The Esteem For Natural Abilities

Natural abilities are esteemed principally because of their tendency to be useful to the person who has them.

It is impossible to execute any design successfully if it is not conducted with prudence and discretion.

The goodness of our intentions alone will not give us happiness in our enterprises.

Men are superior to animals principally by the superiority of their reason. The differences in the faculty of reason also set the differences between one man and another. All the advantages of art are owing to human reason. The most considerable of these advantages must fall to the prudent and sagacious.

Which is more valuable?

• a quick or a slow apprehension?
• a clear head or a copious invention?
• a profound genius or a sure judgment?
• a character that can penetrate into a subject but perform nothing on study? or one which must work everything out by dint of application?

What character or understanding is more excellent than another?

We cannot answer these questions without considering which of those qualities:

• capacitates a man for the world best, and

• carries him farthest in any of his undertakings.

  There are many other qualities of the mind whose merit is derived from the same origin, industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy, with other virtues. These virtues: will be easy to recollect, and are esteemed valuable only because of their advantage in life. It is the same case with temperance, frugality, economy, resolution. On the other hand, prodigality, luxury, irresolution, uncertainty are vicious merely because they ruin us and incapacitate us for business and action.

  Wisdom and good-sense are valued because they are useful to the person who has them. Wit and eloquence are valued because they are immediately agreeable to others. On the other hand, good humour is loved and esteemed because it is immediately agreeable to the person himself. The conversation of a man of wit is very satisfactory. A cheerful good-humoured companion diffuses a joy over his friends, from a sympathy with his gaiety. These qualities are agreeable. They naturally: beget love and esteem, and answer to all the characters of virtue.

  It is often difficult to tell what renders: one man’s conversation so agreeable and entertaining, and another’s so insipid and distasteful. Conversation is a transcript of the mind as well as books. The same qualities which render the one valuable must give us an esteem for the other. Generally, a man’s merit from his conversation arises only from the pleasure it conveys.

  Cleanliness is also a virtue, since it naturally: renders us agreeable to others, and is a very considerable source of love and affection. Uncleanliness is a fault. Faults are nothing but smaller vices. This fault originates only from the uneasy sensation it excites in others. In this trivial instance, we can discover the origin of the moral distinction of vice and virtue in other instances.

  Besides those qualities which render a person lovely or valuable, there is also a certain je-ne-sais-quoi [indescribable quality] of agreeable and handsome, that has the same effect. In this case, as with wit and eloquence, we must have recourse to a certain sense which: acts without reflection, and does not regard the tendencies of qualities and characters. Some moralists account for all the sentiments of virtue by this sense. Their hypothesis is very plausible. Only a particular enquiry can prefer any other hypothesis. Qualities are approved of in proportion to their resulting advantage when we find that: all virtues have advantageous tendencies, and these tendencies are alone sufficient to give a strong sentiment of approbation.

  A quality’s decorum or indecorum with regard to the age, character, or station, also contributes to its praise or blame. This decorum depends on experience. Men usually lose their levity as they advance in years. Such a degree of gravity, therefore, and such years, are connected together in our thoughts. When we observe them separated in any person’s character, a violence is imposed on our imagination and is disagreeable.

  The memory is the soul’s faculty which: is of the least consequence to the character, has the least virtue or vice in its several degrees, and admits of a great variety of degrees. We commonly do not notice the memory’s variations unless it: rises to surprise us, or sinks to affect the judgment. We do not mention its variations to receive praise or dispraise from anyone. Having a good memory is so far from being a virtue. Men generally: complain of a bad memory, and sacrifice memory to the praise of genius and judgment to persuade the world that what they say is entirely of their own invention. It is difficult to say why the faculty of recalling past ideas truthfully and clearly, should not have as much merit as the faculty of placing our present ideas to form true propositions and opinions. The reason must be that the memory: is exerted without any sensation of pleasure or pain, and in all its middling degrees, it serves almost equally well in business and affairs. But the smallest variations in the judgment are sensibly felt in their consequences. Judgment is never exerted in any eminent degree without an extraordinary delight and satisfaction. The sympathy with this utility and pleasure bestows a merit on the understanding. The absence of sympathy makes us consider the memory as a faculty very indifferent to blame or praise.

  One source of the esteem and affection for natural abilities, is derived from the importance they bestow on the person who has them. He becomes of greater consequence in life. His resolutions and actions affect more people. His friendship and enmity are of moment. Whoever is elevated in this way above the rest of mankind, must excite the sentiments of esteem and approbation in us. Important things: engage our attention, fix our thought, and are contemplated with satisfaction. The histories of kingdoms are more interesting than domestic stories. The histories of great empires more interesting than those of small cities and principalities. The histories of wars and revolutions are more interesting than those of peace and order. We sympathize with the persons that suffer in all the sentiments from their fortunes. The mind is occupied by: the multitude of the objects, and the strong passions that display themselves. The mind’s occupation or agitation is commonly agreeable and amusing. The same theory accounts for the esteem and regard we pay to men of extraordinary parts and abilities. The good and bad of many are connected with the actions of extraordinary men. Whatever they undertake: is important, and challenges our attention. Nothing is to be over-looked and despised, that regards them. Anyone who can excite these sentiments, soon acquires our esteem, unless other circumstances of his character render him odious and disagreeable.