Goodness And Benevolence

The Virtuous Motive

We have explained the origin of praise and approbation in everything we call great in human affections.
We now:
    give an account of their goodness, and
    show from where its merit is derived.

After we have gained a competent knowledge of human affairs and have learned the proportion they bear to passion, we perceive that men’s generosity: is very limited, and seldom extends beyond their friends and family or beyond their native country at most. We therefore do not expect any impossibilities from a man. Instead, we confine our view to that narrow circle to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character and love him through a sympathy with the sentiments of those more connected with him. We are quickly obliged to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind. Because of the perpetual contradictions we meet in society and conversation from persons that: are not placed in the same situation, and do not have the same interest with ourselves. Our sentiments only concur with those of others when we consider the tendency of the person’s passion to the advantage or harm of those connected with him. This advantage or harm is often very remote from ourselves. Yet it: is sometimes very near us interests us strongly by sympathy. We readily extend this concern to other resembling cases. When these are very remote: our sympathy is proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame is fainter and more doubtful. This is the same as our judgments on external bodies. All objects seem to become smaller by their distance. The appearance of objects is the original standard we judge them by. But we do not say that they actually get smaller by the distance. We correct the appearance by reflection and arrive at a more constant and established judgment on them. Similarly, sympathy is much fainter than our concern for ourselves. A sympathy with persons remote from us is much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous. But we neglect all these differences in our calm judgments on people’s characters. We often change our situation in this ourselves. We meet persons everyday who are in a different situation from ourselves, They could never converse with us on any reasonable terms if we remain constantly in that situation and point of view peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore makes us form some general inalterable standard, by which we judge of characters and manners. The heart does not always: take part with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them. But those notions: are sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.

From these principles we may easily account for that merit commonly ascribed to qualities which form the character of good and benevolent:
    Generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality, etc.
A propensity to the tender passions:
    makes a man agreeable and useful in life, and
    gives a just direction to all his other qualities, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society.
When courage and ambition are not regulated by benevolence, they are fit only to make a tyrant and robber.
    The same is true of judgment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind.
    They are indifferent in themselves to the interests of society.
    They have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, according as they are directed by these other passions.

Love is immediately agreeable to the person actuated by it.
    Hatred is immediately disagreeable.
This is why we:
    praise all the passions that have love, and
    blame all the passions that have hatred.
We are infinitely touched with a tender sentiment, as well as with a great one.
    Our conception of it naturally causes us tears.
    We cannot refrain giving a loose to the same tenderness to the person who exerts it.
To me, all this seems proof that our approbation in those cases has a different origin from the prospect of utility and advantage to ourselves or others.
    People naturally approve of the character most like their own, without reflection.
The mild and tender man forms a notion of the most perfect virtue by mixing more of benevolence and humanity in it, than a courageous and enterprising man.
    The enterprising man naturally looks on a certain elevation of mind as the most accomplished character.
    This proceeds from an immediate sympathy which men have with characters similar to their own.
        They enter with more warmth into such sentiments.
        They more sensibly feel the pleasure arising from them.

Remarkably, nothing touches a man of humanity more than extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship, when a person:
    is attentive to the smallest concerns of his friend, and
    is willing to sacrifice his own most considerable interest for them.
Such delicacies have little influence on society, because they make us regard the greatest trifles.
    But they are the more engaging, the more minute the concern is.
    They are a proof of the highest merit in anyone capable of them.
The passions are so contagious.
    They pass with the greatest facility from one person to another.
    They produce correspondent movements in all human breasts.
Where friendship appears in very signal instances, my heart:
    catches the same passion, and
    is warmed by those warm sentiments that display themselves before me.
Such agreeable movements must give me an affection to everyone that excites them.
    This is the case with everything agreeable in any person.
The transition from pleasure to love is easy.
    But the transition must here be easier, since:
        love itself is excited by sympathy, and
        there is nothing required but to change the object.

Hence the peculiar merit of benevolence in all its shapes and appearances.
    Even its weaknesses are virtuous and amiable.
A person who had an excessive grief for the loss of a friend, would be esteemed.
    His tenderness bestows a merit on his melancholy, as it does a pleasure.

However, we should not think that all the angry passions are vicious.
    There is a certain indulgence due to human nature in this respect.
Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitutions.
    Sometimes, their lack may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility.
    If they appear a little, we:
        excuse them because they are natural, and
        even applaud them because they are inferior to what most of mankind has.

When these angry passions rise to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices.
    All our pity and concern for the miserable sufferers targetted by anger:
        turns against the angry person, and
        produces a strong hatred for him.
    Even when the vice of inhumanity is not this extreme, our sentiments on it are very much influenced by reflecting on the harm it causes.
Generally, if we can find any quality in a person rendering him incommodious to those who live with him, we always allow it to be a fault or blemish.
    On the other hand, when we enumerate anyone's good qualities, we always mention the parts of his character which render him:
        a safe companio,
        an easy friend,
        a gentle master,
        an agreeable husband, or
        an indulgent father.
    We consider him with all his relations in society.
    We love or hate him according to how he affects those close to him.
It is a most certain rule that a person's character must be perfect if we wish to be related to him.
    His character is entirely perfect if he also wants to be related to others.
    This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue.