The Obligation Of Promises Is An Invention For The Interest Of Society

The knowledge of the observance of promises is not esteemed superior to the capacity of human nature, however savage and uncultivated.
    Only a very little practice of the world is needed to make us see these consequences and advantages.
    Every mortal discovers them from the shortest experience of society.
When each individual perceives the same sense of interest in all his fellows, he immediately performs his part of any contract to be assured that they will not be lacking in theirs.
By concert, all of them:
    enter into a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and
    agree to be true to their word.
The only thing needed to form this convention is for everyone to:
    have a sense of interest in the faithful fulfilling of engagements, and
    express that sense to the other members of society.
This immediately causes that interest to operate on them.
    Interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises.

Afterwards, a sentiment of morals:
    concurs with interest, and
    becomes a new obligation on mankind.
This sentiment of morality in the performance of promises, arises from the same principles as the sentiment in the abstinence from the property of others.
Public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians, have the same effect in both cases.
    We surmount or elude the difficulties in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises.
For instance, the expression of a resolution is commonly not obligatory.
    We cannot readily conceive how the use of certain words should be able to cause any material difference.
    Here, we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing an obligation.
    We suppose the morality to depend on this.
But there is no such act of the mind.
    Consequently, promises impose no natural obligation.

To confirm this, we may subjoin some other reflections on that will which:
    enters into a promise, and
    causes its obligation.
The will alone is never supposed to cause the obligation.
    It must be expressed by words or signs to impose a tie on any man.
    The expression becomes:
        subservient to the will, and
        the principal part of the promise.
A man will not be less bound by his word even if he:
    secretly gives a different direction to his intention, and
    withholds himself from:
        a resolution, and
        willing an obligation.
On most occasions, the expression makes the whole promise.
    Yet it does not always do so.
    One uses any expression which he:
        does not know the meaning of, and
        uses without any intention of binding himself.
    He would not lie under any obligation of performance even if he:
        knows its meaning, and
        uses it in jest only with signs showing he has no serious intention of binding himself.
    But it is necessary that the words be a perfect expression of the will, without any contrary signs.
But a man is not bound by his verbal promise if we accept it knowing that he intends to deceive us, from certain signs.
    We must limit this conclusion to cases where the signs are different from those of deceit.
All these contradictions are easily accounted for, if the obligation of promises is merely a human invention for the convenience of society.
    It will never be explained if it were something real and natural, arising from any action of the mind or body.

A promise is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations imagined.
    It may even be compared to transubstantiation or holy orders because every new promise imposes a new obligation of morality on the person who promises.
        This new obligation arises from his will.
        (Holy orders are supposed to produce the indelible character.
        In other respects they are only a legal qualification.)
    In holy orders, certain words, with a certain intention, entirely changes the nature of an external object and even of a human nature.
Promises and holy orders are so similar.
    But they differ widely in other particulars.
    This difference is a strong proof of the difference of their origins.
The obligation of promises is an invention for the interest of society.
    It is warped into as many different forms as that interest requires.
    It even runs into direct contradictions, rather than lose sight of its object.
Holy orders are monstrous doctrines which are mere priestly inventions.
    They have no public interest in view.
    They are less disturbed in their progress by new obstacles.
    After the initial absurdity, they follow reason and good sense more directly.
Theologians clearly perceived that the external form of words, being mere sounds, require an intention to make them effective.
    This intention is then considered as a requisite circumstance.
    Its absence must equally prevent the effect, whether:
        avowed or concealed,
        sincere or deceitful.
    Accordingly, theologians have commonly determined that the priest's intention makes the sacrament.
        He is highly criminal in himself if he secretly withdraws his intention.
        But he still destroys the baptism, communion, or holy orders.
The terrible consequences of this doctrine did not hinder its establishment.
    Unlike the inconvenience of a similar doctrine on promises, which have prevented that doctrine from establishing itself.
People are always more concerned about the present life than the future.
    People tend to think that the smallest evil in the present life is more important than the greatest evil in the future life.

We may draw the same conclusion on the origin of promises, from the force:
    which invalidates all contracts, and
    which frees us from their obligation.
Such a principle is a proof that promises have no natural obligation.
    Promises are mere artificial contrivances for the convenience and advantage of society.
Force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope or fear, which may induce us to:
    engage our word, and
    lay ourselves under any obligation.
A dangerously wounded man who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him, would certainly be bound to pay.
    The case is not much different from one who promises a sum to a robber.
    These cases produce a great difference in our moral sentiments, if these sentiments were not built entirely on public interest and convenience.