Rules For The Stability Of Possession

The rule of the assignment of property to the present possessor is natural and useful.
    But its usefulness does not extend beyond the initial formation of society.
    Always assigning property to its present possessor is most pernicious, because it:
        prevents restitution, and
        authorizes and rewards every injustice.
Therefore, we must seek for some other circumstance that may give rise to property after society is established.
    Four circumstances are most considerable:
        Occupation
        Prescription
        Accession
        Succession
We shall briefly examine each of these, beginning with Occupation.

The possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain.
    This is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society.
    It is why people restrain themselves by the rules of justice and equity by universal agreement, express or tacit.
The misery of the condition preceding this restraint, is why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible.
    This easily explains why we annex the idea of property to the first possession.
People are unwilling to:
    leave property in suspense even for the shortest time, or
    open the smallest door to violence and disorder.
The first possession always engages the attention most.
    If we neglected it, there would be no reason to assign property to any succeeding possession.16

Footnote 16:

Some philosophers account for the right of occupation, by saying:
    that everyone has a property in his own labour, and
    that when he joins that labour to anything, it gives him the property of the whole.
But:
    There are several kinds of occupation where we cannot join our labour to the object we acquire.
        As when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle on it.
    We gain ownership of such objects through accession or by owning them beforehand.
        This is circular reasoning.
    We can only join our labour to anything in a figurative sense.
        We only alter it by our labour.
        This forms a relation between us and the object.
        From this arises the property according to the preceding principles.

The Definition Of Possession

We must exactly determine what possession means.
    This is not easy as first imagined.
We possess anything when:
    we immediately touch it, and
    we are so situated with respect to it, as to have it in our power to:
        use it, and
        move, alter, or destroy it according to our present pleasure or advantage.
This relation is a species of cause and effect.
Property is nothing but a stable possession derived from the rules of justice or the conventions of men.
    It is the same kind of relation.
But the power of using any object becomes certain according to the probability of the interruptions we meet with.
    This probability may increase by insensible degrees.
    In many cases, it is impossible to determine when possession begins or ends.
There is no standard by which we can decide such controversies.
    A wild boar that falls into our snares is deemed to be in our possession, if it is impossible for him to escape.
    But what do we mean by impossible?
    How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability?
    How do we distinguish that exactly from a probability?
Mark the precise limits of the one and the other.
    Show the standard by which we decide all disputes that may arise on this subject.17

Footnote 17:

We can never find a solution to these difficulties if we look in reason and public interest.
If we look for a solution in the imagination, the qualities which operate on it run so insensibly and gradually into each other, that it is impossible to give them any precise bounds or termination.
These difficulties increase when we consider:
    that our judgment changes very sensibly according to the subject, and
    that the same power and proximity is deemed possession in one case, but will not be so in another.
A person who has exhausted himself hunting a hare, would see it as an injustice for another person to rush in and seize his prey.
    But the person who advances to pluck an apple hanging within his reach, cannot complain if a more alert person passes him and takes it.
The natural mobility of the hare and the effect of industry forms a strong relation with the hunter.
    This relation is lacking in the case of the man and the apple.

Here, a certain and infallible power of enjoyment, without touch or some other sensible relation, often does not produce property.
    A sensible relation, without any present power, is sometimes enough to give a title to any object.
The sight of a thing is seldom a considerable relation.
    It is only considerable when the object is hidden or very obscure.
    In such a case, the view alone conveys a property according to the maxim, that even a whole continent belongs to the nation which first discovered it.
However, it is remarkable that in the case of discovery and possession, the first discoverer and possessor must join an intention of rendering himself as the proprietor, to the relation.
    Otherwise the relation will not have its effect.
    This is because the connection in our fancy between the property and the relation is not so great.
        It requires to be helped by such an intention.
From all these circumstances, it is easy to see how perplexed many questions may become on the acquisition of property by occupation.
The least effort of thought may present us with instances which do not have any reasonable decision.
    An example is the following one met by almost every writer on the laws of nature.
        Two Greek colonies in search of new feats, were informed that a nearby city was deserted by its inhabitants.
        To verify this report, they dispatched two messengers, one from each colony.
        They find that the information was true.
        They begin a race to take possession of the city for his countrymen.
        One of the messengers, finding that he was not an equal match for the other, launched his spear at the city's gates.
        He was fortunate enough to fix it there before the arrival of his companion.
        This created a dispute between the two colonies: Which of them was the proprietor of the empty city?
    This dispute still remains among philosophers.
    I find the dispute impossible to be decided because the whole question hangs on the fancy.
        In this case, the fancy does not have any precise standard to give a sentence.
        If these two persons were simply colony members and not messengers, their actions would not have been of any consequence.
            Since their relation to the colonies would have been weak.
        They only ran to the city's gates instead of the walls because the gates are the most obvious and remarkable part.
            It satisfies the fancy best in taking them for the whole.
            We find this from poets who frequently draw the images and metaphors of cities from their gates.
        We may also consider that the touch or contact of the one messenger is not possession, no more than the piercing the gates with a spear.
            Those only form a relation.
            There is a relation equally obvious in the other case, though not of equal force.
    I leave it to a wiser person to decide:
        which of these relations conveys a right and property, or
        whether any of them is sufficient for that effect.

But such disputes may arise concerning:
    the real existence of property and possession, and
    their extent.
These disputes:
    are often susceptible of no decision, or
    can only be decided by the imagination.
A person who lands on a small deserted island is deemed its possessor from the very beginning.
    He acquires the property of the whole because the object is:
        bounded and circumscribed in the fancy, and
        proportioned to the new possessor.
The same person landing on a deserted island as large as Great Britain, extends his property no farther than his immediate possession.
    But colonizers are esteemed as the proprietors of the whole island from the time of their disembarkation.