authority by (assuming) that the institution (of the imamate) is not necessary, does not help you at all. You agree that observance of the religious laws is a necessary thing. Now, that is achieved only through group feeling and power, and group feeling, by its very nature, requires (the existence of) royal authority.

Thus, there will be royal authority, even if no imam is set up. Now, that is just what you (wanted to) dispense with.If it has been established that the institution (of the imamate) is necessary by general consensus, (it must be added that the institution of the imamate) is a community duty 219 and is left to the discretion of all competent Muslims. 220

It is their obligation to see to it that (the imamate) is set up, and everybody has to obey (the imam) in accordance with the verse of the Qur’an, “Obey God, and obey the Messenger and the people in authority among you.” 221

It is not possible to appoint two men to the position (of imam) at the same time. Religious scholars generally are of this opinion, on the basis of certain traditions. Those traditions are found in the book, “On Leadership (imarah),” in the Sahih by Muslim.223 They expressly indicate that this is so.

Others hold that (the prohibition against two imams) applies only to two imams in one locality, or where they would be close to each other. When there are great distances and the imam is unable to control the farther region, it is permissible to set up another imam there to take care of public interests.

Among the famous authorities who are reported to have held this opinion is Professor Abu Ishaq al-Isfariyini,224 the leading speculative theologian. The Imam al-Haramayn 225 also showed himself inclined toward it in his Kitab al-Irshad. The opinions of the Spaniards and Maghribis often make it evident that they, too, were inclined toward it.

The numerous religious scholars in Spain rendered the oath of allegiance to the Umayyads and gave the Umayyad ‘Abd-ar-Rahman anNasir and his descendants the title of Commander of the Faithful. This title is characteristic of the caliphate, as we shall mention 2 26 Somewhat later, the Almohads in the Maghrib did the same thing.

Some scholars have rejected (the possibility of more than one imam) with reference to the general consensus. This is no evident (proof), for if there existed a general consensus on the point, neither Professor Abfi Ishaq nor the Imam al-Haramayn would have opposed it. They knew better (than any one else) what the consensus meant. Indeed, the imam al-Mazari 227 and an-Nawawi 228 have been refuted 229 on the basis of the afore-mentioned evident sense of the traditions (in Muslim’s Sahih).

Certain more recent scholars have occasionally argued in favor of (a single imam) with the argument of mutual antagonism 230 referred to by the divine revelation in the verse, “If there were other gods except God in the two (heaven and earth), they (heaven and earth) would have been destroyed.” 231

However, nothing of relevance in this connection can be deduced from the verse, because its (force as an) argument is in the field of the intellect. God called our attention to (the verse), so that we might have a rational proof of the oneness of God in which we are enjoined to believe, and so that, as a result, (this dogma) might be more firmly grounded.

On the other hand, what we want to find out in connection with the imamate is why it is forbidden to set up two imams (at the same time), and that is something that belongs to the field of religious law and religious obligations (rather than to the field of the intellect).

Thus, the (verse of the Qur’an quoted) cannot be used for any deduction (in this connection), unless we establish it as belonging to the field of the religious law by the addition of another premise, namely, that quite generally from an increase in number there results corruption, and we are to keep away from anything that may lead to corruption. Then, (the verse) can be used for deductions in the field of religious law. And God knows better.